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ABSTRACT 
Distributive Justice in Patient Selection 
by 
Rebecca Bartley Yarrison 
There are not always enough medical resources to go around and pluralist theories of 
decision making generally do not explain the principle of justice in a way that provides action-
guidance. I adopt a modified and expanded form of the claims-based approach of Rescher and 
Broome as the framework for a substantive and action-guiding theory of distributive justice. The 
resulting theory is that limited resources should be distributed according to the strength of a 
person's entitlement to a resource. In order to determine a person's entitlement, one must 
determine what context-relevant rights the person has and the strength of his or her claim to the 
resource, which is determined by a weighing up of context-relevant considerations, which are 
facts about a person's condition or situation within a certain context that ceteris paribus generate 
some kind of duty that they be given (or denied, depending on the consideration) the resource. 
Since both of these are context dependent, I discuss patients' entitlements in terms of limited 
medical resources. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
There have been libraries of books written on the topic of justice that cover justice's 
application to numerous areas including those in political justice, social justice and 
distributive justice. However, one area that has not been sufficiently canvassed is the 
area of distributive justice under conditions of scarcity. And the question of who should 
get a resource when there is not enough of it to go around is a difficult one. The broad 
understanding of justice is that people should be treated according to what they are due 
but what a person is due and what it means to treat someone accordingly are both highly 
contentious. And in cases of scarcity, the question of justice becomes not a question of 
what a person is due, but one of what a person is due in light of what others are due. 
Complicating the matter, scarcity is not a rare phenomenon. Throughout the 
world, there are very real shortages of food, clean water, shelter and money to buy 
necessities. There are also situations, such as distributions of prizes or awards that 
require some distribution scheme. However, no one single distribution scheme will be 
able to cover such a wide variety of contexts and so any scheme will have to be context 
dependent, as the specific criteria for distributing a prize in a science contest, for 
example, will certainly be different from the specific criteria for distributing food in a 
famine. A prime example of this scarcity is in medicine. People alternatively argue 
that patients are due some basic decent minimum of care, that they are due whatever 
they can pay for, that they are due what they need or what they deserve. There are 
questions about whether a patient's age can increase or lessen what she or he is due or 
whether having donated organs or money can change what a person is due. This 
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complicates an already difficult matter immensely as it becomes a patient selection 
problem—a matter of choosing which patient should be given the resource. 
Though the particulars of a theory of distributive justice will have to change 
with the context of the distribution situation, providing a framework for making 
distribution decisions in situations of scarcity would still be a step toward providing 
action guidance in such situations. My project, then, is to develop such a framework, 
which I will do bby articulating a claims-based approach to distributive justice in 
scarcity within the context of medical decision making. 
The Problem 
(Distributive') Justice 
Most moral thinkers who are pluralists in any form, including those who accept a 
pluralist theory of the good, include justice as an important moral consideration. 
Medical decision makers typically appeal to a pluralist theory, such as Beauchamp and 
Childress's principlism and Brody's appeals. Most pluralist theories of medical 
decision making (and consequentialist theories that accept a pluralist theory of the 
good) recognize the principles of (or appeals to) beneficence, non-maleficence, respect 
for autonomy and justice among others. And, for the most part, there is consensus 
about what each of these encompasses though there is certainly disagreement about 
their application in particular cases. Take, for example, beneficence. Two different 
people discussing a case may agree entirely that it is important to consider what the 
beneficent course of action would be yet disagree as to what course of action is actually 
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the beneficent one. When arguing about which action to take, there is at least a 
common ground of understanding from which to argue. 
However, the situation is not so clear with the principle of justice. Discussions 
about distributive justice in healthcare have had a completely different focus from 
discussions of other principles. Discussions of justice focus on the distributions of 
benefits and burdens in research and macro-allocation issues such as funding primary 
care versus funding secondary and tertiary care or funding this program versus that 
program. Unfortunately, for those making micro-allocational decisions, any discussion 
of micro-allocation decisions tends to either focus narrowly on a single factor (e.g., 
should illegal immigrants have access to healthcare?) or offer such broad advice as to be 
non-action-guiding. This problem, however, is not unique to medical distributions, as 
there is generally very little guidance for any distribution of scarce resources. There is 
no consensus on what factors should play into micro-allocational decisions and how 
those factors fit together into a useable theory of distributive justice. Thus, the person 
making the decision about who should get a scarce resource is left with minimal 
guidance in understanding how justice should play into his or her decision. It is not 
clear what the principle of justice is meant to encompass, let alone how to apply it1. 
This is particularly remiss because justice is the only one of the four principles 
offered by Beauchamp and Childress (and possibly also the only appeal provided by 
Brody, though the appeal to consequences might have some purchase here) that can 
directly account for the effects that a specific treatment decision has on people other 
than those immediately involved in the decision. After all, the principles of autonomy, 
1
 Beauchamp and Childress do offer what Rescher refers to as the "canons of justice" but they offer no 
explanation or justification for these canons, nor any guidance in applying them. The individual canons 
will, of course, be discussed later. 
4 
beneficence and non-maleficence are all patient-oriented; they are about a specific 
patient's autonomy, or what is beneficent or non-maleficent for a particular patient2. 
Justice, alone among the other principles, is uniquely positioned to deal with the 
interpersonal complications that arise in situations of medical scarcity because justice 
does not focus on a single patient but looks at all patients who are concerned. 
Especially in situations of scarcity, when there are not enough resources to go around, 
there needs to be a normative principle of justice that can help sort out situations on the 
micro-allocation level. 
But this does not explain why this is a question of justice in the first place. 
There is a wide-ranging discussion in the literature about the place of justice in 
situations of scarcity and there are some formidable figures that argue that justice does 
not apply in situations where it cannot be ideally satisfied. I will follow Winslow1 in 
addressing both Hume's argument that self-preservation replaces justice in situations of 
dire scarcity and Vlastos's argument that decisions made in situations of scarcity are 
neither just nor unjust but "non-just". I will then discuss a third problem and one that is 
probably more pressing in practical situations and that is the Nozick-esque issue of 
possession; that is, it is not a matter of justice but a matter of what the owner of the 
resource wants done with it. 
Hume's Argument 
David Hume begins with the idea that "public utility is the sole origin of justice, and 
that reflections on the beneficial consequences of this virtue are the sole foundation of 
its merit"11. The justification for justice is not an issue about which I want to quibble; I 
2
 Brody does offer the appeal to respect for physician integrity but this, while not patient-oriented, still 
does not consider the impact of a decision on other patients and regards the physician only with regard to 
the specific patient. 
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will simply grant this for the sake of argument and argue from there. A second aspect 
of Hume's understanding of justice that needs to be brought out is that Hume has a 
property-based understanding of justice. The rules of justice are rules "governing the 
possession, utilization, and transfer of property""1. I will take issue with this further on. 
Hume's argument is this: first, a society of absolute abundance will have no 
need of justice because everyone would have more than s/he needs or wants. To divide 
the resources with property divisions would be entirely unnecessary because leaving the 
goods in common would still allow for everyone to have more than s/he would ever 
want3. And in a society where resources are neither abundant nor scarce but the people 
are absolutely benevolent, there will be no need of justice because everyone will be 
willing to share and ensure that everyone has a fair share. And, Hume says, 
Suppose a society to fall into such want of all common necessaries, that the utmost frugality and 
industry cannot preserve the greater number from perishing, and the whole from extreme misery; 
it will readily, I believe be admitted, that the strict laws of justice are suspended, in such a 
pressing 
emergence, and give place to the stronger motives of necessity and self-preservation,v. 
Thus, the only society that requires justice is the non-benevolent society with neither 
abundance nor scarcity. This is because people are jealous and want so much of the 
resource that not everyone would have enough. So there must be property distinctions 
and justice. 
Now, Hume does not make this argument with medical scarcity in mind. And it 
is important to note that Hume argument only makes use of across-the-board scarcity or 
abundance. Particularly in America, the most basic needs, such as food, clean water 
and shelter are at a level of sufficiency for most. Certainly, some people are hungry and 
3
 Of course, it is not clear how everyone could have everything he or she wants if more than one person 
wants to have more than everyone else. But the point that everyone has an overabundance at his or her 
disposal is well taken. 
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homeless, but for the most part, even those below the poverty line have their basic food 
and shelter needs met. The situations of medical scarcity that are taken as the context 
for this project do not reflect the kind of across-the-board scarcity that Hume thinks is 
necessary to unseat justice. Thus, I think this argument of Hume's does not apply to 
situations where an individual resource is in short supply. However others could 
disagree and so I have two alternative objections to this argument; the first is more 
practical and the second is more theoretical. 
The practical objection is this: even if there is scarcity, there is no reason to 
suppose that a free-for-all better serves the public utility than a just, ordered approach 
(in other words, simply because justice would break own under such conditions does not 
mean that it should). If property distinctions really do break down, they could do so 
violently; the result might even be a Hobbesian state of nature, where life is nasty, 
brutish and short. The bad potential consequences of a breakdown of justice in a 
society of dire scarcity are very bad: civil war could erupt. And what problem would a 
breakdown of justice solve? Since there are only enough resources to keep x number of 
people alive, then only x number of people will survive whether justice determines who 
gets what or not. Of course, fewer than x people may survive if the ensuing battles in 
the state of nature kill off more than the famine would, but even if strife in the state of 
nature does not lead to any extra deaths and all resources once pooled are distributed 
evenly among the people, they are still only enough to keep x people alive and those in 
misery. 
I believe it is this latter situation that Hume envisions and this leads to the 
second, more theoretical objection. He asks, "Would an equal partition of bread in a 
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famine, though effected by power and even violence, be regarded as criminal or 
injurious?'* The key is the phrase "equal partition". The objection is this: while we 
may agree that property distinctions would break down, there would still be a need for a 
just system to distribute the resources there are. Thus, Hume's understanding of justice 
simply as property rights is far too narrow to encompass even most situations of 
distribution. Winslow also notes this when he states that "the problem with [Hume's] 
position when applied to contemporary problems of distributive justice is his lack of 
concern for the distribution of goods to which no individual has exclusive property 
rights"vl. After the granaries have been knocked over and the grain becomes a resource 
for public consumption, owned by no one, what makes the people distribute an equal 
portion of grain to each if not justice? After all, this is not the benevolent, sharing 
society that has knocked over the granary. 
It is important to notice that a slight change in the situation of the society of dire 
scarcity can (under particular circumstances) avoid the practical problem, but the 
theoretical problem remains. Suppose in the society, the scarcity is caused not by a lack 
of resources but a hoarding of resources by a few rich and powerful citizens who look at 
the hungry and say, "Let them eat cake!" Then, breaking into the granaries of the 
wealthy might better serve the public utility4 but once the granaries of the wealthy have 
been thrown open, it is still unclear from Hume's account how the people can choose to 
equally divide the grain, or how they can decide to divide the grain at all instead of 
grabbing and fighting for whatever one can get without some idea of justice. 
4
 Provided, of course, that the ensuing revolution is not more devastating than the original lack of 
resources. 
One other issue is that Hume's argument pertains to individuals, not to society. 
That is, in situations of scarcity, Hume thinks that it would be rational for individuals to 
break open the granaries in the hope of securing what they need (which I have 
questioned above). But what does this mean for social institutions such as hospitals? 
Clearly, maintaining justice is paramount for social institutions and society in general 
for the sake of self-preservation. Without justice, the resulting free-for-all is would 
certainly break down the structures of society; this would certainly reduce to the 
Hobbesian state of nature since society is comprised of individuals. But in the hospital 
situation, it is unclear how this would happen anyway. After all, medical expertise and 
treatments are not like grain in a granary; one cannot throw open the hospital and grab a 
needed surgery. Thus, even if the above arguments against justice no longer applying 
for individuals in situations of scarcity fail, there is still good reason for social 
institutions to maintain justice. 
Vlastos 's Argument 
Even though both Hume and Vlastos think that justice does not apply in situations of 
scarcity, Vlastos has a wholly different understanding of justice than Hume. Where 
Hume connects justice with property rights, Vlastos connects justice with human rights, 
and his definition of a just action reflects this. The definition is this: "An action is just 
if, and only if, it is prescribed exclusively by regard for the rights of all whom it affects 
substantially."™ And because of this definition, and Vlastos's understanding of rights, 
he is committed to saying that no distributions in situations of scarcity are just. Vlastos 
actually claims that, because a person cannot act justly (that is, it is impossible because 
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of the scarcity to act with regard to the rights of all involved), it does not make sense to 
say to say that s/he has acted unjustly; the matter of justice simply does not arise. 
Again, whenever one is in no position to govern one's action by regard for rights, the question of 
justice, or injustice, does not arise. Two strangers are in immediate danger of drowning off the 
dock on which I stand. I am the only one present, and the best I can do is to save one while the 
other drowns. Each has a right to my help, but I cannot give it to both. Hence regard for rights 
does not prescribe what I am to do, and neither 'just' nor 'unjust' will apply: I am not unjust to 
the 
one who drowns, nor just to the one I save"". 
Later, Vlastos describes such situations as "non-just",x. 
Though there are objections that can be raised against the claim that both 
drowning people have a right to the help of the person on the dock, I will accept this for 
the sake of argument. A much more telling objection is the one raised by both Winslow 
and Anscombe; while it may not necessarily be unjust to save one drowning person over 
another, there are certainly ways that people can act unjustly in that situation. In 
Winslow's example, the rescuer finds that one of the "drowners" is German. The 
rescuer, for whatever reason, hates Germans and thinks, "That horrible kraut! I won't 
save him; I'll save the other person who's not a German." Now, the German drowner 
could claim that he was treated unjustly because "the rescuer could not be said to have 
impartially respected the rights of all who were substantially affected."" Justice, then, is 
not merely an element of a resulting distribution but is also important in the procedure 
used to arbitrate between people when not all can be fully satisfied. 
But this might merely be a friendly amendment. After all, from Vlastos's 
discussion in the rest of the article, it is not clear that he would be entirely against such 
an interpretation that gives equal consideration to the rights of all involved. But 
Anscombe describes a situation where, even if equal consideration is given to the rights 
of all involved, the act is still unjust. Her example is actually given in the context of 
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Foot's example of providing a life-saving drug, but the example can be recast in terms 
of the rescuer and the drowners. Suppose the rescuer chooses not to save either of the 
drowners. In that case, Anscombe claims, both of the drowners would be justified in 
claiming that they had been wronged since it was in the rescuer's power to save one of 
them and s/he did not do so. It would be unjust, then, to not save either person even 
though their rights had been taken equally into consideration"1. Thus, justice is still 
required in situations where there is not enough of something for everyone with rights 
to it. 
The Property Problem 
This problem is different because it does not claim, as Hume and Vlastos do, that justice 
does not apply in situations of scarcity. Rather, it asserts (in direct opposition to Hume) 
that property rights should be respected even in situations of scarcity and does not 
oppose some theory of justice for goods that are not owned, or goods that are publicly 
owned. So this argument does not directly challenge the idea that distributive justice 
has a place in situations of scarcity, it rather proposes that the correct distribution of 
property is whatever the owner chooses to do with it and says nothing about the 
distribution of resources that are not owned by anyone or are publicly owned. 
And there are clear examples of cases where the distribution of some resource is 
entirely up to the owner, such as if a philanthropist intends to distribute a large 
endowment, for example, or when a living person offers a kidney to his sister. When 
the owner is a government or public institution, the picture is much more complicated. 
In the case of hospitals, for example, even private institutions may distribute public 
goods. And it is not always clear who the owner of some goods is. Who owns 
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allogenaically donated blood? Who owns the MRI machine in a public hospital 
supported by tax dollars? Who owns the heart-lung machine that was purchased by a 
private hospital but was developed using tax dollars for research funding? Who owns 
the terribly expensive drugs that were developed using grants from the NIH? In the 
case of medical care, the private is infused with the public and it is hard to tell who has 
a sufficient ownership of the resource to determine its ultimate disposition. If the 
institution receives public funds, are its resources public? Are the resources of private 
institutions public resources if they were developed using public funds? 
In most cases, the resources are sufficiently public that determination by their 
owner is not the way to distribute the resource. Certainly, there are not simply two 
categories, publicly-owned and privately-owned, but a continuum. On one extreme, 
there are those things that are clearly privately owned, such the philanthropist's money 
or the living organ donor's kidney. On the other end are resources such as allogenaic 
blood donations (which account for around 95% of all blood donations, at least at one 
typical institution"11) and cadaveric kidney donations. The blood and organ donations 
are public because the donors have donated them to whomever in the public needs them 
and so have been designated by the previous owners as a public resource, whereas the 
public hospitals are public because they are supported by public funds that are 
generated by taxes. The difficult cases are those that lie somewhere in the middle of the 
continuum. A theory of just distribution in situations of scarcity is necessary for 
distributing sufficiently public goods even if a private institution controls those 
resources. Additionally, even within a private institution, there may be a scarcity of a 
particular resource and the decision makers at the private institutions will have to have a 
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scheme for distributing the resource. A private philanthropy, for example, might not 
have sufficient capital to fund all of relevant projects that apply for funding and 
decisions will have to be made about which projects are funded. 
Thus, such an interpersonal distribution question requires an understanding of 
justice in order to come to a conclusion. This does not mean, of course, that justice is 
the only thing that matters in making distribution decisions; beneficence, autonomy, 
consequences, compassion and all the rest still play into the decision as they would for 
any other decision. However, justice is a particularly important principle in making 
resource distribution decisions. 
Scarcity in the Medical Context 
Unfortunately, there are not enough medical resources to go around. This is true on 
both the macro level and the micro level in rich countries as well as poor around the 
world. Consider the HIV/AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa. In some countries, as 
much as 40% of the population is infected with HIV and relatively few people receive 
the expensive treatments and drugs. The expense of the drugs and lack of funds are not 
the only barriers to treatment; there are also very few doctors and pharmacists trained in 
prescribing and dispensing the drugs in the relatively few medical facilities that exist. 
Even the ordinary and inexpensive measles vaccine cannot be properly distributed 
because of the lack of facilities and practitioners3"". 
But it is not only poor countries that suffer from medical scarcity. Even in 
America, the "land of plenty", patients are not always able to get the medical treatment 
that is medically indicated. There are a number of reasons for this. In some cases, 
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funding cuts on the macro level trickle down to the micro level, making fewer 
expensive machines, practitioners and other resources available. In other cases, 
shortages stem from runs on the resource such as blood supplies. Or there may simply 
not be enough of a resource in existence, such as is the case with transplantable organs 
or some new technologies or treatments that have not yet become widespread. 
One might claim that medical scarcity is the result of a lack of funding and that 
by investing more money in medical resources, one could solve the problem and all 
patients could receive the resources, procedures and care they require. There are two 
ways that increasing funding could alleviate scarcity: by direct purchase of more of the 
needed resource and/or by the more indirect method of funding research. With regard 
to the former, with more money, one can increase the size of ICUs, pay for more 
doctors and nurses and buy more medical equipment. For example, if the problem is 
that there are not enough ICU beds to accommodate the demand, a hospital could 
directly pay for an expansion of its ICU, buy more equipment and hire more nurses and 
doctors. With regard to the latter, one might try to alleviate a scarcity by funding 
research into alternate and more plentiful treatments. For example, one might fund 
research into developing synthetic blood and inexpensive methods of manufacturing it 
in order to alleviate shortages of blood for transfusions. 
Simply throwing money at the problem of medical scarcity, however, will not 
eliminate the problem of scarcity or render the philosophical patient selection problem 
moot. Even if increasing funding for healthcare will alleviate scarcity, the scarcity (and 
thus the philosophical problem of distributing resources) will exist until the amount of 
money necessary to completely alleviate the scarcity is funneled into the healthcare 
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industry or until the research projects come to fruition. Even with unlimited funding, 
building ICUs, training nurses and doctors, research and all the rest takes time. During 
that time, the scarcity persists. And that is if throwing money at the problem will 
actually solve it, a solution in which I have little confidence for two reasons: first, not 
everything can be (legally) purchased and, second, there is not an infinite supply of 
money and eventually the money will run out. 
First, and most simply, not every resource can be immediately and indefinitely 
increased by an infusion of funds. One cannot simply buy more blood for transfusions 
or hearts for transplantation (not legally, anyway). Of course, giving more money to 
dialysis centers can certainly help those who need kidneys by providing more patients 
with dialysis; but the problem of not having enough kidneys cannot be solved with 
money because one cannot buy kidneys. Of course, one might argue that, while one 
cannot directly buy such things, one might be able to help the situation in a more 
indirect way by funding research into synthetic blood products and artificial kidneys. 
Certainly the scarcity of kidneys would be neutralized if an inexpensive and permanent 
biomechanical alternative without the morbidity issues associated with dialysis were 
found. And, more practically, one can fund awareness campaigns that encourage 
people to become blood and organ donors. These possibilities (particularly the latter) 
would surely have the effect of reducing scarcity to some degree but it is unclear 
exactly how far such things can go to solve the problems of scarcity. As it is, there are 
campaigns for blood and organ procurement and yet there is still a scarcity of these 
resources. Also, though there is research directed at developing synthetic blood, 
15 
mechanical hearts and better alternatives for dialysis patients, it is not clear when or if 
these will ever be feasible options for people needing blood, hearts and kidneys. 
But even if synthetic blood, mechanical organs and cancer cures are just over the 
horizon, there is a second and more pressing objection to the "throw money at the 
problem" solution to scarcity. At some point, the money runs out. This is true of 
money for all medical resources, whether it is money for research or money for 
preventative, basic or emergent care. In 2007, the United States spent 16.2% of its 
Gross Domestic Product on medical care and it is projected that by 2018 the U.S. will 
spend over 20% of its GDP on healthcareXIV. No other country spends as much of their 
GDP on health care as the United States. Great Britain, for example, spent only 8.4% of 
its GDP on healthcare in 2006xv. And even with this large amount of spending, there 
are still many who lack basic medical care. Healthcare, it seems, is a bottomless pit as 
far as money is concerned. Eventually, the U.S. will hit the point where it cannot spend 
any more money on medical resources and healthcare will have to be rationed. 
Rationing is already implicit in the British National Health Service, which started in 
1948 as an attempt at free and unlimited healthcare. Since the early 1950s, the BNHS 
has worked under a budget cap that has resulted in doctors having to deny treatments 
that are known to be effective because of shortfalls in fundsxvl. 
It is worth pointing out that either of these reasons for supposing that we cannot 
buy our way out of the problem of medical scarcity is sufficient to show that the 
solution is ineffective. One need not accept both reasons to realize that this solution 
would not work. And so, even in the land of plenty, medical scarcity is a fact. 
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A Proposed Solution 
Currently, with only a few notable exceptions, patient selection decisions are made 
without reference to any guiding theory of patient selection or principled methodology. 
Jagsi, et al. note that "Rationing often occurs implicitly, via mechanisms such as price, 
delay, physician discretion, or social barriers to access...Implicit rationing has 
dominated in the United States, and Americans have thus largely been protected from 
the debates over prioritization that have plagued state-funded systems of health care'"0"1. 
Of course, addressing the problem of patient selection is not likely to solve all justice 
problems in medicine, such as implicit rationing due to price, social barriers to access or 
some kinds of delay. However, it will address implicit rationing due to physician 
discretion and other kinds of delay. Implicit rationing is problematic for a number of 
reasons, including the fact that such rationing is likely to be arbitrary with everyone 
applying his or her own standards and done without a critical evaluation of the rationing 
process. Discussions of rationing need to take place "in the sunshine", so to speak, and 
face a critical evaluation process and be based on the principles of medical decision-
making, including justice. 
My project is to give content to the principle of justice by offering a functional 
theory of distributive justice. I intend the theoretical framework to be applicable to any 
distribution of a scarce resource, but, as is stated above, the particulars are context 
dependent. Thus, I will focus on one particular context and generate a theory that 
determines what a just distribution of medical resources would be in situations of 
medical scarcity on a micro-allocation level. There are three parts to this project. 
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The first part, which I tackle in Chapter 2, is to set out the theoretical framework 
for distributions in situations of scarcity and explain why this framework is superior to 
other alternative frameworks. The framework I will adopt and defend is a claims-based 
theory expanding the work of Rescher and Broome in which resources are distributed to 
the patient with the strongest entitlement to the resource, with entitlement understood as 
a combination of a patient's claim relative to others and his or her rights to the resource. 
The second part, presented in Chapter 3, is to fill in the gaps in claims-based 
theories by discussing which reasons (called considerations) constitute a patient's claim 
to a resource. The reasons are simply possible facts about the patient or the patient's 
situation, such as a patient's age, whether or not the patient needs the resource and so on 
that can strengthen or weaken a patient's claim to the resource. The considerations I 
discuss are not taken from a canonical list or generated by some theory of claims but 
from the literature, the media, anecdotal stories- in short, anywhere that someone argues 
that a particular patient or group should or should not get a resource because of some 
consideration. Of course, not all considerations discussed (especially in the media) can 
withstand ethical scrutiny and so in the course of discussing these considerations, I will 
determine which are morally relevant in determining what a person is due. The 
considerations I will discuss are need, potential benefit, urgency, age, ability to pay, 
responsibility for dependents, desert, conservation, past resource use, queuing, 
squatters' rights and immigration status. At the end of this chapter, I will have a list of 
considerations that constitute patients' claims. 
The third part, which is the work of Chapter 4, is to explain how those accepted 
considerations from Chapter 3 fit together to determine patient's entitlements relative to 
18 
one another. I will discuss the nature of the considerations as claim-determinants, 
weighing the considerations against one another, situations that might affect their 
importance relative to one another and strategies for handling possible future claims and 
competing claims. Finally, I will apply this theory to two paradigmatic cases in order to 
demonstrate its functionality and to show how the principle of (distributive) justice thus 
understood contributes to the overall pluralistic theory of medical decision making. 
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Chapter 2: Framework 
There are a number of ethical theories (most notably consequentialism) that offer 
mechanisms for determining optimal distributions in situations of scarcity. However, 
the focus of this project is to work out a substantive theory of the appeal to justice 
within a pluralist framework (such as Beauchamp and Childress's principlism or 
Brody's appeals). This does not mean that theories such a consequentialism are 
necessarily irrelevant here, since consequentialists who have a pluralist theory of the 
good that includes justice will also benefit from this project. It simply means that this 
project is intended to be situated within a pluralist framework that accepts justice as an 
element of decision making. Thus, the framework for this project will have to be one 
that works within a pluralist theory. 
There are a number of theories of distributive justice that would fit this 
minimum requirement. However, many of these general theories of distributive justice 
do not address patient selection problems; they break down when there is not enough of 
a resource to go around. Egalitarian theories ("to each according to his need") and 
theories that propose a basic decent minimum for all do not offer any way of 
distributing resources when there is not enough of a resource to satisfy everyone's 
needs (egalitarian theories) or to provide it to everyone (if it is part of the basic decent 
minimum) or distribute it if it is not part of the basic decent minimum package. 
However, there is a third set of theories that have been proposed that do attempt to 
address distributive justice in situations of scarcity. These theories include monistic 
theories, lottery theories, prioritarian (or maximin) theories and claims-based theories. 
In this chapter, I will discuss each of these theories as a framework of distributive 
justice before adopting a claims-based approach for this project. 
Monistic Theories 
The most common theories of distributive justice are monistic theories. Monistic 
theories hold that a distribution is just so long as it is distributed according to a single 
criterion. The particular criterion varies, depending on the theory, though the most 
popular monistic criteria in the medical context are need, benefit and market 
mechanisms. Each of these will be discussed at length in Chapter 3 (as the 
considerations "need", "potential benefit" and "ability to pay" respectively) and so I 
will not here go into these concepts in depth. Rather, here I will focus on the strategy of 
distributing goods according to a single criterion. Often, these monistic theories are 
assumed rather than argued for, especially when the distribution principle is need or 
benefit. 
However, whatever the strength of the arguments in support of the individual 
values proposed by monistic theories, Rescher points out that all of these criteria have 
the same problem: "they are all monistic. The all recognize but one solitary, 
homogeneous mode of claim production... to the exclusion of all others... As a result 
these canons all suffer the aristocratic fault of hyperexclusiveness. As we see it, they 
err not so much in commission as in omission"3""". It is not so much a problem of 
including, say, need or market mechanisms but of excluding all other considerations. 
When making moral decisions and judgments, especially in the medical context, people 
really are concerned with more than a single value. Appealing to only one value only 
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tells part of the moral story and ignoring all but one part of the moral story and focusing 
on only one value tends to lead to seriously counterintuitive results. The (counter) 
examples given in the above discussions of the various monistic theories all 
demonstrate this problem. And it makes sense that this would be the case. Consider 
other kinds of decisions- the decision to buy a house, for example. In buying a house, it 
is not wise to only consider one value, such as price, without considering other values, 
such as the location or condition of the house. Although the decision to buy a house is 
not particularly analogous to medical decision-making, the example illustrates that it is 
not clear why a variety of values should be rejected simply for the sake of simplicity. 
Advocates of various monistic theories reject the other monistic theories because of the 
counterintuitive results of the rejected theories and claim that their own theories can 
provide better results in such cases. But of course only looking at one value will result 
in counterintuitive results in cases where other values are central. 
For example, suppose two patients are both candidates for a lifesaving treatment 
but only one of the patients can receive the lifesaving treatment. If the single criterion 
is market mechanisms, then the treatment would be auctioned to the highest bidder. 
However, without even questioning the appropriateness of considering ability to pay in 
determining distributions, one can still object that this distribution would neglect 
important factors of the medical situation, such as whether or not either of the people 
would actually benefit from the treatment. If they cannot benefit, one might argue, they 
should not even be part of the bidding. Or what if one of the patient's had previously 
contracted for the treatment or had been waiting longer for it? The point is that, 
whether or not it is valid to consider the criterion, considering any criterion solely 
would lead to such counterintuitive results and most often without any explanation of 
why the others should be excluded. Of course, this can be offset by interpreting the 
single criteria so broadly as to encompass several considerations, which is often what is 
going on when need is asserted as the single criterion; need is interpreted as 
encompassing, at least, benefit and urgency as well as need. However, this approach 
simply is to consider more than one consideration under an umbrella of a single 
concept. 
It is concerns like these that lead people to pluralistic theories in the first place 
and using a pluralistic approach to any ethical question reflects how people actually 
think about moral problems. Because monistic theories are only concerned with a 
single value, decisions on moral questions are a matter of calculations. Disagreements 
about what one should do are disagreements about facts of the situation or how the 
relevant value applies in the situation, not about the value used in making the decision. 
According to monistic theories, everyone with the same knowledge of the situation 
would come to the same conclusion simply by applying the theory. Under such a 
system, there are no moral dilemmas and no difficult decisions5. But people really do 
feel morally conflicted about some decisions, not because of a lack or misinterpretation 
of information but because of there is moral ambiguity. Such moral difficulties are not 
possible in monistic theories because a monistic value system does not allow for value 
conflict since there is not a multiplicity of values to conflict. 
Additionally, rejecting a monistic approach does not automatically reject the 
values that monistic theories champion; those values can still be incorporated into a 
5
 That is, the decision about what should be done is not difficult. If that decision has some unhappy side 
effects, it may be difficult to do the "right thing". 
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pluralistic theory. The only bit that is rejected is the idea that one particular value is the 
only one that should be considered. 
Lottery Theories and Fairness 
Few people, if any, actually advocate using an unrestricted lottery as the primary 
distribution system for medical resources. However, there is some support for a 
restricted lottery to distribute scarce medical goods, the restriction being that the only 
people given a lottery tickets are simply those who need the resources, will benefit from 
them or some other such restriction since it does not make sense to give everyone a 
lottery ticket for, say, a kidney, when most people have two perfectly adequate kidneys 
and cannot really use an additional kidney. There are two types of justifications for 
lottery distributions: deontological and teleologicalxlx. "According to the deontological 
version, a fair distribution of goods is obtained by applying a certain procedure 
(lotteries) for distributing goods. It is the procedure itself that guarantees the fairness of 
the distribution'"™; thus the emphasis is not on the outcome of the distribution (which is 
the focus of most other distributive theories) but on the process of distribution. And 
ensuring fairness in the procedure becomes paramount, with the classic example being 
the U.S. court system. If the rules of jurisprudence are followed, the outcome of the 
trial will be a fair one. However, this is not always the case, as there are two ways that 
following rules might not result in a just outcome. First, following unfair procedures is 
not likely to yield a just outcome. Consider the Jim Crow laws and other laws designed 
to keep the supposedly free vote within a very specific demographic. Certainly there 
were precise and detailed procedures for implementing these laws but if the procedures 
themselves are unfair then the outcome is not likely to be just. Thus, the procedures to 
be followed must themselves be fair. 
Second, consider the classic example of the person who is in the wrong place at 
the wrong time and accused of a crime. All of the evidence points to him and he is 
convicted. In this case, even though the trial procedures may have been perfectly fair 
and followed exactly but since a person is wrongly convicted, the outcome is unjust. 
The first case illustrates that fairness cannot simply be about following procedures since 
the procedures followed must themselves be fair and the second case illustrates that, 
even if the procedures are fair, there is not a direct correlation between fairness in the 
procedure and justice in the outcome. 
But these comments all belie a more interesting issue: the relationship between 
justice and fairness. There is a slip is purely procedural theories that allows the move 
from fair procedure to just outcome and that it to equate justice with (procedural) 
fairness. But understanding justice simply as "the outcome of a fair procedure" seems 
to severely violate intuitions about justice. After all, saying that the conviction of the 
innocent man is just (simply because it is fair) goes completely against intuitive 
understandings of justice. Thus, a thicker theory of fairness is necessary to explain the 
connection between justice and procedural fairness. 
Barry analyzes fairness related to procedures and finds that there are two aspects 
of fairness involved: procedural fairness and background fairness6. Again, procedural 
fairness is merely adherence to the procedural rules. "To say that a procedure is being 
fairly operated is to say that the formalities which define the procedure have been 
6
 Even if this distinction is a false one, as Carr believes, because the background fairness does all of the 
work, I believe it is still a helpful one for explication of the concept. 
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correctly adhered to'"™1. But whether the rules are fair or not is the purview of what 
Barry calls "background fairness": "The fairness of prescriptive rules that regulate and 
govern some event or practice apparently depends upon the way these rules facilitate 
the spirit, ideals, purpose, or point that underlies and inspires the event itself; they rely, 
that is, on the way these rules promote the end, or telos, of the practice they govern'"0"1. 
This notion of background fairness is echoed in Rawls's understanding of fairness and 
unfairness. Unfairness is not simply a matter of breaking the rules, according to Rawls, 
but is "more generally, acting contrary to the intention of the practice"5™1". That is, what 
is fair with regard to background fairness varies dependent upon what the aim of the 
project at hand isxxlv. Recall the example of the Jim Crow laws. The aim of extending 
suffrage was to allow black men to vote, but the Jim Crow laws (which were essentially 
procedures put in place to keep the vote within a narrow demographic) effectively and 
intentionally thwarted this aim even though such laws were followed. Thus, it is only 
with an eye to the outcome and the effect of the procedures upon that outcome that this 
aspect of fairness can be determined. 
There is a difficulty with the claim that establishing procedures that are 
consistent with background justice is to establish procedures that are consistent with the 
purpose of the practice. It is problematic to assume that actions (and practices) have a 
purpose, or telos. And this is quite a problem for an account such as Barry's that 
assumes there is an "end, or telos, of the practice [the rules] govern'"0^. But one can 
still understand background fairness without holding that practices have purposes. 
Consider, for example, that I endeavor to write a paper. There are some things that I 
can do that contribute to the writing of the paper, such as research, outlining arguments, 
etc. But there are also things I can do that frustrate the writing of the paper, such as 
going out with friends or getting far too involved in a television program. When one 
undertakes an endeavor, one generally wants to achieve something and there are some 
actions or procedures that help achieve whatever it is and there are some that do not 
help. To say that an action is conducive to fulfilling a purpose is not the same as saying 
that an action has a purpose. 
However, even this further explanation of fairness of procedures does not avoid 
the initial problem of the connection between fair procedures and a just outcome; it 
simply defines what procedures would be fair ones and places constraints on the 
framework to be applied. Some may argue that there are other criteria usually implied 
by the term fairness. Carr provides a list of possible accounts of fairness found in the 
literature on the topic: 
1. Fairness involves not disadvantaging others in a way contrary to the purpose 
of the endeavor (as using steroids is contrary to the purpose of determining 
which athlete is the best). 
2. Fairness involves being unbiased, impartial, or neutral in our treatment of 
others. 
3. Fairness involves sharing burdens or benefits equally, or maintaining a 
proper proportion between benefit and burden. 
4. Fairness involves treating equal or similar cases equally or similarly. 
5. Fairness involves adhering to the rules. 
6. Fairness involves treating others with the concern and respect they 
deserve.7xxvi 
But with the possible exception of #3, none of these offers any substantive guidance for 
concrete distribution decisions. All that any of these criteria offer are constraints on the 
framework that can be adopted. Thus procedural fairness by itself cannot be a basis for 
distribution decisions in situations of scarcity. 
To illustrate this, recall the rules of jurisprudence. If properly followed, the 
rules of jurisprudence are generally considered (background) fair procedures and the 
outcome that results from following these procedures is a (procedurally) fair one. But 
the wrongful conviction of the person who was in the wrong place at the wrong time is 
still unjust. Further, even if such a connection could be drawn between procedural 
fairness and justice, this understanding of justice is not helpful to the current project. 
After all, in order for the procedures to be fair, they must promote the purpose of the 
practice they govern, and this is fairly clear in the case of sporting events or prizes or 
awards with specific goals in mind. But the distribution of medical resources is not so 
clearly situated with respect to the goals of medical practice and this is especially 
apparent when there is not enough of the resource to go around. If the goals of the 
medical practice relate to healing, palliation and in other ways to promoting as much as 
possible the well being of people vis-a-vis their health, and there are not enough 
medical resources to satisfy this goal, there is little guidance solely from the idea of 
background fairness and the resulting fair procedures. When confronted with nebulous 
7
 Carr actually has a seventh account, the one that he favors, "fidelity to social practice" but I have 
omitted it for the sake of clarity. As I understand that account, it is either little more than Rawls's 
intention of the practice revisited or problematic because it lacks the components of background fairness 
necessary forjudging a social practice. 
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goals and a shortage of resources, justice as the outcome of procedural fairness is 
simply unable to offer any substantive guidance. 
Thus, most supporters of distribution by lottery offer teleological justifications 
of lotteries. "A distribution is, according to the teleological lottery approach, morally 
fair just in case each member of the group receives a lottery ticket entitling him or her 
to an equal chance of winning some good. Note that according to this view, the proper 
"goods" to be distributed is not money, wellbeing, or capabilities, but rather chances of 
receiving money, wellbeing, or capabilities"™1." What each person receives, then, is the 
equal opportunity to receive the resource to be distributed. As an extreme example, 
Goodwin advocates for what she calls a Total Social Lottery, or TSL, where all goods, 
services, jobs and rewards of a society are distributed by lottery not once but many 
times over. She acknowledges that some jobs and goods, for example, should be 
distributed by lot amongst those who are qualified or in need (such as doctors and 
medical care) but even these limited lotteries have restrictions such as annual lotteries to 
ensure that no one person accrues more benefits than others from his or her position. 
The upshot is that the TSL would guarantee a roughly equal opportunity for need and 
desire satisfaction: "The TSL constitutes unequal but impartial treatment, which leads to 
the long-term equalization of chances through repeated sortition, although not to short-
term substantive equality; but short-term equality or equalization of chances is in fact 
unattainable in the context of diverse goods'"0™11. Goodwin justifies her equal outcome 
measures on egalitarian grounds that people are roughly equal regarding their needs, 
their desires (which, although different, count equally) and their capabilities'™". 
However, the distribution of benefits and burdens by lottery in this way has 
some serious flaws, particularly in the medical context. Such a comprehensive lottery 
system does not account for differences between individual patients' situations. Now, 
advocates of a lottery system might see this as a virtue since suppressing particulars of 
patients' situations can lead to a more impartial, egalitarian distribution. But even 
accepting that people are roughly equal in their general needs, their desires and their 
capabilities, it is still the case that people's specific needs, particularly their medical 
needs, are quite different. Sher notes that "It is part of our concept of strongest claims to 
goods... that when someone has such a claim, no one else is entitled to enjoy or dispose 
of the relevant good as he alone prefers'"0™. Distributing goods by lottery thus 
systematically ignores legitimate stronger claims to a resource. The problem here is 
that by distributing resources by lottery independent of individual circumstances and 
what may be very good reasons to give a resource to a particular person, people are 
indeed treated equally, but they are not treated as equals. Giving an equal opportunity 
to receive, say, a donor liver to two people, one of whom is in desperate straights and 
will soon die without the liver and the other who is certainly sick but who is not in such 
desperate straights fails to give equal respect the lives and situations of the two people. 
Thus, while a lottery might treat people equally, it fails to treat them as equals. 
Additionally, from a practical perspective, if decisions are made without 
reference to the medical particulars of a case, then the decisions are likely to be highly 
inefficient. If everyone who needs an appendectomy is thrown into a lottery to see who 
receives it without reference to how urgently it is needed or how likely it is to be 
successful, the resulting distribution of surgery is likely to help fewer people than could 
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otherwise be helped if a more nuanced distribution plan were adopted, allowing the 
distributors to be better stewards of the resources under their control. 
Of course, one could respond that the lottery can be further narrowed by 
considerations such as urgency or benefit. Sher***1 and others, for example, describe 
lotteries as a fair way to distribute goods among those with equal claims to the resource. 
Certainly, using a lottery as a final "tie-breaker" is the most popular role for lotteries in 
medical decision making. This Goodwin, however, rejects this method of narrowing 
the lotteries, calling it '"relevant equality' rather than being truly egalitarian"xxx". But it 
is not clear why, once she is willing to concede that a lottery may be circumscribed by 
need or (in the case of jobs) skills, she is unwilling to circumscribe the lotteries further. 
She does say that "all stronger [than egalitarian] assumptions (for example, that some 
people are more valuable to society than others) rest on value judgments and may 
already contain covert assumptions about social justice'"0™111. The concern seems to be, 
then, that if we distinguish between people at all, then the basic premise of 
egalitarianism, that people are fundamentally equal, is violated by treating equals 
unequally; introducing additional restriction son who may enter the lottery reduces 
impartiality in the distribution process. However, the problem of treating people 
equally vs. treating people as equals in medical situations again rears its head. 
Again, rejecting distribution by lottery does not necessarily reject the values 
(impartiality and fairness) it tries to promote. Like the values proposed by monistic 
theories, these values can be promoted by other distribution frameworks. However, 
lottery systems are too problematic to be used as a framework for distribution for this 
project. 
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Prioritarian Theories 
The much more promising framework is prioritarianism. Prioritiarianism has become 
the most prevalent framework for distributive justice, particularly in the medical 
context, and is generally taken as the default view. Prioritarianism essentially states 
that the (morally) best distribution is the one that benefits the person who is the least 
well off and is thus concerned with both well-being and with prioritizing the least well-
off. Though most people recognize this as Rawls' Difference Principle, Rawlsian 
maximin is but one (extreme) example of prioritarianism. Parfit defends a more 
nuanced version of prioritarianism. Both of these versions are discussed below. 
Rawls does rely on procedural fairness to yield justice but, unlike pure 
procedural theories, he uses the procedure to determine substantive principles of justice 
that would be agreed to under a social contract. Rawls devises the Original Position, in 
which contractors are behind a Veil of Ignorance; that is, they are ignorant of their own 
talents, abilities, places in society and all other such facts about themselves and their 
own situations. Rawls argues that these blinded, hypothetical contractors would choose 
principles two principles of justice, the Liberty Principle and the Difference 
Principlexxxlv. The Liberty Principle ensures people the most extensive system of equal 
basic liberties that is compatible with a similar system of liberties for all. The Liberty 
Principle has lexical priority over the Difference Principle, which ensures fair equality 
of opportunity in offices and positions and that any inequality of distribution of basic 
goods (such as wealth, power and opportunities) should be to the advantage of the least 
well offxxxv. These substantive principles of justice provide the framework for a just 
society because they are derived from the procedure that is akin to a common procedure 
for distributing cake among children: having one child cut the cake and having the other 
choose. Instead of cutting cake, the contractors are finding ways to divide the liberties 
and goods (such as positions and offices) and Rawls argues that there would be a strong 
presumption in favor of liberty and equality since the contractors would want to guard 
against being desperately badly off if they find themselves in the least well-off 
group300™1. Though Rawls himself does not address health care or the distribution of 
medical resources, other indivisible or scarce goods that cannot be distributed evenly 
are distributed according to the difference principle and so it seems logical that medical 
resources would follow this track and be distributed to the least well-off. 
There are numerous objections to Rawls' theory of justice and they have been 
covered extensively in the literature. The objections cover all aspects of Rawls' theory 
and include issues with the set up of the original position (including the contractors 
being understood as heads of households'00""1), the psychology of the contractors (how 
risk-averse they would actually be) and especially whether or not the contractors in the 
original position would actually choose the principles Rawls argues they would8. This 
massive catalog of objections, and the fact that Rawls does not address distributions of 
medical resources directly, seems like a good reason to be wary of applying Rawlsian 
principles to medical resource distributions. However, Norman Daniels champions 
Rawls' theory of justice and extends it to the healthcare arena. Daniels argues that a 
system akin to universal healthcare is justified by Rawls' principles of justice: "by 
maintaining normal functioning, healthcare protects an individual's fair share of the 
See, for example, Michelbach et al, for an empirical study on what such contractors might actually 
choose. 
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normal range of opportunities (and plans of life) reasonable people would choose in a 
given society"xxxvul. Thus, providing healthcare in such a way as to bring as many 
people as possible to a level of health at least close to normal functioning promotes 
equality of opportunity. 
But when Daniels tackles the question of how to distribute medical resources 
that are indivisible or scarce, he retreats from Rawls' principles of justice. The natural 
extension, as I mentioned above, would be to apply the Difference Principle to medical 
resources. But even Daniels, who accepts the Rawls' principles of justice generally, 
does not think the Difference Principle would work for medical resourcesxxxlx. Daniels 
argues that people would, in practice, reject both the maximin position and the 
utilitarian maximization position in which goods are distributed according to whatever 
distribution will yield the greatest amount of benefit regardless of the recipient of the 
benefit. He argues that in cases where there is a large overall benefit that would be 
forfeited in a maximin distribution, people would prefer a maximization distribution and 
in cases where there is less difference in overall benefit between two choices for 
distribution, people would favor a maximin distribution . People's commitment to 
equality is not so strong as to override large gains in overall utility. Instead of turning 
to another principle of justice, Daniels makes the following argument: 
1. We have no consensus on principled solutions to a family of morally controversial 
rationing problems, and general principles of justice for health and healthcare fail to give 
specific guidance about how to solve them. 
2. In the absence of such a consensus, we should rely on a fair process for arriving at 
solutions to these problem (sic) and for establishing the legitimacy of rationing decisions"11. 
He argues that this approach is still within the Rawlsian framework since it is the same 
approach Rawls takes (justice as procedural fairness) initially in setting up the Original 
Position. 
Daniels' fair procedure for determining in what way health care is limited is 
what he calls 'accountability for reasonableness' by which he establishes four criteria to 
govern fair procedures: the publicity condition, the relevance condition, the appeals 
condition and the enforcement condition. Essentially, the idea is that any distribution 
scheme must be transparent to the public (or "in the sunshine"), based upon reasons that 
"people who are disposed to finding terms of cooperation that are mutually 
justifiable""1", incorporate an appeals process in case of disagreements and be 
enforceable by regulations"1"1. Thus, fair-minded people who are willing to come 
together to discuss principles of distribution (die-hard utilitarians or other extremists 
need not apply) agree to the principles and process for distribution, a process that 
includes a process for appeals. The process and principles are then vetted through 
public scrutiny and enforced by law or regulation. But this solution to the problem of 
rationing has many problems. First, it is not in the least bit action-guiding and offers no 
substantive help in making rationing decisions. Second, it suffers from all of the 
problems discussed above attributed to purely procedural theories, but more 
egregiously. One could easily argue that the framers of the U.S. Constitution met all of 
these requirements in establishing the United States of America and yet the institution 
of slavery was still protected by the Constitution. 
However, prioritarianism does not rely upon a Rawlsian maximin theory or 
justification. Parfit argues in favor of a less extreme version of prioritarianism; he 
defends the Priority View, which states that "benefiting people matters more the worse 
off these people are"xhv. Parfit proposes his version of prioritarianism as opposed to 
egalitarianism and unlike Rawls' maximin principle, Parfit argues that "the priority is 
35 
not, however, absolute. On this view, benefits to the worse off could be outweighed by 
sufficiently great benefits to the worse offxIv. This is not because of a concern about 
equality but out concern for those who are worse off because they are at a worse 
absolute level, not because they are worse than others'^1. Thus, even if the people who 
are worse off do not know they are worse off than others, they should still receive the 
resources because of the concern for their situations. 
However, there are two main problems with this view. First, if a person is in a 
concern-causing situation, why does it matter of they are worse or better off? If the 
concern is about absolute condition, why not help anyone who needs help and not worry 
whether they are better or worse off, especially since this version of prioritarianism is 
supposed to be non-relative? Of course, Parfit might respond that those who are in 
worse situations (even if, say, everyone's situation is bad) are more properly the subject 
of concern because their situations are more dire and, if significantly more benefit 
accrues helping those who are better off, then the priority principle could be outweighed 
in favor of the large amount of benefit. But if everyone's situation is bad, it is not clear 
why it would be worse to help anyone who needs help as opposed to the person who is 
the worst off. 
A more interesting question is if large amounts of overall benefit can offset 
giving the resource to the worse off person, why not other reasons? Even without 
challenging the idea that potential benefit plays into distribution decisions and accepting 
that a person's condition plays into distribution decisions, there are still no argument 
why other reasons, such as the affect of the distribution on others, whether or not the 
person can pay for the resource and so on. In some distributions, these reasons may not 
be important or even relevant, but there is no argument offered for why to include 
benefit but then not to include any other reasons. A theory of distributive justice for 
medical resources would have to at least be able to deal with other reasons, even if they 
are ultimately rejected, since so many are offered in the literature, the media and in 
anecdotes from the medical context. 
Claims-Based Theories 
The heading "claims-based theories" loosely covers those theories that hold that goods 
should be distributed in proportion with a person's claim to the resource. The idea is 
that distributive justice is concerned with giving to each his what he or she is due in 
light of what is due to others. Rescher, writing before the rise of prioritarian theories, 
argues that the litany of monistic theories that had been previously proposed as "canons 
of distributive justice" (such as 'to each according to his or her ability to pay' or' to 
each according to his or her needs') each had some element of the moral story but not 
all of itxlvii. And so, he proposes a "canon of claims" in which "distributive justice 
consists in the treatment of people according to their legitimate claims, positive and 
negative""1™1. Rescher points out that the "Canon of Claims plainly avoids the fault of 
overrestrictiveness: indeed, it reaches out to embrace all of the other canons. From its 
perspective, each canon represents one particular sort of ground (need, effort, 
productivity, etc.) on whose basis certain legitimate claims- on whose accommodation it 
insists- can be advanced""1'". However, as Rescher also points out, by adopting a 
claims-based approach to distributive justice, "the concept of justice is no solitarily self-
sufficient ultimate, but becomes dependent on the articulation of certain coordinate 
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ideas, namely, those relating to claims and their establishment"1. Unfortunately, 
Rescher does not see the need to flesh out this critical element of claims-based theory 
and leaves the explication of the concept of legitimate claims to others. 
Broome's claims-based theory advances Rescher's a step or two. Broome's 
project is to explain fairness in lotteries and what their role is in a distribution scheme 
and his claims-based theory is an extension of that argument. As such, he couches his 
project in terms of "fairness" and not in terms of "distributive justice"9. Fairness, he 
states, "requires.. .that claims should be satisfied in proportion to their strength"11, 
which he claims is an extension of the well-accepted idea that people should be treated 
as equals1". However, the argument can just as easily be made in terms of justice. 
Distributive justice, being concerned with giving each his or her due in light of what 
others are due, certainly requires that claims be satisfied in proportion to their strength. 
Rescher makes this same assertion regarding distributive justice and so trading fairness 
for distributive justice, in this case, can be done. Certainly, this move does not offer 
any insight into the connection between justice and fairness and it is not meant to. The 
point is simply that the arguments that Broome makes under the term "fairness" can just 
as easily be made under the term "distributive justice". 
What Broome adds to Rescher's theory is the distinction of the types of reasons 
that can be claims. Broome delineates three types of reasons: side constraints, claims 
and 'other reasons'. Side constraints are a kind of absolute rule that cannot be broken; 
Broome's example is that rights are sometimes considered side constraints. The 
9
 Broome does say that he believes that fairness is a subset of justice, where "justice is concerned with all 
claims, but fairness only with fairness-claims". A reading consistent with this statement is that fairness is 
somehow equated with distributive justice, with the concept of justice covering retributive justice, 
political justice and other such subsets but since he is not clear on his terminology, it is not certain what 
he means by this. See Broome, p. 96. 
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presence of a side constraint automatically settles the issue of who should get the 
resource1"1 and so side constraints are not considered in the distribution scheme because 
they arrest the distribution. Claims, which are the focus of the discussion, are reasons 
that are "duties are owed to the candidate" for distribution1^. The third set of reasons do 
not fall into any of these categories; these are simply other reasons that might be put 
forth as a reason to give a resource to a person that are not reflected in claims or side 
constraints, such as compassion for a person's situation. He argues that teleologists go 
wrong by lumping all reasons together and weighing them up as if all of the reasons had 
equal weightlv. He argues that weighing up all of these reasons, even if claims are given 
particular weight, does not pay proper attention to the separateness of individualslvl. 
Instead, Broome proposes two requirements to be satisfied by a distribution. 
The first is the 'satisfaction requirement' in which all of the 'other reasons' are weighed 
up. The second is the 'fairness requirement' in which people's claims are to be satisfied 
and to be satisfied proportionally1™. The fairness requirement is then balanced against 
the satisfaction requirement for a decision about the distribution. Broome's example is 
a situation in which there are a number of people who are candidates to go on a very 
dangerous mission. All of the candidates are similar in all relevant respects except that 
one has special talents that make her more likely to successfully carry out the mission, 
though she is no more likely to survive the mission1"". Since everyone has the same 
claim to the good of staying behind (assuming that bypassing a chance for glory or 
danger pay is a good), then only a lottery would satisfy the fairness requirement since 
singling the one person out because of her particular talents would be unfair. However, 
the satisfaction requirement allows for other reasons, such as her special talents, to enter 
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the equation. Fairness requires a lottery but satisfaction requires sending the candidate 
with special talents. Thus, on balance, we send the candidate with special talents, 
knowing it is unfair and efficiency won out when balancing the satisfaction and the 
fairness requirements11". 
Broome's theory goes beyond Rescher's in delineating what type of reasons are 
claims: reasons that are duties owed to candidates for the resource. Additionally, he 
situates these claims in a larger theory of decision making; the translation of the fairness 
requirement to distributive justice and the satisfaction requirement to the other appeals 
in a pluralist theory is easily done. Maddeningly, however, Broome, like Rescher, does 
not see fit to further elucidate exactly what these claims are and is content to simply 
draw the distinction; "It is clear, then, that there is a distinction between claims and 
other reasons. It is not so clear which particular reasons are claims and which are 
not.. .1 am not going to engage in controversy over which reasons are claims and which 
are not"lx. He is likewise slippery about what counts as a side constraint. 
This missing part of claims-based theory is particularly frustrating given the 
strengths of the theory as a framework for distributive justice. After all, this type of 
approach to the justice in patient selection problem can accommodate (or at least has a 
place for discussion of) the values of the monistic and prioritarian theories discussed 
above as well as other concerns. Potential benefit, age, desert, urgency, need, 
responsibility for dependents, squatter's rights, etc. can all be evaluated and assessed 
under this framework. But claims-based approaches are inherently pluralistic and 
therefore bring all of the benefits and downfalls of ethical pluralism into play. It is 
outside the scope of this project to provide a comprehensive defense of ethical pluralism 
and, frankly, I do not have anything to add to the debate. I would be remiss, however, if 
I did not address one problem that plagues all pluralist theories and is particularly at 
issue in this project: the problem of contradicting values. When a theory supposes a 
number of equally valid values, it is inevitable that in some cases the different values 
will conflict with one another and support different courses of action. For example, 
suppose that a man arrives in the emergency room in desperate need of a blood 
transfusion. The man is a devout Jehovah's Witness. In accordance with his closely 
held and long-standing religious beliefs, the man refuses the blood transfusion with 
complete understanding that he will die as a result. Looking at the consequences, one 
can make a clear argument in favor of forcibly transfusing the man for the sake of 
saving his life. However, from the perspective of autonomy it is easy to argue that the 
informed patient has a right to refuse even lifesaving treatment. In this case, appealing 
to the consequences leads to one course of action and appealing to autonomy leads to 
another10. And even though the current project is concerned not with the plurality of 
general principles but with a plurality of considerations of justice, the problem still 
applies because different considerations will often support different courses of actions. 
There are a couple of possible responses to this. First, the idea of equally valid 
values could be rejected in favor of a priority of values11. That is, one might decide that 
all values are not equally valid and establish a kind of chain of command, not unlike the 
one Rawls establishes between the liberty principle and the equality principle, where 
value x always takes precedence over value y and value y always takes precedence over 
value z and so on. However, one of the central motivations of pluralism is that in 
10
 There are undoubtedly other appeals at work here than just consequences and autonomy but for the 
sake of simplicity of exposition, I will only deal with these two in this series of examples. 
111 will revisit to this idea in Chapter 4 when the whole of the substantive theory is assembled. 
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different circumstances, different values are more important. If one value always takes 
precedence and the others are tie-breakers, then part of the moral story is still missing. 
But there is a better method for solving this problem, one utilized in most pluralist 
theories. The problem is solved by looking at the particulars of the individual case, 
using reasoned judgment to work out in reflective equilibrium which value or values are 
stronger or more important and determining which course of action to take based upon 
these values. In the above example of the Jehovah's Witness, the decision maker would 
look at the consequences of the two actions (transfuse and the patient lives but is angry 
and not transfuse and he is dead) and autonomy (which is maintained by not transfusing 
and not maintained by transfusing). Then, by looking at the circumstances of the case 
(that the patient knows the consequences of his actions and accepts them and with full 
understanding accepts them and still refuses treatment) the decision maker concludes 
that respecting the patient's autonomy would be the best course of action. But consider 
a case with a different set of circumstances. Suppose that the Jehovah's Witness is also 
a widower with two small children. Now, the consequences of not being transfused are 
that the man dies and his children are left parentless; not being transfused now has a 
major impact on the lives of two people who are dependent upon the patient. This 
change in circumstances triggers a change in the consequences that may trigger, upon 
ethical reflection, a change in the decision. 
Critics of this method say that this makes moral decision making arbitrary and 
subject to personal bias. The decision maker could simply go with his or her gut 
instincts or be guided in the process by personal prejudices. The decision maker in the 
above example could go with his or her initial reaction and use the principles to justify 
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that gut feeling. There are two responses to this. First, just because someone can abuse 
the system does not mean that the system is wrong. After all, one could just as easily 
use pretty much any other theory incorrectly to go with one's gut feeling; a 
consequentialist could claim that the consequences support his or her initial gut feeling 
just as easily. That a theory may be so manipulated is not a problem with the theory but 
with the person applying it. Second, reasoned judgment and reflective equilibrium are 
not synonymous with a knee-jerk reaction. Reasoned judgment involves examining the 
circumstances of the case and reflecting ethically upon how the values apply in that 
particular case. With ethical reflection upon the values and the circumstances of the 
case comes reasons and justification for choosing one course of action. It is true that 
different people can come to different conclusions about what actions to take and this is 
much more likely to happen with particularly sticky cases like the one above. But each 
of these people will have good reasons based in the relevant values backing their 
arguments. This is not a knee-jerk reaction or a bias toward an initial gut feeling but a 
well-thought-through decision based upon the relevant values. 
That said, claims-based theories also have difficulties that arise from their 
reliance on legitimate claims as the basis of distributive justice. Also unfortunately, no 
one else really takes up the challenge. Certainly, numerous people have worked to 
identify a number of values (or reasons for giving a resource to one person over 
another), including those faced with medical rationing decisions, such as the Seattle 
Artificial Kidney Center Admissions and Policy Committee (the so-called "God 
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Committee")12, the Northeast Proton Therapy Center1"1 and, to a lesser extent, some of 
the distribution schemes followed by the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). 
Also Kilner1*" has identified a number of values that might be at work or that might be 
acceptable in some form, when people do make rationing decisions. But no one has 
actually taken up the challenge of working out a system of legitimate claims. 
The Framework for the Current Project 
Though I have not taken the time to conclusively demonstrate that the other possible 
frameworks for decision making are fatally flawed, the strengths of the claims-based 
approach make it particularly eligible as a framework for this project; I will build on 
Rescher and Broome's theories to develop a substantive theory of distribution for scarce 
medical resources. In order to do this, I will work out a system of claims (Ch. 3) and 
demonstrate how that would fit into a pluralist theory (Ch. 4). But first, the theoretical 
framework needs to be more concretely set out. 
Broome's theory essentially sets out two different kinds of reasons that fit with 
distributive justice. The first are claims, which are discussed above. Claims are reasons 
that are duties owed to a candidate for distribution; these duties (positive and negative) 
are weighed up to determine the person's overall claim to the resource in question. For 
the sake of clarity, I will refer to reasons that may be claims (such as need, desert, etc.) 
as considerations. These considerations that I will discuss in the next chapter are facts 
about a person's condition or situation that potentially generate some kind of duty that 
they be given the resource. A theory of the nature of this duty and how it is that any 
12
 The Seattle Committee predates Rescher's discussion and also did not necessarily follow pre-identified 
values or any particular theory, but they did incorporate a number of different values into their 
deliberations. 
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particular considerations generate duties at all is beyond the scope of this project. 
Instead, to identify the considerations, I will look to the literature, media and anecdotes 
about medical distribution and evaluate the considerations that have been identified in 
these sources as claims. 
The second type of reasons is side constraints, under which heading Broome 
places rights. Rights are not a particularly prevalent element in medical distribution 
decisions though they are undoubtedly an important one. This is not to say that there 
are very few rights in healthcare; rather, not all rights in healthcare have to do with 
distributive justice. The most prevalent healthcare rights that people have are decisional 
rights (the right to accept or refuse treatment), the right to confidentiality and so on. 
These rights do not generally give a person a right to a resource in a distribution (though 
people do have a right to refuse resources). The right to decide what to do with one's 
own body is not a right to demand treatment. Rights that are more traditionally relevant 
to distribution decisions include rights of ownership of a resource, rights generated by 
contracts and rights guaranteed by law. Ownership rights rarely arise in medical 
distribution decisions because it is rare that patients own, say, a heart-lung machine or 
an ICU bed in a hospital. However, there are at least two situations in which patients do 
have ownership of the scarce resource: directed donation of organs and autologous 
blood donation. So, even though it is a rare situation that may not arise frequently, 
ownership rights do play into medical distribution decisions. 
Contract rights are also fairly rare since patients generally do not legally contract 
for specific treatments or healthcare generally. The most common exception to this 
involves contracts for home health care, for example, or concierge medical practices in 
which patients pay an annual fee (usually a few thousand dollars) to the physician in 
addition to any regular medical costs. In return, the physician is able to limit the 
number of patients in his or her practice and provide the patients same day 
appointments and more attentive care. Even in concierge practices, whether or not a 
contract between physician and patient exists depends upon the specific agreement 
between the two parties. In most other medical situations, no actual contracts exist 
between a physician or health care institution. 
An interesting question that arises in this vein, however, is whether or not 
promises can generate contract rights. One might argue that by making an appointment 
or scheduling a procedure, a patient has been promised that he or she will be seen or 
given the procedure. This, in turn, generates a right, based on that promise, to the 
appointment or procedure. But this is a bit of a stretch for several reasons. First, it 
certainly is not a legal right and so it would have to be a moral right, which is a bit 
murkier to understand. Further, although it is possible that a physician (or other 
potential contractor) has said, "I promise", it is unlikely that an explicit promise has 
been made. Indeed, even the argument for an implicit or understood promise is shaky 
since the medical scene is rife with stories of resource restriction, triage decisions, and 
so on. Even accepting (more plausibly) that making an appointment generates a right to 
be seen by a physician, it is difficult to argue that this is also a right to whatever 
treatment, especially if the treatment is scarce, or to be seen at a particular time. 
The third set of rights in medical distribution are those that are guaranteed by 
legislation such as the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act 
(EMTALA). These rights, however, are generally had by everyone and even in 
emergency room triage decisions, each patient has a right to be evaluated and stabilized 
whatever their condition. Thus, such rights are much less helpful in distinguishing 
between competitors for a resource though there may be occasions where the 
requirements of such laws do help distinguish between competitors, so they should be 
included. However, the issue of legislated rights raises the much more interesting 
question about whether or not there is a right to health Care. Such a right is certainly not 
specifically guaranteed in law or the U.S. Constitution, but there is quite a bit of 
discussion about whether or not there is a moral right to health care (or whether or not 
there should be a legal right to health care). I do not intend to address that issue in this 
work. If there is a right to health care, then everyone has a right to health care and we 
will still have to decide among those who have the right which person should get the 
resource. Or, if there is no right to health care, then nothing changes in what is 
discussed here. There is, however, an alternative that would have implications for this 
project; if there is a right to health care but that right is not had by everyone equally. 
That is, if some people have a right to health care (or some higher levels of health care) 
that other people do not. People do have different levels of access and some have little 
access at all to health care. However, this is not the same as having a right to health 
care, or levels of health care that others do not have a right to. In any case, I will not 
take a position on this but assume that there is no such right beyond what is specifically 
guaranteed by legislation such as EMTALA. 
The role that Broome gives to rights is as a potential side constraint (though he 
does not argue for this position). From a distributive point of view, viewing rights as 
side constraints actually makes things much easier; if someone has a right to a resource, 
that person should get it, end of discussion. This essentially shuts down any discussion 
of claims and the distribution is simply determined by rights if any of the competitors 
has a right to the resource in question. But the problem is that it makes rights absolute 
when the rights that are at issue in distributive justice are generally understood not to be 
absolute. Even a person's ownership rights can be overcome by sufficiently compelling 
reasons in eminent domain or adverse possession law. So how should rights be 
understood? One alternative to accepting rights as side constraints is to do a complete 
reversal and reject any special role for rights and consider rights as just another 
consideration. But this does not seem to be the correct way to go, either, since it is true 
that to have a right to something generates a very strong presumption that no one else 
can have that thing. This seems to be much stronger than the claims that come from 
other considerations, even if it does fall short of being absolute. The best solution then, 
is to accept rights as a separate category from considerations that generate claims. If a 
patient has a right to a resource, that is an extremely strong presumption in favor of his 
or her getting the resource, but rights are not absolute. Thus, a patient with a right to a 
resource might have his or her entitlement outweighed by another patient's 
entitlement even if the latter patient's does not have a right to the resource, but in that 
case the latter patient's claim would have to be very, very strong. 
But what happens to a patient's right if it has been outweighed? A right is not 
like other considerations that contribute to fairness in distribution and so if they are 
outweighed, it is only fair. In other contexts, when a person's rights are violated, some 
kind of remuneration or compensation is required. A rights violation might result in a 
13
 For want of a better word, I will use "entitlement" to refer to the overall reckoning of a person's rights 
and claims. 
tort action (or, depending on the type of violation, a criminal charge) and even property 
appropriations under eminent domain require that the property owner receive payment 
for the appropriated property. And this is not so different from the medical context, in 
which EMTALA violations can lead to tort actions and breaches of Contract can lead to 
remunerations. Consider the patient in a concierge medicine practice. The patient has 
paid an additional sum in return for particular services (e.g., same-day appointments, 
more time with the physician and more personalized care). Assuming that there is some 
explicit contract, if the physician fails to reliably deliver these services, then the 
physician has violated the contract and the patient has a case for breach of contract. 
Depending on the language of the agreement, the patient may be entitled to having his 
or her money refunded at the very least and possibly more if some injury has resulted 
from the contract violation. 
Thus, the framework for determining a just distribution of scarce resources will 
be to give the resource to the person with the strongest entitlement to the resource. 
Rights are a separate element of a person's entitlement from claims and will be weighed 
up with a person's claim to determine a person's overall entitlement to a resource. If 
only one of the competitors for a resource has a right to the resource and others have 
claims, it would take a very strong claim-only entitlement to override the entitlement of 
the person with a right to the resource whether or not that person also has a claim. But 
rights are not absolute and it may be the case that more than one person has a right to a 
resource. Given this, the system of claims will be doing the most work in most medical 
distribution decisions. It is to the considerations that will determine claims that I now 
turn. 
Chapter 3: Assessing the Considerations 
In this chapter, I will evaluate the various considerations that could impact the strength 
of people's claims to a resource. Before I begin that discussion, there are a few caveats 
about what this chapter is and is not. First, in listing these potential considerations, I am 
not trying to define justice by them or make any theoretical arguments about duties and 
what generates them. Rather, I am simply taking considerations that have been 
identified in the literature or have been prevalent in the media and other sources and 
using them to try and flesh out the idea presented in the previous chapter about claims 
as a component of a theory of distributive justice in healthcare. Although it is fairly 
extensive, this list is undoubtedly not exhaustive and there is certain to be disagreement 
about how I have categorized some claims. For example, I group a number of 
considerations under the heading of "desert", though one might certainly argue that 
some (or even all) of them should be pulled out and discussed independently of the 
desert consideration. 
Second, the list of considerations I present are not meant to be a comprehensive 
list of all considerations that impact all claims in all contexts in which distributive 
justice matters. This project is limited in scope to micro-allocation issues in healthcare 
and, as such, the considerations will be evaluated for fitfulness in that context. Some of 
the claims I reject for this context might be accepted in other distributive contexts and 
vice versa. This assessment of considerations is not intended to be, nor do I think it is 
adequate as, an assessment of claims for all distributive contexts. The particular 
distributive context for this project is micro-allocation of scarce medical resources and I 
only intend the discussion to apply to this particular context, though some of the 
arguments for and against particular considerations likely apply in other contexts as 
well. 
Finally, a full discussion of each of the individual considerations could easily be 
a book-length project unto itself and most (if not all) of the considerations have books 
dedicated solely to them. It is simply not within the scope of the project to give a full 
accounting of each of the considerations I discuss. Rather, the discussion of each 
consideration is limited to the basic conceptual framework, overarching points and 
general objections. In some cases, this means compressing centuries of debate or 
disregarding some smaller theories. That said, I will now turn to the considerations. 
Need 
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Need is one of the most if not the most oft-asserted criteria for determining who should 
be given a scarce resource. But what people mean when they talk about need is not 
always clear. The term "need" (in both noun and verb forms) is frequently both used 
and abused in common usage, from the four year old who whines, "I need that cookiel" 
to the forty year old who asserts, "I need that house!" In medicine, need is a powerful 
concept as many physicians (and others) think that medical need (however it is 
understood) should be the only consideration used when deciding whether or not a 
patient should get a particular treatment. However, even in medical contexts what is 
meant by need is confusing, as writers on the subject often combine the concepts of 
need, want, benefit and urgency to various degrees1"1". In what follows, I will first 
discuss what is the moral significance of need before turning to why need should be 
considered and need's relationship with other considerations. 
I. What exactly is "need" or "a need"? 
There are essentially two senses of "need". The first sense is the instrumental 
sense (also called the ellipse theorylxiv of need or the non-normative form of needlxv) and 
the second is the inherent sense of need. According to the instrumental sense of need, 
"A needs X in order for A to (p in circumstances C if and only if X is a necessary condition of 
A's <p-ing in circumstances C"1™. 
So, because obtaining X is a necessary condition for realizing cp, cp cannot be realized 
unless X is obtained. What is needed, then, is always necessary for the sake of some 
further end; people need gasoline for driving a gasoline-powered car AND it is the case 
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that the gasoline-powered car cannot be driven without gasoline. This basic 
formulation of need generates any number of true "need statements" such as "I need a 
space suit to go into space" or "I need a bat to play baseball". These statements are true 
whether or not I actually have the goals of going into space or playing baseball. But, 
unless I actually have the goal of going into space or playing baseball, it is not the case 
that I need a spacesuit or a baseball bat. So, whether or not A actually needs X depends 
on whether or not A is interested in (p-ing. There are an indefinite and vast number of 
needs statements that are true of A at any given time, since at any given time A will 
need all sorts of Xs in order to achieve all sorts of (ps, but in order for A to actually need 
X, A must have the relevant goal, (plxvu. 
This non-normative instrumental sense of need is not especially controversial 
since all it asserts is that there is some X, without which A cannot cp. But it is also true 
that this is not especially helpful for the current project since it does not capture the why 
it is that need has such wide moral force. As Frankfurt points out, "an assertion that 
something is needed tends to create an impression of an altogether different quality, and 
to have a substantially greater moral impact, than an assertion that something is desired. 
Claims based upon what a person needs.. .are likely to arouse a more compelling sense 
of obligation"lxvin. In other words, the strictly instrumental view lacks any performative 
content. And it is precisely the move from a non-normative version of need to a 
normative version that generates controversy. Taking the example from above, suppose 
I assert that I want to play baseball and so I assert that I need a baseball bat. This need 
statement, while true, does not have the moral importance that Frankfurt describes. I do 
need a baseball bat to play baseball but what is so important, especially morally, about 
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my playing baseball? The problem is that needing a thing to obtain a further end does 
not entail that there is any significance or importance to obtaining that further end. 
Nothing in the wholly instrumental sense of need can explain which need statements 
take on this moral dimension or why they do so. 
An additional problem with a purely instrumental account of need is that 
instrumental needs are conditional needs; that is, the thing that is needed is only needed 
if it is needed for some further end. But needing a thing to obtain a further end does not 
entail that one needs that end. The end something is needed for is only a need itself if it 
is needed for some further end, which itself is only a need if it is needed for a third end 
and so on into a difficult regress. For example, I may need surgery to remove a 
cancerous growth. I need to remove the growth to have health. I need to have health to 
flourish and, indeed, function as a human being. Why do I need to flourish or indeed 
function as a human being? The answer is either (logically) I don't or I don't know. 
The question is either one of logical necessity or it is a bit absurd. There must be some 
stopping point, some end with a sufficient status, to turn all of these conditional needs 
into actual needs. 
In order to address this problem, some writers shift to a theory of inherent needs. 
On the inherent account of need, there are some things that are needs simpliciter; that is, 
there are some things that are needed in and of themselves and not for the sake of some 
further end and it is these needs that are morally important. This is generally what is 
meant when the noun form of "need" is invoked and plays out in the form of a list of 
things that are objectively needed. These lists often roughly correspond to Maslow's 
hierarchy of needs, which includes food, potable water, breathable air, shelter, clothing, 
safety, security and, sometimes, self-respect or self-esteem. In most cases, the things on 
the list count as "needs" and can explain why some instrumental needs are morally 
important. If A (instrumentally) needs some X (which is not an inherent need) in order 
to achieve (p and q> is the attainment or preservation of an inherent need, then the need 
for X is morally important. Making this move to determine which needs are morally 
important closely parallels objective list theories of the good, where what is good is 
good regardless of whether or not any given person actually prefers it, values it or 
agrees that it is good. In the cases of inherent need, if A (instrumentally) needs some X 
(which is not an inherent need) in order to achieve cp and cp is the attainment or 
preservation of an inherent need, then A needs X whether or not A actually has the goal 
of cp. On a strictly instrumental account of need, A needs X in order to cp might be a 
true need statement but is not an actual (instrumental) need unless A has the goal, (p. 
Another similarity with objective list theories of the good is the central problem 
of an inherent account of need. Just like proponents of objective list theories have to 
explain what makes the good things on the list good, proponents of inherent needs 
theories have to explain what gives some things the special status of inherent need. 
Doyle, who holds a theory of inherent need, argues that those things that are inherent 
needs are so because they are "goals that all humans should have in common if they are 
to be able to act in their objective interests"1"1". Doyle argues that there are essentially 
two inherent needs, the most basic levels of both physical health and individual 
autonomy, which represent the most basic preconditions of human functioning. He 
further introduces what he calls "intermediate needs"1"", which include the things on 
Maslow's bottom two tiers, including nutritional food, potable water, physical security, 
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etc. These are needs because they are also universal goals for human beings but they 
are intermediate because they are instrumentally needed to satisfy the basic inherent 
needs. If these goals are not satisfied, Doyle argues, serious harm will result and this is 
true for all humans. The inherent needs, then, are not contingent on any one person's 
life choices but on facts of human life that everyone shares. By making 
universalizeability a requirement of inherent needs, Doyle grounds inherent needs in the 
basic human condition: "Unless individuals are capable of participating in some form of 
life without arbitrary serious limitations being placed on what they attempt to 
accomplish, their potential for private and public success will remain unfulfilled, 
whatever the detail of their actual choices"lxxl. 
As a preliminary point, there is a slight hitch between the inherent needs and the 
intermediate needs. The difference between the inherent needs and the intermediate 
needs is that the things that are intermediate needs are instrumentally needed to satisfy 
the inherent needs. But the things that are inherent needs are also instrumentally needed 
for human flourishing. This is a bit of a semantic point and it may be that the solution 
to the problem is simply to identify the inherent needs not as contributors to human 
functioning but as elements of human functioning and that the intermediate needs are 
things that are needed in order to promote human functioning (or, at least, avoid harm). 
Making this move, he could still hold that basic levels of physical health and individual 
autonomy are inherent needs as universal elements of human functioning, without 
which we certainly suffer serious harm. 
It is not clear that the universal importance of inherent needs (and, indeed, 
intermediate needs) is enough to somehow grant them the special title of "morally 
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important need" over and above other goals. He is making the claim that, of all things, 
everyone must have these two things to flourish as human beings. While it is true that 
no one could practically choose to deny themselves the basic levels of physical health 
and individual autonomy14 that Doyle claims as inherent needs, it is not the case that the 
intermediate needs are universally paramount since any individual's particular life plan 
may not grant them priority over other goals. Some people do choose to forgo 
intermediate needs in pursuit of spiritual growth or other personal goals, such as 
wandering monks who give up shelter or firefighters who give up physical safety to do 
their jobs. Also, although Doyle uses universalizeability to avoid making needs too 
subjective, it is not clear that goals such as some level of preference satisfaction are not 
at least as universal as some of the other goals he lists. But even if the lists are tweaked 
to include only things that are universalizeable, the key question remains: why should 
universal goals be given special status over and above goals that are more (or at least 
equally) central and important to an individual's identity or life plan simply because 
they are widely shared? It is not clear what moral work the idea of universalizeability is 
actually doing. The moral importance of the inherent needs seems to be derived not 
from universalizeability but from avoidance of harm, which will be discussed below. 
Most need theorists, avoid such complications by avoiding the initial move to an 
objective list. By far the most popular move is to instead put the emphasis on the cp in 
the need equation; the moral importance of the need depends upon the thing the need 
sets about to satisfy. Most writers who take this approach argue that the instrumental 
needs become inherent needs when failing to achieve cp would result in some amount of 
141 am setting aside the issue of martyrs and others who kill themselves, since those cases often involve 
extenuating circumstances regarding relations with others. The concern here is that Doyle's needs are so 
because they are necessary for functioning or flourishing. 
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harm to Alxxu. The connection to harm is what invests the needs with moral importance. 
Thomson argues that instrumental needs convert to inherent needs when the thing that is 
needed is needed to prevent a harm. 
The normative claim 'A has a need for X' implies that X is practically necessary specifically for A, 
and X is practically necessary for A when he cannot do without it, when his life will be blighted or 
seriously harmed without it... Such a need is non-instrumental in that it related to the overall quality 
of a person's life rather than a particular goal that he happens to have. This kind of non-instrumental 
need I call 'a fundamental need'.1"™ 
And on this point, Wiggins agrees: "a person needs x [absolutely] if and only if, 
whatever morally and socially acceptable variation it is (economically, technologically, 
politically, historically.. .etc.) possible to envisage occurring within the relevant time-
span, he will be harmed if he goes without xlxxlv". Wiggins calls such needs "basic just 
if what excludes futures in which v remains unharmed despite his not having x are laws 
of nature, unalterable environmental facts, or facts about human constitution"lxxv. Thus, 
what makes some needs inherent and morally important is that if they are not satisfied, 
significant harm will result. 
This connection to harm is by far the most popular but it also creates a serious 
problem: what counts as harm and what harms count as significant? Though Thomson, 
Wiggins and others who take this approach are a bit sketchy on the details, most 
approaches are compatible with Feinberg's second sense of "harm", which is "harm 
conceived as the thwarting, setting back, or defeating of an interest"lxxvi where an 
interest is set back when it is left in a worse condition that it would otherwise have 
been. Attaching the idea of "serious" or "significant" to the concept of harm is clearly 
intended to exclude instances in which a person's interests are set back in unimportant 
or non-critical ways, such as when I do not get to play baseball. I may feel some 
unhappiness and, because of this, my interests will have been set back, but no one wants 
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to argue that my need to play baseball is a morally important one. The challenge in all 
of this is to lay out what counts as significant without ending up with counterintuitive 
results. 
One way of resolving this issue is simply to claim that only those things that are 
needed for physical survival count as morally important needs. The implicit assumption 
in much of the medical literature is that if someone needs something, he or she will die 
without it. Certainly, cases where A needs X in order to continue living are paradigm 
cases of morally important needs. But these cases being paradigm cases does not entail 
that they are the only cases; physical existence being a precursor to other life interests 
does not preclude those other life interests being morally important. Why should 
physical survival automatically take moral precedence over other goals and values in 
people's lives? People do choose to die for a person, principle or idea; this reflects the 
greater importance accorded other values and goals in individual lives. For example, 
suppose that people who suffer from Disease X do not die but are quickly left paralyzed 
with their mental faculties devastated. Now suppose that if Disease X patients receive a 
single dose of DruGood, the only drug that can help, at any point in their illness, they 
make a full recovery fairly quickly. It is hard to argue, then, that Disease X patients do 
not need DruGood in any morally important way. True, they will not die without 
DruGood, but the massive setback of their interests that they suffer from Disease X 
surely counts as morally important. Expanding the morally significant harms to include 
all and only physical harms also suffers from this same problem, since, again, including 
harms to physical well-being is not an argument against including other harms that are 
not connected to physical well-being. Additionally, people's well-being consists in 
much more than physical well-being, even if physical is taken to include the 
psychological. Excluding serious harms to people's well-being from the category of 
morally important harms is counterintuitive and seems to exclude from the category 
quite a large number of things that people do consider central to their own view of the 
good life and human flourishing. 
But, taking a different tack and arguing that the morally important harms are 
those that represent setbacks to the well-being and central life goals of individuals has 
its own problems. Doing this has the benefit of respecting the differences between 
individuals and their own views of the good life and recognizing that not all serious 
harms in people's lives are physical ones. However, the problem with expanding the 
category of morally important harms this way is that it can be far too subjective. Some 
twisted individuals have life goals that are seriously detrimental to the well-being of 
others. Adolf Hitler is the paradigm here. Conquering Europe and eradicating minority 
populations was a key life goal for him that was central to his very identity, yet it does 
some violence to the idea of need to claim that Hitler needed (in a morally important 
way) to conquer Europe and kill Jews. It is easy to dismiss this and claim that the 
subjective life goals of dangerous raving lunatics simply do not count but this problem 
applies to less extreme cases as well. Suppose a man has been interested in cars since 
he was very young and has made a life around cars as a collector and salesman. He has 
made it the project of his life, almost an obsession, to complete his collection of vintage 
Aston Martins and is missing only one. It seems strange to say that the man needs the 
final car in any morally important way. Certainly, he will suffer the thwarting of a 
major life goal if he does not get it but it is still difficult to say that he needs the car. 
The critical problem with tying morally important need to harm is that one will 
either have to defend an objective list of harms (e.g., only physical) or a subjective list 
(e.g., life goals) of harms that count. But however successful or not these approaches 
are, there is an even more fundamental problem with this approach and that is that any 
attempt to determine the moral importance of a particular need with reference to the 9 
in the equation inescapably uses a benefit consideration to determine the moral 
importance of a need. When differentiating between the ends for which something is 
needed, need itself, as a concept, has nothing to say because the 9 for which something 
is needed is a benefit and the importance of that benefit is not part of the concept of 
need. This does not mean that "need" is a morally bankrupt concept. It simply means 
that looking for the moral importance of the concept of need in the end for which 
something is needed is a non-starter because to look at the end is to look at the benefit 
in a situation, not to look at need at all. 
To illustrate this point, consider the following two statements (and assume that 
both are instrumentally true): 
la) Maggie needs DruGood to cure her Disease X. 
2a) Dave needs DruGood to kill (merely) unsightly Ickweeds in front of his 
house 
(since, in addition to curing Disease X completely, it is also the only 
herbicide 
that kills Ickweeds). 
All of the above discussions focus on the moral importance of curing Disease X and 
killing Ickweeds. But such a discussion is a discussion of benefits, i.e., which benefits 
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are morally important ones and which are not. The above strategies all make the moral 
importance of the need dependent upon the moral importance of the end it is needed for 
without actually addressing whether or not the concept of need plays any role in the 
matter. This comparison is a non-starter for determining whether or not the concept of 
need itself has any moral importance. Instead, suppose that further study of Disease X 
reveals that in people with certain genetic mutations, Disease X can be cured by several 
different treatment regimens, all of which are just as effective as the dose of DruGood. 
Maggie does not have the genetic mutation, but Bill does. Now consider the following: 
lb) Maggie needs DruGood to cure her Disease X. 
2b) Bill does not need DruGood to cure his Disease X, though it would cure 
him. 
Maggie and Bill would both be cured with DruGood, but Maggie needs it and Bill does 
not. Keeping the benefit constant and varying the need condition allows an evaluation 
of whether or not need itself has any moral importance independent of any moral 
importance invested in it by the benefit that the thing is needed for. The question, then, 
is whether or not the fact of needing independent of any benefit considerations 
generates any moral importance. The answer, as I see it, is yes. Maggie's Disease X 
cannot be cured if she does not get DruGood while Bill's can. The fact that Maggie has 
no other means of being cured gives her situation vis-a-vis the DruGood a certain 
importance that Bill's lacks since he could easily seek another cure. She cannot obtain 
her end without it while he can. 
There is one more issue that should be addressed before moving on. Suppose 
that the only alternative to DruGood that are effective in people like Bill with the 
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genetic mutation is AltDrug, a drug that is extremely rare and hard to find because it 
comes from a plant that grows only on certain hillsides in a remote region of Africa and 
cannot be synthesized. Bill, then, might have an alternative to DruGood in theory but it 
is not easily acquired and so he may not have the alternative in practice. His situation, 
then, is very close to Maggie's except that he has a minute chance of getting an 
alternative treatment. It seems that this tiny difference should not be enough to make it 
less important that Bill get the DruGood than Maggie. The question is nor whether or 
not AltDrug exists; the question is whether or not AltDrug is available to Bill. Given 
the economic, social, physical, geopolitical, etc. context of the situation, is AltDrug 
available to Bill? If not, then he needs the DruGood. If it exists but is not available to 
Bill, then it is not a real alternative for him and his Disease X will not be cured without 
DruGood. The person either needs the thing in question or he or she does not and this 
depends upon whether there are alternatives available to accomplish the goal or not. 
An alternative explanation of the situation is that need is not an all or nothing 
proposition; rather, need admits of degrees depending on how difficult obtaining the 
alternative is. Suppose that the AltDrug is practically available to Bill but requires extra 
effort to get it or costs an inordinate amount of money or is difficult to obtain for some 
other reason. For those reasons, though it is available, it is difficult to acquire. On this 
account, both Bill and Maggie need the DruGood, but Maggie needs it very slightly 
more because she has no other alternatives and Bill's alternative is available but is very 
difficult to obtain. Lucy, who has a specific gene mutation that makes her body convert 
ten other readily available drugs into DruGood would still need the DruGood, but would 
need it significantly less than either Maggie or Bill because of all of the alternatives 
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available to her. This satisfies the intuition that Bill should get some "credit" because 
of the difficulty in obtaining his alternative cure but it is not without problems because 
although this explanation satisfies one intuition, it violates another. This blurs the line 
between "needing a thing" and "the thing is the best option" or, indeed, simply "the 
thing is an option". Thus Lucy, with ten alternatives easily available to her, still needs 
the DruGood, albeit only a little bit. By this, anyone for whom a resource will satisfy 
an end goal will need that resource regardless of what alternatives are easily available to 
them, which stretches the meaning of need substantially. In addition, the all or nothing 
proposal for need is not draconian; recall that the alternative must be practically 
available. The existence of an alternative is not sufficient to negate considering need. 
Thus, the moral significance of need comes from the lack of alternatives 
available to those in need, not from any connection to harm or any other end for which 
things are needed. Because of this, all need claims are equal qua need since all cases of 
need are ones in which those in need do not have any other options for obtaining cp. 
Furthermore, need is an all or nothing concept; A either needs X or does not need X. X 
cannot be "needed just a little" or "kind of needed" because it is either the case the A 
needs X in order to <p or it is not. If A has any practically available alternatives (even 
just one) that will enable A to op, then A does not need X. If A has no available 
alternatives, then A does need X. 
II Why should need be a consideration? 
Not all things that are morally important are considerations of justice and the question is 
whether and how need affects claims to scarce medical resources. There is a strong 
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intuition that need should be considered and a long history of a connection between 
need and distributive justice. Often this connection is implicit or assumed such as when 
distributions schemes are established to distribute resource amongst those in need; that 
he resource would only go to people in need is assumed. In other cases, it is explicit, 
such as with Karl Marx's famous "from each according to his ability, to each according 
to his need". Of course, most of the discussions of the relationship between need and 
benefit do not have the same understanding of need discussed here so the question is 
whether this appeal can still be supported when stripped of the moral work being done 
by the connection to benefit that is generally at work (at least implicitly). 
But even without the moral work done by the connection to benefit, many of the 
same reasons still hold for considering need. The two key arguments in favor of need 
are an argument from efficient use of resources and an argument from equality. Behind 
the argument from efficiency is the idea that, by giving the resource in question to 
people who need it instead of those who do not, more people overall can be helped 
because the scarce resource is given first to those for whom nothing else will work 
before it is given to people with alternatives. Suppose that DruGood is in short supply 
and AltDrug is generally available. Maggie's Disease X will only be cured with 
DruGood while Bill's can be cured with either the DruGood or AltDrug. Giving the 
AltDrug to Bill leaves the DruGood available to be given to Maggie; giving Maggie the 
DruGood while Bill gets the AltDrug makes it so both can be cured. Thus, by giving 
the scare resource first to people who have no alternatives, more people can be helped. 
The argument from equality is rooted in the idea that people should be treated as 
equals, with equal concern given to their interests. In Maggie and Bill's case, the only 
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relevant difference between them is the fact that Maggie needs the DruGood while 
either the DruGood or the AltDrug will work for Bill; he does not need the DruGood. 
Thus, giving the DruGood to Maggie and AltDrug to Bill reflects an equal concern for 
Maggie's and Bill's health-related interests because both patients will be cured, thus 
serving both patients' interests. Giving Bill the DruGood, which would cure him and 
leave Maggie to suffer, disregards Maggie's health-related interests and does not show 
equal concern for her interests. Though this sounds similar to the efficiency argument 
above, the issue here is not that two people are cured instead of one but that the health-
related interests are accorded equal concern. Only by acknowledging that Maggie 
needs the DruGood and Bill does not can the health-related interests of both Maggie and 
Bill be protected. Of course, there might be other schemes by which Maggie just by 
luck gets the DruGood (such as flipping a coin or first come, first served) but only by 
considering her need and distributing the two drugs accordingly is the concern for 
Maggie's interests equal to that of Bill's. 
It is rare that anyone argues against considering need in a scheme for just 
distribution. It is much more common for people to argue that only need should matter, 
though how much other considerations such as benefit and urgency are built into the 
operative concept of need is often unclear. It is also more common for people to argue 
against considering need exclusively and that other considerations should be included. 
For example, one might argue that there are situations in which the person who needs 
the resource has only a miniscule chance of benefiting. Arguments such as this are not 
arguments against considering need but are arguments in favor of including other 
considerations such as benefit when distributing scarce resources. 
Despite this popular support for considering need, it is not unanimous. Those 
who favor a libertarian conception of justice in healthcare argue that what a person has 
paid for (either directly or by purchasing insurance) is the only morally relevant 
consideration in healthcare. Helping those in need, libertarians argue, is the proper 
concern of charity, not justice. This objection is not specifically against need but 
against any pluralistic approach to distributive justice. Any proposed scheme of just 
distributions that is not pluralistic will not accept need as a consideration (unless, of 
course, the proposal is that only need counts). I will not spend time in this chapter 
arguing against comprehensive views; I will instead address this and other objections 
from non-pluralist theories in Chapter 4 competing comprehensive understandings of 
just distributions. 
That being said, it seems clear that need (narrowly understood as discussed 
above) is an important consideration and should be accepted. Because of the limitations 
it places on the options of those in need as opposed to those who do not need the 
resource, needing a resource strengthens the patient's claim to the resource. If the 
patient who needs a resource does not get it, he or she has no other options to 
accomplish the goal; those who do not need the resource can (by definition) still 
accomplish their goals through some other means. 
III. How does need fit in with other considerations? 
As is apparent from the above discussions, need has an interesting relationship 
with both benefit and urgency. All three of these considerations are conceptually tied to 
one another, since all situations in which something is needed require that the thing that 
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is needed is needed for the sake of some end, which will almost always be a benefit of 
some kind and there is often a time restraint after which the resource is no longer 
needed, since it will no longer bring about the end for which it was needed. These three 
considerations are conceptually separate though and, as such, will not always support 
the same course of action. This will be discussed more in the sections on benefit and 
urgency. Need is not so strongly tied to the other considerations and so it operates a bit 
more independently with regard to them. In some cases, need will be the only 
consideration supporting a claim; in others, it will be one among many. 
Also, it is important to remember that the importance of need (and all 
considerations) depends strongly on the facts of the situation. Recall the intuition 
mentioned above that Bill should get some credit for his alternative to DruGood being 
difficult to obtain. Need does not just add five claim-points; it can be more or less 
important based on the facts of the case. In the case where Bill has a difficult to obtain 
alternative where Maggie has none, Maggie's need claim can be less important in the 
assessment of each person's claim. The facts of the case can thus influence the 
importance of need as a consideration. 
Potential Benefit 
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One of the most prevalent and least controversial reasons for asserting that one person 
should get a contested resource over another is that the person can derive a greater 
benefit from the resource. And, given that medicine is primarily concerned with 
benefiting people through healing and the relief of suffering, that someone can be 
benefited by a resource seems a good reason to give it to them. But it is not so simple. 
What counts as a benefit and how can benefits be quantified in such a way that a benefit 
to one person can be said to be a greater benefit than a benefit to another? And how 
important is benefit in determining a patient's claim? 
1. What is a "benefit"? 
Joel Feinberg provides a general definition of benefit: "to produce any kind of favorable 
effect on another's interest"1"™1. Feinberg recognizes that this definition encompasses a 
number of "senses" of benefit. Essentially, any intervention that improves one's 
situation over what it would have been without the intervention counts as a benefit. 
This includes situations where a person's interests are furthered beyond a normal 
baseline or a status quo of sorts such as when one has medical assistance losing weight. 
Also included are situations where a person is prevented from falling below that status 
quo such as when one's infection is treated. And there are also situations where a 
person is prevented from falling farther below that status quo than he or she would have 
without the benefit such as when a disease progression is slowed. Thus, sometimes 
simply maintaining the status quo is beneficial when the alternative is getting worse. 
In the medical context, an assessment of benefit is often complex; sometimes, 
such as when one undergoes chemotherapy, harms must ensue in order to obtain a 
benefit. And just as people have various kinds of interests (health interests, economic 
interests, etc.) that comprise a person's set of interests, there are also social, economic, 
emotional, physiological and psychological benefits15. This list is meant to be an 
illustrative, not exhaustive, list of possible areas in which people's interests may be 
affected in a clinical context. And not all of the factors that determine what interests 
might be favorably affected are strictly clinical factors. Consider the widow having hip 
surgery. The type of social support network she has in place will strongly influence her 
discharge plan and the possible long-term success of her surgery. And favorable 
clinical outcomes might also have unfavorable social or economic outcomes, e.g., when 
an expensive intervention that drains a man's savings renders him unable to pay for 
medications that he needs to manage his condition. 
One might argue that in the clinical context that is the focus of this project, 
medical benefit as understood by immediate physiological indicators should be the only 
kind of benefit that matters since the medical establishment is not in the business of 
solving the social and economic ills of people; it is in the business of caring for their 
medical interests. But to take this view is to take a narrow view of the consequences of 
medical intervention. Certainly, people do not go to the hospital for childcare or 
because they need help filling out their tax returns. But being diagnosed with a disease, 
sustaining an injury, falling ill and the variety of other medical problems that people do 
seek medical help for all have social, emotional and economic implications as well as 
15
 In what follows, I combine physiological and psychological benefits under the heading of medical 
benefits. By doing so, I do not mean to imply that medicine should only be concerned with physiology 
and psychology. 
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medical ones. And, as the above examples illustrate, these factors can have a major 
effect on the amount of even strictly medical benefit derived from a medical 
intervention. 
In addition to the complexity due to the wide affect of medical intervention in so 
many aspects of life, there is the additional complexity that comes from the concept of 
benefit itself. Bentham identifies seven factors that are relevant to a calculation of the 
value pleasures and pains. Though Bentham's purpose is to determine which action 
would bring about the greatest balance of pleasures over pains, his value calculus can be 
helpful here in determining the value of various benefits. Bentham includes intensity, 
duration, certainty, propinquity (how close the pleasure or pain is in time and space), 
fecundity (whether one can expect more pleasures to follow a pleasure or more pains to 
follow a pain), purity (whether one can expect pains to follow a pleasure or pleasures to 
follow a pain) and extent (the number of people who would benefit)lxxvi". For the 
purposes of the current project, this list can be pared down a bit. Intensity, duration, 
certainty apply to the current project and fecundity and purity can be discussed best in 
the medical context as the type of benefit one hopes to accrue since it simplifies matters 
to think of the complex consequences of medical interventions not as generators of 
pains and/or pleasures but of medical outcomes and the process of generating these 
outcomes of as a package of events, some of which cause pain and some of which 
improve a patient's condition. Propinquity makes less sense in the current situation, 
except as either an influence on intensity or as part of the overall package of type of 
benefit. Extent of the benefit will not be considered in this section because if "extent" 
is meant narrowly, then only the one patient receives the benefit of the intervention: the 
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patient. Understanding "extent" more broadly to encompass all of those who are 
affected is a much larger issue and is addressed in other sections, particularly the 
section of responsibility to dependents. Thus, the four fundamental factors in 
determining the potential benefit of an intervention are: the probability that the expected 
benefit will accrue, the expected length of the benefit, the quantity of the benefit and the 
type of the benefit expected. 
Probability of Benefit Accruing 
In deciding whether a person (or which person) should be given a resource, one can 
only consider potential benefit since one can only guess about what will happen in the 
future, however much confidence one might have in the prognosis or however educated 
the guess may be. There is uncertainty about what benefit might accrue, the amount of 
benefit that will accrue, the amount of time the accrued benefit could last and about how 
likely it is that any of this will happen. Consider, Mrs. Smith, the widow who has hip 
replacement surgery. After surgery and physical therapy, there are several benefits that 
might accrue, including a reduction in pain and an increase in mobility and each of 
these can be realized to a certain degree and there is a certain probability that any of this 
will happen. She may be able to walk unaided and without pain or she may only 
achieve a reduction in pain while still having significant mobility issues. Or, she may 
achieve none of these and the surgery may fail entirely and leave her with increased 
pain and reduced mobility. 
In one sense, determining the probability is a simply probability calculation. 
The probability, P, that Mrs. Smith will achieve a certain level of either pain reduction, 
R, or increased mobility, M, is P(R) + P(M). The probability that she will achieve a 
certain level of both R and M is P(R) x P(M). However, in order to generate any useful 
information from these equations, both P(R) and P(M) must be determined and this is 
where difficulties arise. Medical probabilities are not like the probability that a person 
will roll a 6 on a fair die because the parameters are not fixed, as they are with a fair die. 
Certainly, patient outcomes can be informed by research data about how many patients 
achieve pain reduction and increased mobility and to what degree but for an individual 
patient such as Mrs. Smith, this information is but one factor considered by the 
prognosticating physician. The other factors are more idiosyncratic, such as Mrs. 
Smith's specific condition and any comorbid conditions she may have, the skill and 
experience of the surgeon and the care team, the type of hip replacement device, and so 
on. This is further complicated by the fact that not all relevant factors are strictly 
physiological. Compliance, support systems, economic situation and so on can all 
affect the likelihood that the benefit accrues. If a patient is unwilling or unable to 
follow the necessary treatment plan, including taking medications on schedule, making 
follow-up appointments and so on, then the benefit is less likely to fully accrue. Also, 
more involved or prolonged treatment regimens are easier to follow if a patient has a 
support network that can help with transportation to doctor's appointments, 
remembering to take pills and buoying the patient's spirits. Emotional support is 
important because a patient's attitude can also have an impact on the effectiveness of a 
treatment. This list is clearly not a comprehensive one of all the things that impact the 
probability of a benefit accruing. Determining the likelihood of a potential benefit 
accruing depends upon all these things and others that are entirely context-dependent. 
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But the list given above does illustrate the main areas that determine the likelihood that 
a particular benefit will obtain. 
In many cases, physicians will have a pretty good idea about the prognosis 
because of their experience and the knowledge base about a certain intervention or 
disease process but this is not true in all cases. Ultimately, this problem is irresolvable 
since there is no way to know the future with perfect certainty. Instead, the level of 
confidence one has in the probability calculation should influence the role that benefit 
plays in determining a patient's claim; the more confidence the care team has in the 
patient's prognosis, the more important potential benefit can be in a discussion of a 
person's claim. Thus, any probability calculations (and numbers discussed below) are 
based on clinical judgment and, as such, are estimates and should be taken as such with 
the weight accorded them proportional with the confidence in the prognosis 
probabilities assigned. 
Length and Quantity of Benefit 
Length of benefit, on its own, is fairly straightforward. The idea is that if two people 
will get the exact same benefit from a particular intervention except that one will benefit 
for a longer amount of time then the person who will benefit for longer will obtain a 
greater benefit from the intervention. This is fairly intuitive; when a person is in pain it 
is clear that they derive a greater benefit from a treatment that provides pain relief for a 
longer period of time than a treatment that provides pain relief for a shorter period of 
time. However, there are two important caveats to this. The first caveat is the same 
uncertainty that plagues calculations of probability; no one can predict the future and 
there are many physical and medical factors that determine how long a patient will 
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benefit and even if all of the factors can be identified, patients will get infections, fail to 
thrive inexplicably or even get hit by a bus leaving the hospital. Because of this, length 
of benefit calculations must also be taken as probability calculations are: as inherently 
uncertain with the weight given them proportional to the confidence in the prognosis of 
length. 
The second caveat is that, though the intuition to think that longer is better, 
especially with regard to life itself, this might not always be the case. Saying that, 
ceteris paribus, sustaining a benefit for a longer period of time is a greater benefit than 
sustaining a benefit for a shorter period of time does not imply anything at all about the 
benefit of keeping someone alive. On the superficial level, this issue is not so much a 
problem because the first assessment should always be to determine if something is a 
benefit and only then the length of that benefit. A patient who is in intractable pain and 
has slim chance of recovery might not see continued life as a benefit if it cannot include 
relief from pain or a patient who can no longer perform basic functions such as going to 
the bathroom, feeding him- or herself and so on might not think that continuing life in 
that state has any benefit. As Gems points out, "What is immortality to Sisyphus but 
the cruelest element of his punishment?"lxxlx Gems also reminds us of the myth of 
Tithonus of Troy, who Zeus granted eternal life without granting eternal bodily integrity 
and so he wasted away eternally1***. Keeping someone alive longer is only a benefit if 
any continued life is actually a benefit to that patient. 
In some respects, length of benefit is just a component of quantity; generally 
speaking, an overall greater amount of the benefit accrues the longer the benefit 
accrues. If a person receives one dollar every day for ten days and another person 
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receives one dollar a day for twenty days, the person who has $20 has a great amount of 
money. However, the duration of the benefit is not the same as the quantity, since the 
quantity also refers to the intensity of the benefit. Intensity refers to how much one's 
interests are advanced beyond what they would be without the intervention, in 
Feinberg's terms, and can be described as the magnitude of the benefit. Crudely, in 
utilitarian terms, intensity is the number of utiles that accrue from a given action; if 
relieving the pain of one person's paper cut yields 5 utiles and relieving the pain of 
another patient's bone cancer yields 500 utiles, then the intensity of the benefit from 
relieving the bone cancer pain is significantly greater than the relief from paper cut 
pain. And it is fairly intuitive to claim that the greater the intensity of the benefit, the 
greater the benefit overall and, in most cases, especially involving pain relief, it is 
probably correct. However, there are often costs associated with these gains that would 
blunt the intensity of the benefit. For example, increasingly the dose of morphine for a 
patient with chronic pain would certainly increase the pain relief but there are also side 
effects, including depressed respiratory function; increasingly the pain relief maximally 
might actually harm or even kill the patient. The entire picture of an action's 
consequences must be looked at in order to determine the quantity of a particular 
benefit. 
Type of Benefit 
Type of benefit refers to what it is that a medical practitioner tries to bring about by 
doing a medical intervention, e.g., saving a life, reliving pain, curing an infection, etc. 
In the section on need, I argue that there is no distinction in importance between the 
inherent needs qua needs. The argument is that the perceived differences in importance 
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between the ends are actually differences in benefit and these differences might either 
reflect the quantity of the benefit or the type of the benefit. This is a difficult question 
to address because in some cases the quantity of the benefit can only be determined 
with reference to the type of benefit because some types of benefit are generally thought 
to be more valuable than other types. Ceteris paribus, saving a life will always be a 
greater benefit than saving a finger, but the issue is what is doing the theoretical work? 
It may simply be that certain types of benefits so often generate a greater quantity of 
benefit that they are considered more important as types when the real importance 
comes from the quantity of benefit. But it may also be that the quantity of the benefit is 
so much greater because certain types of benefits are more intrinsically valuable. Part 
of the difficulty in teasing this out is that quantity and type of benefit are inextricably 
linked and there is a real danger of falling into a chicken-egg debate. 
An additional problem is that there is no theoretical consensus regarding what 
counts as a "good" for human life. There are three main types of theories of the good 
for humans: mental state theories (e.g., hedonism), objective list theories, and 
preference-satisfaction theories. On mental state theories such as hedonism, things are 
good insofar as they generate pleasurable mental states. Objective list theorists such as 
Arneson and Nussbaum argue that what is good for a person (and for people generally) 
is good independent of people's attitudes towards it. Some of the challenges to such 
theories have been aired during the discussion of inherent needs, which are rooted in 
objective list theories of the good. On preference-satisfaction theories, something of 
value has occurred when your preferences have been satisfied. Like mental state 
theories, preference-satisfaction theories of the good are strongly subjective and depend 
upon the life goals and plans of the individual person. 
Fortunately, the present problem does not require solving the problem of human 
good or adopting any of these theories because at this level of specificity, all of the 
theories will yield the same results. As Schermer points out, 
Most, if not all, theories on well-being agree that [the shape and content of 'the good life'] 
depends in large part on personal features and on the individual point of view of the person 
whose life it concerns. For example, if deep personal relationships are a component of well-
being, then it depends on the person in question and on her circumstances.. .what counts as a 
deep relationship, with whom such a relationship can be established and what needs to be done 
to establish or maintain such a relationship. It also depends...on this person's own preferences 
how much deep personal relationships contribute to her well-being, relative to other 
goods...Even objectivists...do generally believe that on a more concrete level a person's own 
opinions and preferences matter in determining what enhances her well-being.1™0 
Nussbaum, for example, lists among her list of capabilities for the good life "bodily 
health"1"50"1 (as do most, if not all, objective list theorists) but leaves it to the individual 
to determine the value of various elements of bodily health and the relative importance 
of these in his or her life. A preference-satisfaction theorist, such as Schermer, can 
make this move a bit more directly by claiming that the value of a particular medical 
benefit (and indeed whether it is even a benefit at all) is determined by the person's 
(perfected) preferences. 
Thus, the value of certain types of benefits will be subjective valuations in the 
sense that the actual value of outcome of a medical intervention is determined by the 
individual. This is because the value of any benefit that might accrue is tied to the 
identity and life plans of person who might accrue the benefit and so the same type of 
benefit may offer a different quantity of benefit or be more important depending upon 
personal identity and life plans. For example, suppose that two people have the same 
infection in a leg, one an Olympic sprinter and one a paraplegic. No one denies that 
losing a limb is a horrible experience, but curing the infection without the amputation 
would certainly give greater advantage to the interests of the Olympic athlete since, if 
her leg were amputated, it would be a major setback of her interests and life plans. The 
paraplegic, however, would already have life plans that did not involve the use of the 
leg. Thus, the quantity of the benefit of saving the leg would be greater for the Olympic 
sprinter than the paraplegic because the type of benefit (saving a leg) is more central to 
the identity and life plans of the sprinter than to those of the paraplegic and the to lose 
the leg would be a much greater detriment to the sprinter's interests than to the 
paraplegic's interests. 
The subjective value of a potential benefit also shows itself when the type of 
benefit is different. Suppose that Chris, a professional ballet dancer, needs surgery that 
is expected to prevent her from becoming quadriplegic and Dave, a longtime PVS 
(persistent vegetative state) patient, needs surgery that will save his life. For Chris, the 
type of potential benefit from the surgery is prevention of quadriplegia and the quantity 
of that benefit is extremely large since, as an active person who relies on physical 
activity for her profession, becoming a quadriplegic would be extremely detrimental to 
her interests. For Dave, the value of continued life in a persistent vegetative state is at 
least controversial. For many people, biological life in a PVS has little value and so the 
surgery would only offer a small quantity of benefit. Of course, many people think that 
all life has intrinsic value and so would argue that the surgery for Dave would be a large 
benefit. This, however, does not necessarily imply that certain types of benefits 
(particularly continued life) are more important than others. What this can mean is that 
there is such a high value placed on life by those people (even if not by Dave) that 
continued life always yields a large quantity of benefit. 
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By assessing the type, length, quality and probability of the benefit, one can determine 
how great the benefit is. Of course, these three factors will not always agree and no one 
of them trumps any other, but all four factors inform the determination of the greatness 
of the benefit. A patient could have a high probability of obtaining a minimal quality 
benefit that will last a long time, a low probability of obtaining a high quality benefit 
that will not last very long and so on. The benefit to a person cannot really be 
quantified (even though probabilities are given in percentages, the importance to a 
patient is not a numerical value) and there is no calculus for determining exactly how 
great a benefit is. Certainly a benefit that is long-lasting, high quality and has an 
excellent chance of obtaining is a greater benefit than a short-term, low quality benefit 
that has minimal chance of obtaining but, in general, the determination will depend on 
the facts of the particular situation and the reasoned judgment of those making the 
decisions. 
2. Why include potential benefit? 
Potential benefit should certainly be considered when determining a patient's claim to a 
resource. After all, if a resource is given to someone who simply cannot benefit from it 
then the resource is simply wasted and by strengthening the claims of those who have 
the greatest potential for benefit, we get the most "bang for our buck" out of a medical 
resource.. Indeed, few people if any argue against considering potential benefit even if 
there are smaller disagreements about calculating the extent of the benefit. Even among 
those who advocate for entirely equal distribution systems, such as a lottery, most 
advocate narrowing the pool of potential recipients to those who can benefit from the 
resource. 
3. How will it fit with other considerations? 
The importance of benefit as a consideration can vary. Certainly, it should be taken as 
more or less important depending on the level of certainty there is about the prognosis. 
If the probabilities are mere guesses and no one is quite sure what will happen, then not 
much importance can be attached to potential benefit when determining a patient's 
claim. The more certainty about the prognosis, the more important benefit is in 
determining who should be given resource. Also, considering potential benefit 
strengthens a claim proportionally with how great the potential benefit is; greater 
benefits strengthen a claim more than smaller potential benefits. 
There will certainly be a tension between potential benefit and other 
considerations. Interestingly, accepting a potential benefit criterion could indirectly 
introduce an age criterion, since length of benefit is one of the factors that determines 
potential benefit and, all else equal, young people can benefit from a resource longer 
since they will live longer. Also, because the potential benefit criterion is 
predominantly efficiency-driven and patient-focused, it will conflict with any 
consideration that is more equality-driven (such as wait time) or other-focused (such as 
responsibility for dependents) but will likely be in accord with other efficiency-based 
considerations. And there will likely be conflict with both need and urgency. Need and 
benefit are tied together because one can not need something if one cannot benefit from 
it but this does not mean that need and benefit will always support the same course of 
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action. Indeed, someone may very easily need something that has little potential 
benefit. And the tension with urgency comes because those whose situations are more 
urgent are sometimes significantly less likely to benefit. 
Urgency 
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When a person asserts a claim to a scarce resource because the person "needs it more" 
or "can't wait for it", the person may be making a claim based at least partially upon 
considerations of urgency. There is little literature that addresses urgency specifically, 
since urgency is often (and unconsciously) rolled in as part and parcel with benefit or 
need. In order to assess urgency as a consideration in its own right, it must first be 
determined what exactly urgency means independently of other considerations before 
arguing that it is an independently justifiable consideration and discussing how it fits 
with other considerations. 
1. What is urgency, particularly in relation to need and benefit? 
Urgency recognizes that there is a limited amount of time to act in some situations; an 
urgent situation is one that calls for immediate action in order to accomplish a goal 
before the point in time arrives at which it is no longer possible to accomplish that goal. 
For example, suppose a woman is bitten by a snake whose venom is fatal unless the 
antidote is administered within one hour of being bitten. This is an urgent situation 
because it requires the immediate action of acquiring and administering the antidote in 
order to accomplish the goal of saving the woman's life before the hour is up. Once the 
hour is up, the woman's life can no longer be saved and that is why the action must be 
immediate. As such, urgency is a function of time, specifically, of how much time is 
16
 Actually, when a person claims that someone "needs it more", he or she could mean any number of 
different things. But one thing they may mean is that the person needs it more than someone else because 
the person has less time, e.g. to live, than someone else. It is this understanding that will be the focus of 
this section. 
left to accomplish one's goal before the time endpoint is reached. Of course, in many 
situations exactly how much time is available will not be known. Suppose that the 
woman is bitten but she and her party do not know that the antidote must be 
administered within an hour to save her life; they may only know that it must be 
administered within some time period, or that it must be administered "soon". Even if 
the woman and her party do not think the snake is remotely poisonous, the clock is still 
ticking whether they know it or not. The fact of not knowing does not make the 
situation any less urgent. 
Urgency is usually discussed as a part of an amalgamation of need, benefit or 
both concepts and not as a separately justifiable concept in its own right. 
Understanding the limits of these three concepts would be helped by a discussion of 
what each brings to the table. Kilner, for example, combines urgency, need (which he 
considers a factor that justifies considerations, not a consideration in its own right) and 
one aspect of benefit (continued life) under the heading of "Imminent Death". And 
when urgency is discussed separately from need and benefit, the meaning of urgency is 
not always conceptually separated from need or benefit or its relationship to need and 
benefit is not explained. Winslow, for example, couples urgency with need without 
either defining one in terms of the other or discussion how they are related, both in his 
discussion of triage and in his enumeration of the principles for triage. Thus, the 
relationship between urgency and need and urgency and benefit must be understood. 
Such a connection could quite easily lead to the conclusion that urgency is a 
function of need, benefit or both. After all, urgency (only) represents a limit on how 
much time one has to satisfy a need or accomplish a benefit. As such, it does not make 
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sense to try and explain urgency as a separable concept from need or benefit; it only 
makes sense to talk of an urgent need or an urgent benefit. However, this argument 
confuses contingent concurrence with conceptual dependence. The connection to 
benefit and need is not inherent to the concept of urgency but is due to human nature. It 
would be extraordinarily rare for a person to seek to accomplish something or satisfy a 
need for something that is purely harmful (even a sadist or a masochist derives the 
benefit of pleasure from the harm of pain and one who bedevils his enemies derives 
pleasure from the suffering of those enemies). Suppose, for example, that a man is 
offered an investment opportunity and he is given only 10 minutes to decide if he wants 
to buy in. Now, the man knows with 100% certainty that the business will fail and that, 
should he invest in it, he will suffer substantial financial harm. Nonetheless, though he 
anticipates no benefit and only harm from investing, the man chooses to buy in anyway. 
It then becomes a matter of urgency to get ahold of the person in charge of the 
investment opportunity so that he can buy in. Now, this example is quite farfetched 
because it is quite unlikely that anyone would seek to do something that they know for a 
fact will only cause them harm with no corresponding benefit whatsoever. People 
generally do not seek pure harm. However, the example illustrates the theoretical 
disconnect between urgency and benefit. It is a matter of urgency to contact the man in 
change of the investment opportunity even though making the investment is not a 
benefit in any way. 
Additionally, urgency attaches not merely to the attainment of the goal but also 
the actions taken to accomplish the goal. In the above example, the time constraint is 
not merely on the buy in but also on contacting the person in charge of the investment 
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and arriving at an agreement about the terms of the man's investment. As such, 
urgency is a factor of the situation in which the need satisfaction, benefit attainment or 
other goal accomplishment takes place. Thus, there is no urgent need, urgent benefit or 
even urgent goal but an urgent situation, which encompasses not only the goal but also 
the actions taken to accomplish the goal. 
A situation is not necessarily urgent from its inception, but the question of at 
what point a situation becomes urgent is a difficult one. A situation that is not urgent 
may become so and a situation that is currently urgent may have started out not being 
urgent; immediate action may not be requires if one's deadline is in the distant future 
but as one comes closer and closer to that deadline the situation becomes urgent and 
increasingly so. Not all situations involving deadlines are cases of urgency since not 
all deadlines require immediate action to be taken in order that they are met. There is, 
however, no equation that determines the point at which a situation becomes urgent 
particularly because urgency is highly dependent upon the context of a specific 
situation, specifically on what action needs to be taken, how long that action takes, how 
much time is left until the point past which the goal can no longer be attained is reached 
and so on. Additionally, urgency is not a threshold concept; that is, a situation can be 
more or less urgent and as the designated endpoint draws nearer and the goal is not 
attained. Suppose that a woman is in a car accident that severely injures her leg and she 
will lose her leg if she does not have surgery within two hours. In such cases, the 
situation is quite urgent from the moment the woman's leg is injured; surgery is 
required soon to save her leg. In other situations, such as if the woman needs surgery 
sometime in the next couple of days instead of the next couple of hours, having the 
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surgery may get put on a back burner because there is plenty of time before the deadline 
to save her leg is reached. But as more time passes with the goal as yet unattained, 
more immediate (and possibly more frenzied) action is required and the situation 
becomes increasingly urgent. 
There are many ways to relieve this urgency, though not all are available in 
every situation. First, one way is simply to take the necessary action to attain the goal; 
once the woman receives the surgery and her leg is saved, it is no longer a matter of 
Urgency to save her leg. Second, urgency is eliminated when the designated endpoint is 
reached and the goal is not attained. If the woman does not receive surgery in time, the 
goal of saving her leg is rendered moot and it is not a matter of urgency to do what 
cannot be done. A third way of relieving urgency that is not available in all situations is 
to somehow change the endpoint, or buy oneself more time. It may not be possible to 
buy more time to save the woman's leg, but in other cases this is certainly an option. If 
a person severs his finger in a construction accident, putting the severed finger on ice 
may buy him more time to get to the hospital and get the finger reattached than he 
would otherwise have had if he had not put the finger on ice. A fourth way of relieving 
the urgency of a situation may be to change the goal one is trying to attain. Changing a 
goal may relieve or increase urgency, depending upon the context of the situation. 
Suppose that the car accident victim has other significant injuries and that the doctors 
realize that if they focus on saving her leg she may very well die of her other injuries 
and so they change the goal to saving her life but not her leg. Suppose the actions 
needed to save her life are not needed as urgently as those needed to save her leg and so 
the urgency of the situation is relieved somewhat by the shift in goal. 
The situation is urgent because the medical facts of the case limit how much 
time there is to accomplish the goal but even in the clinical setting this is not always the 
case. Consider that two people are on dialysis and both urgently need a kidney 
transplant. A man needs the transplant urgently because his last site for an arterio-
venous fistula has failed and the woman needs the transplant urgently because she will 
be fired from her job and lose her health insurance if she has to continue taking time off 
because of dialysis and its side effects. In the man's case, the urgency comes from the 
medical facts of the case; he must now receive dialysis through a catheter, which puts 
him at increased risks of infection and he may even die without the transplant. In the 
woman's case, the urgency does not come from the medical facts of the situation but 
from the economic facts of the situation; she will suffer economic collapse if she does 
hot get a transplant soon. The woman's situation is no less urgent because it is not 
made urgent because of the medical facts of the case but by the socio-economic ones. 
In both cases, immediate action is required in order to prevent harm to the individuals; 
the different nature of the harm to each does not make the situation less urgent but 
affects the benefit that each would receive from the intervention. 
Urgency and need are often combined into one concept that is expressed by the 
idea that one person is "needier" than another or that someone "needs something now". 
But understanding need in the way discussed in the section on need makes urgency and 
need conceptually separable. The definition of urgency is that immediate action must 
be taken in order for a goal to be attained. And since there are no constraints on the 
selection of the goal, the chosen goal need not be something that is needed. True, it is 
often the case that the goal to be attained in an urgent situation is the satisfaction of a 
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need and all of the above examples of urgency are cases in which the satisfaction of a 
need is urgent. However, just as not all cases of need are cases of urgency (the need for 
surgery sometime within the next four months, for example), not all cases of urgency 
involve needs. Suppose that a Jimmy, a 48 year old man, presents to his primary 
physician with a rare kidney infection. If the infection stays in the kidney, which is its 
typical course, then the only clinical symptom is that the man's urine turns an alarming 
shade of chartreuse. If the infection spreads, it can cause flu-like symptoms for two or 
three weeks and then clear up on its own. There are several treatment options to 
prevent the spread of the infection, including a variety of antibiotics and surgical 
removal of the kidney. However, it is Friday and the local hospital's entire surgery 
department is leaving early the next morning for a conference and a covering surgeon 
will be available only for emergencies, which Jimmy's infected kidney is not. If they 
wait until the general surgery team returns, the infection will have already either spread 
or cleared up, rendering surgical removal of the kidney moot. So if Jimmy and his 
physicians opt for kidney removal, they will have to do it today. Now, Jimmy does not 
need the surgery; indeed, given the risks of surgery (and only having one kidney) versus 
the limited side effects of the drug alternatives and the fact that there is a good chance 
that the infection would even clear up on its own, surgery is not the best treatment 
option. But because if the surgery is going to be done it has to be done now, it is a 
matter of urgency. Thus, while urgent situations can (and maybe often do, especially in 
the medical context) involve need satisfaction, need and urgency are conceptually and 
functionally separate concepts. 
Urgency is also closely linked to benefit, though these two concepts are also 
entirely conceptually separate. The example of Jimmy's infected kidney can illustrate 
this as well. It is not clear that surgery would be beneficial for Jimmy, since, on 
balance, the risks of surgical intervention would almost certainly outweigh the benefits 
by a large margin. In a strict sense, Jimmy would receive the benefit of the infection 
not spreading since the site of the infection had been removed. However, the risks and 
harms of the surgery so far outweigh that benefit, especially given that it can be 
achieved through other simple and far less risky means, it is hard to say that he would 
receive an overall benefit. That being said, there are no theoretical constraints on what 
that thing to be accomplished can be but what a person seeks to accomplish will almost 
always be something that he or she sees as a benefit (recall that "prevention of harm" 
falls under the heading of a benefit). Nearly every urgent situation will likely be one in 
which immediate action is required in order to obtain some benefit or other simply 
because the goals that people set tend to be beneficial in some way. Of course, some 
goals may have both harms and benefits associated with them (the side effects of 
chemotherapy are harmful but the therapeutic aspects can be beneficial), or may be a 
harm that will bring about a benefit (amputating a person's leg in order to stop the 
spread of gangrene, ultimately saving the person's life), but the Ultimate benefit in these 
situations is what the person seeks to accomplish. 
There is one final complication to the relationship between need and benefit and 
urgency: even though urgency is conceptually separate from either need or benefit, it 
does rely on its relationship with need and benefit for its moral force. If Jimmy were to 
enter the hospital and declare that it is a matter of urgency that he have his kidney 
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surgically removed, he would be correct. However, if the surgery is neither needed nor 
particularly beneficial, it is hard to see how the urgency matters in any way, morally. 
Thus, urgency can only have an affect on claims that feature need or benefit. 
2. Why consider urgency when evaluating claims? 
There is an important practical reason that could favor an urgency consideration: if a 
resource is given to the people for whom getting the resource is urgent before it is given 
to those for whom getting the resource is not urgent then more people will get the 
resource than if the resource is given to those for whom getting the resource is not 
urgent before it is given to those for whom getting the resource is urgent. This is 
because the time may run out for the people whose situation is urgent before the 
resource is given to them in the time it takes to give it to those whose situation is not 
urgent. Suppose, for example, that in the above example of the woman in the car 
accident, there is another person, a man, who is injured and who needs surgery but his 
surgery is not urgent. Provided he has surgery sometime in the next several days, he 
will not suffer any ill effects. Now, suppose the hospital only has one surgical team 
available and will not have another available for three hours. If the surgeons operate on 
the man first, only he will get he surgery he needs and she will lose her leg. However, 
if the surgeons operate on the woman first then both the woman and the man will get 
the surgery they need and recover fully. 
The idea that fewer people will die without treatment if the most urgent and 
severe cases are treated first is compelling indeed and is evident in numerous 
emergency triage policies. To be clear, triage itself is simply a method of sorting 
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patients into treatment categories that is seldom based solely upon urgency. Military 
triage, for example, has in the past prioritized those who can immediately be returned to 
the fighting even if others are in much more dire straightslxxxi". Also, Stedman's 
Concise Medical Dictionary defines triage as "medical screening of patients to 
determine their relative priority for treatment; the separation of a large number of 
casualties.. .into three groups: 1) those who cannot be expected to survive, even with 
treatment; 2) those who will recover without treatment; 3) the highest priority group, 
those who will not survive without treatment"lxxxiv, which is a division based solely 
upon need and benefit. However, treatment policies in emergency rooms across the 
country that state that more serious and more urgent cases will be seen before others 
regardless of wait time and old M*A*S*H reruns that display triage of surgical patients 
in the compound testify to the use of urgency (in combination with benefit) as a criteria 
for further sorting those who fit in Stedman's third category, just as in the example of 
the car accident above. 
One place where urgency has been given a seminal place is in the distribution of 
livers for transplant by the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS). Of course, 
needing a new liver and the potential to benefit from a transplant is what gets a person 
on the transplant list in the first place, but among those on the list the only consideration 
that takes priority over urgency is that the blood type of the liver is a match to the 
recipient. Aside from that, urgency is the decisive consideration used in the distribution 
of livers. UNOS uses a Model for End-Stage Liver Disease (MELD) score for patients 
over 12 years old as a determinant of how likely one is to live three months . The 
scores range from 6-40 and are calculated from three lab values: serum creatnine, 
bilirubin, and INR (an indicator of the liver's ability to make blood clotting factors). 
The higher the MELD score, the sooner the patient is likely to die and so the situation is 
more urgent for people with higher MELD scores. Livers are thus distributed to the 
person among the blood type matches with the highest MELD score. The justification 
that UNOS offers for implementing a system based predominantly on urgency is just 
the consequentialist justification of aiding more people and indeed, since the 
implementation of this system in February 2002, UNOS reports a decrease in the 
number of people who die while on the waiting listlxxxv. 
There are two key problems with this system and they are the problems 
associated with accepting urgency as a consideration. The first problem is a theoretical 
problem with the justification of employing urgency as a consideration. The prevailing 
justification for the use of urgency as a consideration is the consequentialist justification 
that (ceteris paribus) treating the most urgent cases will result in more people being 
treated overall. And this is true in all but one important case: when the resource that is 
to be distributed is finite and scarce and once the resource is used no more will be 
available. Consider the system for the distribution of livers by UNOS. One key reason 
that UNOS is able to aid more people by implementing an urgency criterion is because 
transplantable livers, while scarce are constantly coming available and by giving these 
to the most urgent cases they are able to catch more people before they die on the 
waiting list. If, for whatever reason, the removal of organs from living or dead human 
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 Children under 12 years old are scored using the Pediatric End-Stage Liver Disease (PELD) model, 
which adds growth failure and age at listing to the calculation. For simplicity, I will leave out transitions 
from PELD to MELD and other complications and only discuss the MELD system. 
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and human-like creatures were to suddenly become illegal and UNOS would only ever 
have the finite number of livers, say fifteen, it happens to have taken just before the new 
law were to go into effect, only fifteen people would be able to undergo a transplant 
whether the livers are given to the most urgent cases or not. In cases where the amount 
of the resource on hand is all that is likely to be available, the consequentialist 
justification for urgency does not hold since more people are not aided. 
The second problem is the practical problem that, despite the hope that 
prioritizing people whose situations are urgent will reduce the number of those who are 
not treated, such a system is likely to be quite inefficient. This is readily apparent in the 
UNOS liver distribution program. It is true that under the MELD score-based system, 
fewer people die on the waiting list. However, because priority is given to the highest 
scores, people generally do not get livers until their situations are quite urgent because 
they are more seriously ill. And, unfortunately, the sicker one is, the less likely he or 
she is to survive the rigors of a liver transplant. A study of one year post-transplant 
survival outcomes by Saab, et al. found that "patient survival was worse with higher 
MELD scores"lxxxvl. Another study published a year later by Northup and Berg found 
that, while patient survival outcomes are unrelated to the amount of change in one's 
MELD score in the days or weeks prior to transplant, one's MELD score at 
transplantation was still the significant indicator of mortality outcomeslxxxv". Thus, it is 
true that more people are able to have access to livers but by the time they are badly 
enough off to get them, their chances of surviving have decreased. 
3. Should urgency be accepted as a consideration? 
The case for accepting urgency as a consideration is a strong one. In the case of the 
woman who must have surgery to save her leg after a car accident, we really do think 
that she should have surgery before the person who can wait and we think this for 
reasons that are not captured by appealing to benefit or need or anything besides the fact 
that she needs it now and, though he needs it, he does not need it immediately and he 
will not have a worse outcome for having waited. If one person can wait for the 
resource without having his or her outcome adversely affected and another cannot, the 
person who cannot wait should get to go first. And that is what is so compelling about 
urgency and why it should be accepted here. 
And the problems that arise are not insurmountable. The first problem points to 
the inability of the consequentialist justification to justify giving a resource to the 
person for whom it is (more) urgent when there is simply no more of the resource. This 
does not rule out urgency as a consideration but merely points to the fact that urgency 
cannot be the only consideration because it does not apply in such a situation. If three 
people need a thing and one of them needs it within and hour, the second needs it within 
two hours and the third needs it within four hours and there is only one of the thing and 
there will not be another for several days, then urgency cannot help determine which of 
the three people should get the thing. But if another thing will come available in three 
hours, then the decision is between the two people whose situations are more urgent, 
since the third person can now wait. The scope of urgency as a consideration, then, is 
limited to situations where the resource may be limited but it has not run out and there 
is a chance of getting more of that resource. 
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The problem of inefficiency can also be overcome by acknowledging that other 
considerations should be employed. In situations where the person whose situation is 
less urgent will be adversely affected by waiting, then other considerations come in to 
play. Urgency should be checked against, especially, benefit and need in order to 
prevent the rampant inefficiency that could result from giving priority to those whose 
situation is the most dire. Urgency will also likely conflict with equality-based 
considerations, such as responsibility for dependents, since such considerations will 
blunt efficiency concerns. 
Age 
The idea that one's age can alter one's claim to a resource is a widespread one. Kilner 
reports that "88 percent of renal center directors consider age a legitimate 
consideration" and that "57 percent [of physicians] consider age a very important 
consideration in deciding which of two patients is to receive the last available bed in the 
ICU (with a much higher percentage according the criterion at least some 
importance)",xxxvm. The general idea behind an age consideration is that being older or 
younger (depending upon the particular situation) affects one's claim to the resource in 
question purely in virtue of their age. 
1. What does an age criterion look like? 
An age consideration is appealing for a number of reasons. It is easy to assess and 
apply; that is, one can easily determine a person's age and then distribute the scarce 
resource to the appropriate person. Of course, the closer in age the competitors for the 
resource are, the less significant the age consideration will be in one's reckoning. 
Suppose the choice is whether to provide a resource to a 35 year old or to a 36 year old. 
In this case, age is not going to come into play much, whereas it would if the choice is 
between, say, a 25 year old and a 75 year old. The strength and importance of an age 
criterion in making distribution decisions will vary by case. 
An age criterion often manifests itself as age limits on particular procedures but 
introducing an age consideration does not imply that age limits will be instituted for 
different treatments. If one were to institute age limitations on certain treatments, such 
as the understood age cut-off of fifty-five years old for a heart transplant ™ax, then one 
would have to justify the age chosen as the cut-off. If the cut-off is fifty-five years, is it 
really the case that a 54 year-old patient has a significantly better prognosis than a 56 
year-old patient? The difficulty with utilizing age limits is that the limit itself is 
typically arbitrary and one has to justify the choice of one limit instead of another. Of 
course, accepting an age criterion does not mean that one has to institute age limits on 
treatments. An age criterion simply states that, ceteris paribus, the resource will be 
distributed according to the competitors' ages. In this way, the age criterion can be 
relative; one can compare the ages of the patients to each other. One can see patients 
not as too old or too young for a resource but as older or younger than the other 
competitors. 
A second assumption in discussions on age is that an age consideration favors 
the distribution of resources to younger patients. However, it is important to keep in 
mind that an age criterion does not always reduce the claim of those who are older; in 
some cases, younger people's claims are at issue. For example, a number of researchers 
advocate excluding the very young from renal dialysis because of concerns about the 
effect of dialysis on children's physical development and doubts about whether children 
would comply with the strict diet and other difficulties of those undergoing dialysisxc. 
2. Why consider age when evaluating claims? 
The initial plausibility of an age criterion is readily apparent. The reason most often 
given for favoring older people over young people are that the very young cannot 
withstand the rigors of difficult treatments. Reasons given for favoring younger people 
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over older people are that more life years are saved when the young are saved, the 
elderly have already lived a great portion or their lives, the quality of life of the young is 
generally better than the old and there is a series of arguments about greater potential 
productivity18 (and the resulting contribution to society) of younger people than of older 
people. Almost every proponent of an age criterion appeals to one of these 
justifications. 
However, these explanations are not explanations of an age criterion. Applying 
an age criterion based on these considerations runs into two interconnected problems. 
The first problem is that an age criterion is not what is being applied; for example, the 
justification that younger people should get a resource before older people because the 
young have more life ahead of them than older people is actually a length of benefit 
consideration. Likewise, the justification that the very young cannot withstand the 
rigueur of difficult treatments is actually a prospect of benefit consideration; the quality 
of life justification is just that- a quality of life consideration; and the productivity 
justification is simply a productivity consideration. Instituting an age criterion would 
thus add a layer of needless complication to the matter. 
The second problem is that appealing to other considerations in order to justify 
the age criterion is unjustified because these other considerations are not age-dependent 
and do not vary directly with age and so would not justify applying an age criterion. 
We can all come up with (not-so-outlandish) cases where the older person will be the 
one with the greater prospect of benefit, where the very young person would be better 
able to withstand the rigors of a particular treatment better than an older person, where 
18
 Kilner lists potential productivity as a justification of age in its own right (op. cit. 79) but he misses that 
potential productivity is a consideration of its own, like prospect of benefit and length of benefit, 
the elderly patient has the better quality of life and so on. Now, it is true that, generally 
speaking, a younger person will live longer than an older person (thus allowing for 
greater productivity for society, longer prospective benefits, etc.) but age is only one 
determinant among many. Consider the justification that younger people are likely to 
live longer and then suppose that two people are admitted to a hospital, both needing a 
type O negative blood transfusion. One is a fifteen year old with leukemia and a very 
poor prognosis; the other is a sixty year-old car accident victim who is in otherwise 
good health. An age criterion (justified by a concern for length of benefit) would 
simply be counterproductive here since the car accident victim is likely to live another 
decade or two, at least, while the girl with leukemia is likely to only live another year at 
most. If the point of applying an age criterion is to distribute resources to people who 
are most likely to accrue longer benefits from those resources, then it fails in this case 
because length of benefit is not dependent upon age. 
There is one justification of an age criterion in its own right that has been 
discussed extensively in the literature: age group or generational equality. This 
justification does not apply to arguments about weakening the claims of the young; 
rather, this justification focuses solely on the reduced claims of older people. Now, it 
seems odd to say that an age criterion would promote equality. It seems prima facie 
likely that an age criterion would be a form of age discrimination and therefore break 
down equality because it would favor giving resources to the young over the old. Most 
commentators, however, point out that age discrimination is different from other forms 
of discrimination based on group membership because, unlike race or gender, we all get 
to be in the privileged group (the young) and most of us can expect to be in the 
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underprivileged group (the old)xcl. If everyone gets a chance to be in privileged group 
and most also grow into the disadvantaged group, it is not clear that there is any 
unfairness. It is important to note that these theories of equality would not justify 
withholding treatment from the very young, only from the elderly. After all, one cannot 
argue that everyone has a chance to be in the advantaged group (the young) if the claims 
of the very young are diminished because of their age. 
Indeed, there are a number of arguments from equality that support an age 
consideration. First, it has been argued that benefits (in this case, medical resources) 
should be equalized over lifetimes; that is, instead of comparing people at particular 
times, one should consider the benefits and resources accrued in the totality of that life. 
Regarding this, Cupit points out that applying an age criterion "may affect when, within 
a lifetime, benefits come; but it need not affect the level of benefits one person has 
compared with another""011. Such a criterion has the additional practical benefit that 
"concentrating benefits in the early years of people's lives will tend to equalize lifetime 
benefits between people who will live to different ages"xcm. 
However, this understanding of equal distributions seems to require that the 
relevant comparison be between age groups and not individuals. Since the concern is 
with some kind of equal distribution of resources over a lifetime, it makes much more 
sense to compare individual consumption than the average consumption of an age 
group. Recall the above example of the leukemia patient and the car accident victim. 
Suppose that the sixty year-old car accident victim has lived quite a healthy life and has 
only been hospitalized briefly once before after a construction accident, whereas the 
leukemia patient has undergone two years of extensive treatments. Now, if one is 
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concerned with distributing resources equally within whole lives, it seems that the older 
person should receive the transfusion because he has received fewer resources over the 
course of his life. While it is true that a disproportionate amount of healthcare resources 
are consumed by the elderly and that living longer gives one more time to have 
consumed resources, simply having lived longer is no indication that one will have 
consumed more resources. 
Additionally, simply because the car accident victim belongs to a group (older 
people), the members of which tend to use more medical resources, is no reason to 
diminish a particular member's claim to the resources. After all, even if low-income 
people tend to commit more crimes and if there are two people who could have 
committed a crime, there is no reason to arrest the person with the lower income simply 
because she has a lower income and low-income people tend to commit more crimes 
than higher income people. Nothing in anything thus far explains why "older" or 
"younger" is a morally relevant kind for equal resource distribution, especially 
considering there are plenty of cases where individual older people have used fewer 
medical resources than individual younger people. If the concern is about equalizing 
resources or welfare (whichever way this is to be interpreted) over a lifetime, then one 
should compare individuals, not the groups to which those individuals belong. 
But there is another way that the argument to equalize benefits over time might 
be understood: instead of equalizing benefits actually accrued, suppose that what should 
be equalized is the amount of time that one has had access to a resource, whether that 
person has used the resource or not. Older people, clearly, will have had more years of 
access to the resource. There is one practical problem with this assertion. When a new 
medical technology comes out, a five-year-old will have had the same number of years 
of access as the ninety-year-old man. The only person who can claim that she has not 
had as many years of access to a new technology as another person is a person born 
after the technology comes out. The same problem can play out a number of ways. 
Suppose someone is sixty years old but has recently emigrated from country in which 
he did not have access to even basic medical care. A ten-year-old who was born and 
raised in the United States, then, would have had access to various resources for a 
greater number of years than the immigrant. And even in the United States, access to 
medical care is not guaranteed; some people, in virtue of poverty, geography or 
whatever simply do not always have access to much beyond basic medical care and 
sometimes not even that. The point is that one's circumstances, not just one's age, 
determines one's access to medical care. 
It is true, however, that the cases described above probably represent a small 
number of exceptions; age does generally determine how much access one has had to 
resources. But there is a more pressing problem: specifically, why does it matter if 
someone has had access to a medical resource for seventy years if one has not needed 
the resource until now? Suppose an older gentleman is arrested and at the jail and, for 
the first time in his life, he requests a criminal lawyer. The detective tells him that he 
has had access to a lawyer for decades and so he does not get one now. Lawyers are for 
younger people. Having access to the lawyer for decades does not help the gentleman 
now. Likewise, having access to medical care for years does not matter if one does not 
have it when one needs it. Access to resources is only helpful to a person who has to 
use those resources. This is especially true because medical resources cannot be stored 
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up or saved for the future like food or money. Having access to money, food or other 
retainable goods allows one to build up a nest egg against the day when those things are 
no longer coming in. Conversely, having access to medical resources when one does 
not need them does not give a person the opportunity to store up such resources. So it is 
not clear why access to resources over time is something that should be equalized. 
A more plausible justification is the "fair innings" argument. There is strong 
intuitive appeal here because living longer is ceteris paribus of value. On one 
understanding of this statement, if it is valuable to live more years, then the person who 
would live the longest after the resource is given should receive it. This is simply the 
length of benefit consideration again. Another reading of this statement is that the 
resources should be given to the young in order to equalize people's opportunities to 
live beyond their youth or live a normal length life. The idea is to attempt to reduce the 
impact of losses in the natural lottery (or simple bad luck) by prioritizing the young; it 
should be noted that this does strictly prioritize the young over the old. Suppose two 
patients, one who is 20 years old and one who is 50 years old both need a new cancer 
drug and the prognosis for both is the same. With the drug, each is expected to live five 
more years but without the drug each will die in a matter of weeks. Because production 
has not gotten fully underway, there is not enough of the drug for both patients. The 50 
year-old has only had 50 years of life already and the 20 year-old has only had 20 and 
so to give the extra five years to the 50 year-old would be to give more years to the 
person who already has more, increasing the inequality of years lived. In terms of life 
years, since the 20 year old has fewer and the 50 year old has more, then the 20 year old 
is the least well off in terms of life years. Following the "fair innings" argument, the 20 
year-old should get the drug since the extra five years represent 25% more life for the 
20 year-old and only 10% more life for the 50 year-old. 
But why does the difference in percentage matter so much? If a bag of potato 
chips says "Now with 15% More", you get more chips. But in this case, both the 25% 
and the 10% will only ever be five years in absolute value; the extra 15% does not get 
you more years. The years are not longer for the young person than the old person. 
Giving five more years to an older person over a younger person is also not like giving 
an extra $ 100 to a rich person over a poor one. What about being younger makes the 
two years more valuable, or what about being older makes the two years less valuable? 
One reason that more years of life are valuable is so that we have more time for life 
projects, relationships, accomplishing goals and so on. A person who is older may (or 
may not) be farther along in these projects and indeed an older person may have 
undertaken more relationships and projects than a younger person. To reduce this 
complicated picture of life to a person's age is a vast oversimplification. 
Or, another reason that a person might value life is if life is intrinsically 
valuable. If this is the case, then it is still not clear why treating people as equals would 
require that those five years be distributed to the younger person. If life is valuable in 
and of itself independent of life experiences, then it is equally valuable for older person 
and the younger person. The Rawlsian might argue that because the older person has 
more years than the younger person, the younger person is less well off with regard to 
life years. And it is by definition true that older people have lived more life years than 
younger people. But the difference that the 20 year-old gets 25% more life does not 
equalize or improve his or her opportunity to live to a ripe old age since he or she will 
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only live to be 25 years old. The new cancer drug is not a cure; the 20 year old will not 
have an Opportunity to live any older than 25. 
3. Should age be a consideration? 
I strongly suspect that the appeal of applying an age criterion is because of its 
connection with so many other intuitively plausible considerations such as length of 
benefit, productivity or social contribution, quality of life and so on. It is also a nice 
bright line that can be drawn. When the age criterion is analyzed in its own right, 
however, it is difficult to justify. Considering age when it is a determinant in other 
considerations, such as length of benefit or likelihood of benefit, is perfectly appropriate 
because it does affect those things. But that does not justify an independent age 
criterion. It may be that looking at other considerations that go to a totality of a 
person's life leads to younger people tending to receive a greater share of the resources, 
but a person's claim should not be diminished because of age. 
Ability to Pay 
One constant in all health care is that no matter what the treatment in question, it costs 
money. Even when the resource in question is donated, as are blood products and 
organs, there are still costs associated with the utilization of the donated resource, such 
as physicians' and nurses' time, sterile equipment, anti-rejection drugs of organ 
transplants, heart-lung machines that pump blood and so on. And the money to pay for 
such interventions has to come from somewhere. Unfortunately, the large cost of most 
medical interventions (especially life-saving interventions) is much more than what 
most people can afford to pay out of pocket; with the enormous cost of medical 
treatment, it is not just the poor who are unable to pay for care. Increasingly, higher 
income families are faced with bills they are unable to pay. Many people rely on health 
insurance, but a 2003 study found that 35% of people ages 19-64 were either uninsured 
or underinsured (had insurance insufficient to protect patients from amassing 
catastrophic medical bills)XCIV. If a patient cannot pay for his or her treatment, then the 
cost of treatment must be either paid for by taxpayers via government programs, be 
borne by the hospital or the patient must go without. The question then arises, when 
one must decide between patients, should a patient's being able to pay (either out of 
pocket or through adequate insurance coverage) or not for the treatment in question 
affect his or her claim to the resource? 
1. What does the ability to pay criterion encompass? 
In the strict sense, ability to pay is simply that- one's ability to pay for one's medical 
expenses, whether by paying out of pocket or by paying for medical insurance 
(including Medicare). However, discussions of this consideration often range beyond 
this more strict understanding of ability to pay and may encompass any expenditure a 
patient may make in obtaining a limited health resourcexcv. Often, ability to pay is 
confused with other pecuniary activities such as monetary donations to healthcare 
institutions generally, for awareness campaigns and/or medical research, for organizing 
blood drives or advertising for organ donors or one might simply bribe the doctor or 
allocator. And all of these are ways that monetary expenditure might influence one's 
access to a particular resource in different ways. However, all of these are examples of 
considerations entirely different from one's ability to pay one's bills. The case of 
giving money to fund awareness campaigns and research is an example of past (and 
possibly continuing) contributions. Equipment and monetary donations to specific 
hospitals are also examples of past (and possibly continuing) contributions unless there 
are strings attached to the gift, in which case it is likely a contractual issue. And by 
funding blood drives and advertising for donors, a patient increases his or her chances 
of getting a resource either by finding donors to donate specifically to that patient or by 
increasing the amount of the resource available. 
They are also examples of expenditures over and above the simple paying of 
bills and, as such, are completely different issues. In the case of ability to pay, the issue 
is that healthcare costs money and someone has to pay; if it is not the patient, then it has 
to be the hospital or, ultimately, taxpayers via government funds. In the other above 
cases, the issue is not one of who pays but of whether or not additional contributions or 
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efforts can strengthen one's claim to a resource. If a person does not make these 
additional expenditures but pays for his or her care, no one else is left holding the bag. 
Thus, the ability to pay consideration does not encompass all monetary expenditures but 
only those expenditures made to cover the cost of one's own care. These expenditures 
may take the form of simply paying cash out of pocket (including cash that comes from 
donations from friends, family and community/charity groups) or through insurance 
programs. Those without the means to pay out of pocket or who are underinsured and 
cannot cover the expenses their insurance does not cover are not able to pay. 
2. Why accept or reject an ability to pay criterion? 
There are two issues that arise with an ability to pay consideration. First, should ability 
to pay affect a patient's claim to a resource and, second, if so, does one's ability to pay 
strengthen or weaken the patient's claim? The answer to this latter question may seem 
obvious in the current climate of cash-strapped medical facilities and increasing 
healthcare costs, but there are arguments on both sides of that issue. However, the 
former question must first be resolved. 
There are, of course, numerous arguments regarding the validity of an ability to 
pay criterion but the individual arguments generally coalesce into a few main arguments 
on either side of the issue. The arguments for rejecting an ability to pay criterion tend 
to be person-oriented in nature, claiming that a person's value is not determined by his 
or her bankroll and that health and healthcare are so intrinsically necessary in life that it 
is inappropriate to withhold medical treatment because of one's inability to pay. 
Wealthy people are not more entitled to life or to be accorded greater respect and 
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dignity simply because of their wealth because it is humans qua humans that have equal 
intrinsic value and that are deserving of respect and accorded dignity, not wealthy 
humans or poor humans. Depriving people of needed medical treatments because of 
their financial status, then, inappropriately disvalues the less wealthy because of their 
lack of wealth. These sentiments have a strong pull and have been crafted into 
legislation such as the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act 
(EMTALA), which requires Medicare-accepting hospitals to provide emergency and/or 
stabilizing care to patients regardless of their ability to pay. 
Of course, the leap from "people are inherently equal" to policies like 
EMTALA, which ensure the very basic minimum of healthcare to everyone, requires a 
bit more explanation. Unsurprisingly, most studies of monetary impact on health find 
that those without insurance (and are thus more likely to do without healthcare) have 
worse overall health outcomes"0™. And, with the exception of cutting short a person's 
life, nothing limits a person's life prospects as much as having poor health since at least 
some level of good health is instrumental in pursuing the good life, whatever that may 
be. Access to at least a minimum level of healthcare This does not entail that everyone 
is entitled to those things that are necessary to achieve their visions of the good life but 
that they should not be cut off from the pursuit itself. However, this line of argument is 
open to the objection that it goes too far. It entails not only that people have a right to a 
basic minimum of healthcare but also that they have a right to have losses in the natural 
lottery offset using whatever amount of healthcare is necessary to preserve their lives 
and bring them to a certain level of functional health. 
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There are, of course, other arguments in support of a right to a basic decent 
minimum of healthcare, but arguing whether or not people have such a right is beside 
the point of the present project. There are practical realities to consider. Even accepting 
the idea that human beings are equally intrinsically valuable qua human beings and, as 
such, should have access to (at least a certain level of) medical treatments without 
regard to ability to pay, the world is not an ideal one. The reality of the matter is that 
healthcare costs money and there is not an infinite supply of money. Certainly, giving 
one person a scarce resource means it is not available for the others competing for the 
resource but the potential problem is that by distributing scarce resources without regard 
to a patient's ability to pay could affect the care and treatment of people other than 
those competing for the resource since any treatment that a patient receives that he or 
she does not pay for contributes to this financial problem. If medical facilities treat all 
patients without an eye to the economics of the situation, then the hospitals and the 
government (through programs and subsidies) will have to eat the costs of the care for 
those who cannot pay. And the result of hospitals and governments bearing the costs of 
so much expensive care is compromised care for everyone (since less money means less 
up-to-date facilities, fewer doctors and nurses, and so forth) or an overall lack of access 
to medical facilities in places where the financial outlay versus income is untenable. As 
much as we may value human beings qua human beings, the current cost of medical 
treatments makes giving free medical treatment to everyone who cannot afford it 
financially impossible. And, since money (or lack thereof) is often (at least partially) 
behind a scarcity of medical resource, it makes perfect sense to distribute resources 
according to who can pay for them. 
I l l 
This practical concern is sometimes coupled with a more person-oriented, 
Nozickean, appeal to freedom of choicexcv". People choose what to spend their money , 
on and have the freedom to buy medical insurance or save money for medical needs. 
Those who have chosen not to spend their money on medical goods have made their 
beds, so to speak. This argument freedom argument is flawed because, in order to be 
true, one has to make several questionable assumptions. The level of freedom 
(specifically of choice) and the amount of (presumably monetary) resources one must 
have to have that high level of freedom are unrealistically high. The presumption is that 
everyone has a real option to be covered medically, whether through purchasing 
medical insurance, saving sufficient funds to cover oneself medically, or by taking a job 
with great benefits. Some people choose not to go this route. But for the choices a 
person makes, everyone could have bought insurance or saved against a future 
catastrophic health problem. 
But this is simply not the case. Certainly, in the case of any given individual, he 
or she could have worked hard and gone to college and majored in a field (such as 
engineering or pre-medicine) or learned a trade (such as a mechanic or electrician) that 
offers a good prospect of a high salary and a job with good benefits. But even this does 
not take into consideration the realities of many people's family, social or economic 
situation, or even an individual's talents, from the outset. If unfavorable, these areas of 
a person's life can put up legitimate barriers to education and jobs with good benefits. 
And even if all individuals can choose their paths in life despite possible barriers from 
one's family, social class, economic status or individual talents, it is not the case that 
everyone can obtain the financial resources or good job necessary to have the level of 
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freedom necessary to make such choices that the argument asserts. After all, even if 
anyone can be a doctor, it does not follow that everyone can. Someone has to grow the 
food, get it to the store or restaurant, manufacture the laundry detergent, teach the 
children, etc. In order to support a culture in which professionals exist, there has to be 
an entire support network that frees the professional class from doing the work their 
family needs done, such as growing and harvesting food, teaching children, etcXCVI". 
And in order for those who perform these tasks to have the level of (financial) resources 
to make the kind of freedom the argument assumes possible, products such as food 
would have to cost exponentially more than they do and all prices would rise 
drastically. And even wealthy people may be underinsured in the even of catastrophic 
illness. The actual level of freedom all people can possess combined with the 
exorbitantly high cost of medical treatment makes this argument unworkable in this 
context19. 
So it comes down to whether or not the concern for the value of people qua 
people trumps the practical realities of the situation. The practical concern is that in the 
absence of major health care reform hospitals will have to cut back on services and 
staffing to stay solvent which would result in less or compromised care for everyone. It 
is because of this impact on others that ability to pay should be considered. When a 
patient does not pay for health care and receives resources, not only are those resources 
no longer available to others, which is generally the outcome when a resource is used, 
19
 This kind of argument has been much more successfully employed as an objection to single-tiered 
health care systems such as Canada's. See, for example, Krohmal B. Access and ability to pay: The 
ethics of a tiered health care system. Archives of Internal Medicine. 167: 2007. Pp. 433-437 and 
Engelhardt HT. Why a two-tier system of health care delivery is morally unavoidable. In Strosberg M, et 
al. Rationing America's medical care: The Oregon plan and beyond. The Brookings Institution; 1992: 
196-207. 
113 
but also care is compromised a bit more, or other patients will pay more for their 
insurance premiums to cover the difference to maintain the level of care. The point is 
that not only does a no-pay patient reduce the amount of resources available by using 
resources, but by not paying for them, that patient also reduces the level of care for 
everyone or causes others (insurance companies, employers, taxpayers) to have to pay 
more for the level of care to be maintained. This is a kind of double hit to those who 
either find lesser care for themselves or have to pay extra, since the pay patients have 
not only lost the competition for the resource in question but then also have to pay for it, 
either with greater monetary expenditure or with compromised or less care. Thus, not 
only is it more efficient to consider one's ability to pay, but making some patients take a 
double hit is also inconsistent with treating people as equals. 
There is an important argument against this line of reasoning that should be 
mentioned. Returning to the issue of a right to a basic decent minimum of health care, 
the argument is that if a certain level of care is guaranteed to everyone, costs would be 
kept down because everyone would have access to primary and preventative care, 
earlier diagnosis, earlier intervention, etc. and all without using the emergency room as 
a primary care clinic. It would be cheaper and more efficient to offer the basic decent 
minimum of care. Though this argument is not generally employed to address the 
particular problem at issue here, it implies that the argument about compromised care 
due to free riders on the system would no longer be a problemxcl\ There is thankfully 
no need to debate the economics of the situation, though, because, once again, this 
argument misses the point. If everyone is guaranteed a basic decent minimum of health 
care, then there is some entity (e.g., the state, Medicare, the British National Health 
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Service, etc.) that is paying for the care. If it is guaranteed, then it is paid for and ability 
to pay is a non-issue because someone is paying for the resource. The argument from 
the basic decent minimum does not address the current reality of the situation which is 
that people in the United States are generally not guaranteed a basic decent minimum of 
health care. 
3. How does not specifically considering ability to pay affect a patient's claim? 
Considering ability to pay does not, however, leave the poor and uninsured entirely 
without access to health care. The key justification for considering one's ability to pay 
is the impact that a patient not paying has on others, so a no-pay patient's claim is only 
weakened to the extent that not paying actually has a detrimental effect on others. Not 
all treatments have the same cost or impact on hospital budgets, or on the availability of 
resources for others. And many charities provide some money for indigent care. The 
point is that not being able to pay does not bar someone from receiving a health care 
resources; being able to pay is not a necessary condition for obtaining health care or 
scarce resources. 
This does, however, raise a related issue. If the justification for considering 
ability to pay is that failure to pay (ultimately) results in compromised care for 
everyone, then it seems that someone who is willing to pay more than his fair share in 
return for a strengthening of his or her own claim, (ultimately) raising the level of care 
for others, should be able to make such a deal. In some cases, this is fairly easy to 
accept: consider a wealthy dialysis patient who offers to pay for an additional dialysis 
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machine and the staff to run it if he or she can use the machine at his or her 
convenience. Others clearly benefit from the greater availability of dialysis and no one 
is really made worse off by the deal. It is simply a good deal. More problematic are 
people who simply offer to pay more for their treatments in return for special 
consideration. The best answer to this is that, just as not being able to pay only 
weakens a claim to the extent that not paying would have a detrimental effect on others, 
paying extra should only strengthen a claim to the extent that it has a beneficial effect 
on others. In some cases, this beneficial effect will be more pronounced or more clear 
(as in the dialysis example) but in some cases it will be merely a drop in the bucket and 
difficult to quantify what beneficial effect it actually confers. 
Considering ability to pay certainly opens up potential conflicts with such 
considerations as need and urgency. Because those who lack the funds to pay for health 
care often put off seeing a physician or are diagnosed later, they are more likely to have 
more serious conditions. Additionally, considering ability to pay as a separate criterion 
makes it count double, in a sense, since one's ability to pay affects not only the initial 
treatment but also all associated medicines, treatments and follow-up care including 
travel to and from appointments, parking, time off work and so on. People who can 
afford all of these peripheral expenses are more likely to realize the full benefit of a 
treatment; people who cannot afford these things are less likely to benefit from 
treatment. The ability to pay criterion is also likely to dovetail with a conservation 
criterion insofar as the impact on those others is to deprive them of health care or 
treatment they would have had if the no-pay patient could pay and this can set up a 
competing claims situation. 
Responsibility for Dependents 
116 
The idea that having responsibility for dependents can increase a person's claim to a 
resource is different from other considerations. Other considerations are concerned 
with particular patients and are grounded in medical facts about the patient (e.g., the 
urgency of the patient's situation) or about a patient's own actions and goals (e.g., past 
donations). But this consideration involves concern for people other than patients; the 
concern in this case is for the people who are dependent upon the patients. 
1. What does it mean to be responsible for dependents? 
Though there are various arguments supporting a dependency consideration, most have 
at their heart the realization that patients are not isolated and complete entities unto 
themselves; patients exist in a complex web of relations and what impacts individual 
patients has a kind of ripple effect of impact on others. In one sense, this is trivially true 
since, if a patient dies, close friends and family grieve, uncompleted work may have to 
be shifted onto others, employees may have to find new jobs and so on. But to be 
dependent means that one relies on another for some form or level of support, 
sustenance or care and there must be some sense in which only that person can supply 
that kind of support, sustenance or care. For those who are dependent on the patient, 
the impact of a patient's death or disability is especially pronounced because poor 
outcomes for the patient result in a serious downgrade in the quality of life for those 
who are dependent upon the patient. 
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The parent-child relationship is the paradigm of this consideration and for good 
reason. Minor children are, to varying degrees, physically, psychologically, financially 
and possibly spiritually dependent upon their parents. Very young children cannot feed 
or clothe themselves and they certainly cannot get jobs to pay for things they need. The 
relationship between a parent and child is the central relationship in children's lives. 
But it seems that the reason that the parent-child relationship is the paradigm case is not 
because of the people entering the relationship but because of the many modes of 
dependence at work in the relationship. If children were able to fend for themselves and 
the culture were such that children were raised by the community group and not by 
parents, the specific parent-child relationship would be devoid of dependency. It may 
still be special, or have meaning, but it is the modes of dependency that are operative in 
the relationship that make it the paradigm dependency relationship. Thus, since it is 
modes of dependency that matter in dependency relationships, then any relationship in 
which the dependency exists matter for evaluating claims. It does not make sense, as 
some do, to limit the dependency consideration to only the parent-child relationship. 
There are numerous modes of dependency, including financial, physical and 
psychological. But the congregants of a small church may be spiritually dependent 
upon the church's longtime pastor and the lives and safety of some people may be 
dependent upon a certain politician's ability to maintain a delicate truce between two 
warring factions. The question is whether all of these different modes of dependency 
matter for evaluating claims; to determine this, they should be checked against the 
justification for considering responsibility for dependents in the first place. Considering 
responsibility for dependents is justified because of the serious and detrimental impact 
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losing the person upon whom a person is dependent has on the interests of that 
dependent. Modes of dependency that matter morally are those that would seriously 
harm the interests of the dependents if they would no longer be fulfilled. 
Physical dependence clearly meets this, since if one is physically dependent on 
another, then the dependent depends upon another for the very conditions of life, such 
as food, shelter and security. Elderly, incapacitated parents may be physically 
dependent upon a child who cares for them, as they are not able to care for themselves. 
Should the child no longer be able to care for the parents, they may be sent to a nursing 
facility where the level of care cannot meet that of the personal care they had received 
from the son or daughter. The other modes of dependence mentioned are murkier. In 
each, there are clear cases where a dependent's interests would be severely harmed by 
losing the person on whom he or she is dependent. An older employee who has worked 
for the same family business for his entire working life might be financially dependent 
upon his employers and a loss of financial security affects so many aspects of one's life 
and enables a person to maintain a certain quality of life. And, in cases such as the one 
with the politician whose diplomacy holds together a fragile peace, it is clear that the 
very lives of numerous people are at stake. 
But there are cases that seem counterintuitive. A person might be financially 
dependent in upon a patient because the dependent is blackmailing the patient. 
Psychological dependence and spiritual dependence also admit numerous of these types 
of cases. People do have unhealthy dependence relationships, which are chronicled not 
only in psychology literature but also in many books and movies. Spiritual dependence, 
in which people depend upon someone for their spiritual well-being, can fall under this 
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latter, unhealthy category. But there are also clearer cases; it may be the case that a 
particular group of worshippers is dependent upon a particular leader because she is 
able to reach them as others cannot or, more practically, may be the only spiritual leader 
who speaks the language of the worshippers. These difficult cases are still cases of 
dependence, so another criteria is needed to determine if a particular case of dependence 
is relevant to claims. What the problem cases have in common is that the dependence 
relationship itself is harmful to one or all of the people in the relationship. In the case 
of the blackmailer, the patient is harmed financially. In the case of the unhealthy 
psychological and spiritual dependence relationships, one or all of the people in the 
relationship can be harmed psychologically (such as when an adult child remains 
psychologically dependent upon his parent's approval a la Psycho) or spiritually (such 
as when a worshipper begins worshipping the leader). Thus, in order for a patient's 
responsibility for dependents to strengthen his or her claim to a resource, the dependent 
must meet the criteria for being dependent and also the dependency relationship must 
not be a harmful to the patient or the dependents). 
Finally, the degree of dependence also matters. Dependence is not an all or 
nothing concept; there is a continuum of how dependent a person can be. The greater 
the degree of dependence, the more important dependence becomes when evaluating 
claims. Degree refers to both how many dependents are affected as well as how serious 
the harm to their interests is. Clearly, if one small business owner has five employees 
and another has fifteen, all other things being equal the patient with fifteen employees is 
depended upon to a higher degree than the patient with five employees simply because 
more people's interests are at stake. Determining the seriousness of the harm done to a 
person's interests is not as straightforward. It involves an assessment of both what kind 
of harm is done and also the intensity of the impact of that harm. Harms to physical 
well-being will almost always be more serious than, say, financial harms simply 
because of the primacy of physical well-being. Food, shelter and physical security are 
necessary for the fulfillment of other, higher-order interests and thus have an impact on 
almost every aspect of one's life. Essentially, the greater the affect of losing the person 
on whom one is dependent is on more areas of one's life, the higher the degree of 
dependence. 
2. What modes and degrees of dependency are morally significant? 
There are numerous specific arguments put forth as to why dependency should 
be considered. However, as Winslow argues, the justifications for considering 
dependency are at root all consequentialist in nature since by considering dependents, 
decision-makers seek to maximize the well-being of all involved0. These 
consequentialist arguments can generally be divided into two types, society-focused and 
person-focused. The society-focused arguments emphasize the benefit to society 
derived from a particular person and translate into a focus on the role that the patient 
plays in a dependency relationship. Society certainly benefits from minor children 
being raised, jobs being created and elderly parents being cared for by others. If the 
person with dependents is no longer able to provide for them, society must bear the 
responsibility of providing for the dependents; by saving the person with dependents, 
society is saved the burden of providing for those dependents. Minor children do not 
become wards of the state, Medicaid is saved expensive nursing home care and people 
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are kept off the unemployment rolls. This society-focused justification cannot be the 
entire justification because, in focusing on a person's role, it ignores the relationship 
between individuals in the dependency relationship. From a societal standpoint, as long 
as someone fulfills the role of parent, caregiver or business owner, the efficiency is 
maintained. 
Suppose a woman owns a small, family-run business with several employees, 
one of whom is a 53-year-old man who has worked his whole life for the company. If 
the woman dies and the business folds, the man's pension would be at risk and he 
would likely have difficulty finding another job at the same wage level, given his age. 
He may never actually seek financial assistance from society (in the form of 
government programs), but his financial well-being is clearly at stake. He may have to 
take a job that pays less and work at it for more years than he otherwise would have had 
to to stabilize his retirement funds. This outcome is not problematic from a societal 
standpoint because society does not have to support the employee at any point. But the 
employee suffers a large blow to his financial well-being that represents a serious 
downgrade in his quality of life. From his standpoint, the outcome is certainly 
problematic. Focusing solely on society and the role the patient plays in the life of the 
dependent completely ignores the impact of patient care decisions on the dependents 
themselves. Indeed, from this society-focused perspective, a minor child's losing a 
parent is not problematic as long as there is a godparent or other relative willing to raise 
the child. 
None of this is meant to deny that society does benefit from considering a 
patient's responsibility to his or her dependents in making decisions about who receives 
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a resource, nor is it meant to deny that these are good reasons to support a dependency 
consideration. The argument is rather that society-focused justifications miss the 
importance of the connections between people, which are provided by person-focused 
reasons. Together, these two types of reasons provide the justification for a dependency 
consideration. Recall that, in order to be dependent there must be a sense in which only 
the person upon whom one is dependent can supply that particular kind or level of 
support, sustenance or care. The sense in which only the particular person can do so is 
found in the particular relationships between people and a person-focused justification 
focuses on this relationship. Consider the minor child who loses a parent. Even if there 
is someone available to step in the parental role, the child will still experience 
psychological trauma and harm because in losing his or her parent, the child 
experiences the loss of that particular person and the parent-child relationship. The 
child may not suffer financially or physically in being raised by someone else but the 
psychological harm of losing a parent certainly represents a major downgrade in his or 
her quality of life. Likewise, the man in the above example who lost his job suffered 
the job he lost offered a certain level of financial security that he cannot find elsewhere. 
That which causes a downgrade in the quality of life for a dependent after the loss of 
person upon whom he or she is dependent does not result from losing the person in that 
role as parent or employer but rather result from losing a particular person or 
relationship. 
And in these relationships, losing the person upon whom they are dependent 
represents a serious downgrade in the quality of life of the dependents. In the case of 
the employee, he loses his financial security, which in turn affects his other life 
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prospects. In the case of the minor child, he or she suffers psychological as well as 
financial harms. An elderly parent may suffer physical and psychological harm if he or 
she has to be placed in a nursing home after the loss of a caretaker child. These harms 
are more than grief. While grief is certainly suffering, the harms a dependent suffers 
are the result of a loss of financial, psychological, physical and so on support. And this 
is morally significant because, in losing the person upon who one is dependent, the 
dependent suffers real harms to his or her interests. Since such harms to others' 
interests can be the outcome of allocation decisions, they should be considered when 
making those decisions. 
The most prevalent reason offered against considering dependents is the concern 
that the interests of dependents will be considered as at least equal to those of other 
patients. Kilner points out, "Whereas most people would agree that [dependency] 
relationships are quite important, the priority of these considerations over the very lives 
of patients is more debatable. Children indeed experience a significant loss when a 
parent dies; but the greater loss is that of a patient who must die if the parent is 
selected"01. Also operative in this concern is physician's obligation as a fiduciary of the 
patient since, while people other than patients may have a stake in the well-being of the 
patient, the interests of patients should come first. Considering dependents is especially 
problematic if the consequences of a patient not being treated are that the patient suffers 
serious disability or death which are, in many cases, much more serious consequences 
than those suffered by dependents at the loss of the person upon whom they depend. 
However, this criticism misses the point when the issue is distributing scarce resources 
because, no matter who receives the resource, someone will not. The question is 
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whether or not it is, ceteris paribus, morally significant that the harms the untreated 
patient suffers would be compounded by the harms his or her dependents suffer. Or, in 
cases where the patient is the dependent, the question is whether or not the possibility of 
imposing responsibility on a caretaker is morally significant and should factor in. The 
concern that the interests of non-patients being considered as on par or more important 
than those of patients is simply unfounded in scarcity cases. 
Two related objections concern perfectionism and good parenting. The first 
objection is that allowing responsibility for dependents to increase a patient's claim to a 
resource is a form of perfectionism that values parents, business owners and others who 
have dependents more than those who do not. This represents a form of discrimination 
against those whose idea of a good life does not include having children (or who have 
already raised their children) or being in a position in which others depend upon them. 
The second related objection is that considering responsibility for dependents penalizes 
those parents who work to make their children independent and stable and rewards 
parents who raise needy and dependent children. Taken together, it seems that 
considering a patient's responsibility for dependents would encourage people to become 
parents (and bad ones at that) and find ways to make others dependent. 
There are several responses to this. First, in response to the perfectionism 
objection, there are already numerous cases in society where parents, small business 
owners and so on are given special allowances, such as tax deductions and incentives 
for hiring more people. These are justified because it is generally good for society 
overall, in the case of child tax credits or deductions, that society be perpetuated and 
that children are not raised as wards of the state. In the case of business owners, it is 
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good for there to be jobs for people, as fewer people will then need public assistance, or 
not need as much public assistance. And, to some extent, the non-parent, non-business 
owning section of the population pays for this with taxes that are somewhat higher than 
they would be without the tax breaks and incentives for parents and business owners. 
Admittedly, paying somewhat higher taxes is not exactly analogous to suffering severe 
disability or death for lack of a particular resource but it is true that it is better for 
society as a whole if parents raise their children, businesses provide jobs and so on. But 
it is not only the societal benefit that matters. Since the driving justification for 
considering responsibility for dependents is the concern for the interests of all those 
affected by treatment decisions, this is not really a perfectionist consideration. The 
concern is not about encouraging people to adopt certain lifestyles or make particular 
choices, but about the interests and well-being of those affected by treatment decisions. 
Besides, if the goal of considering responsibility for dependents were to 
encourage certain life choices, the results would surely be a mixed bag, as the second 
objection illustrates. Certainly, more people might seek careers such as "the only 
physician for two hundred miles" or "small business owner with numerous older 
employees" but parents also might think twice about encouraging little Bobby to 
overcome his separation anxiety. This objection does seem to overstate the impact that 
considering responsibility for dependents would have on people's behavior. After all, 
there is a much greater chance that someone who is obese or is a smoker will have 
serious health problems from that than that a person will be in a situation where a scarce 
resource must be distributed and yet people continue unhealthy habits. But, of course, 
the second objection is not concerned about influencing (as the first objection seems to 
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be) but about people who have raised independent and stable children getting a raw deal 
where people who raise needy and unstable children being rewarded for it. This is a 
bullet worth biting, however, especially if it is tempered by the kind and degree of 
dependence considered. 
3. How does responsibility for dependents fit in with other considerations? 
Responsibility for dependents is not inherently tied to other considerations the way that, 
e.g. benefit and urgency are tied. As such, whether or not it agrees with other 
considerations or not is not a function of the considerations themselves but of the facts 
of the case. When a patient has responsibility for dependents, his or her claim will be 
strengthened but by how much will depend on how many dependents the patient has, 
the degree of dependence of those dependents and so on. 
Desert 
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The idea that people should get what they deserve is a prevalent one that has spawned 
an enormous discussion in the justice literature. This is an intuitively powerful 
assertion since "to say that someone deserves something is to say that there is certain 
sort of propriety in his having it"c". Or, a person may be undeserving, in which case 
there is a certain propriety in his or her not having the thing in question. And there are 
numerous reasons that one might deserve (or not deserve) a particular medical resource, 
the main ones being: past contributions (of any kind), character, responsibility for one's 
condition and compensation. But, while the idea that people should get what they 
deserve is intuitively plausible, whether and what role it should play in patient selection 
decisions is not so clear. Consider the following scenario: during a blood shortage, two 
people need blood transfusions and there is only enough blood to transfuse one of them. 
One of the people has been a blood donor for years and has donated gallons of blood 
while the other has only donated sporadically, if at all. One might argue that the donor 
deserves the transfusion in virtue of his past contributions of blood. But what about 
having given blood generates the donor's desert of the current transfusion? And even if 
the donor does deserve the blood transfusion, does that desert mean that the donor 
should be given priority over the non-donor? 
1. What constitutes desert? 
There is very little consensus about what, exactly, it means to say that something is 
deserved. It is widely accepted that a desert claim is different from an entitlement 
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claim. Being entitled to something means that a person has met the sufficient 
conditions for having a right to that thing, such as when a competitor correctly spells the 
most words in a spelling bee. Then, she or he has met the sufficient condition (correctly 
spelling the most words) for winning the bee and has a right to the medal or scholarship 
or whatever the prize is for winning the bee. The winner is then entitled to the prize. 
But being entitled to something does not imply anything about desert; a person might be 
entitled to something but not deserve it and one may deserve something but not be 
entitled to it. For example, suppose a CEO's salary is $250 million but during her 
leadership the company is run into the ground because of her lack of vision and poor 
performance. The CEO may be contractually entitled to the $250 million but it would 
be hard to argue that she deserves it. Conversely, suppose that a hardworking and 
productive employee of the company has worked there for decades and makes a 
pittance; the employee may deserve more money but he is not entitled to it. 
There is also general agreement about the basic structure of desert claims. 
Desert consists in a three-place relationship between the subject, the thing deserved and 
a desert basis (the reason the subject deserves the thing deserved). Thus, desert is of the 
form "P deserves x because of y" where P is the subject, x is the thing deserved and y is 
the desert basis. But, beyond these basic points, everything else, from the subject of 
desert to the maelstrom of disagreements surrounding desert bases, is contested. And, 
unfortunately, it is not the case that there are a few general standout theories around 
which ideas about desert coalesce. Instead, a person's theory of desert is a patchwork 
quilt made up of the positions he or she takes on numerous issues, ranging from free 
will/determinism to the nature of justice. It is not within the scope of this project to 
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engage all of these debates nor to articulate and defend a full theory of desert. Instead, 
in what follows I will present my working theory of desert and defend those parts that 
are especially pertinent in determining whether or not desert should play a role in 
patient selection decisions. 
Because the present problem is the question of who should get a scarce medical 
resource, the question of who should be the subject of desert and the question of what is 
deserved are not at issue. The subject will always be the person claiming the resource; 
a person is the paradigm example of the desert subject. The question of whether or not 
animals or inanimate objects can be subjects of desert does not arise in this context, 
although whether or not animals are the subjects of desert may arise in research ethics 
or veterinary ethics. And the thing that is putatively deserved is the medical resource at 
issue. Some might argue that medical resources are not the kind of things that can be 
deserved. But this seems false. Other things that people need for wellness or survival 
are often said to be deserved. Indeed, the claim that someone deserves even life itself is 
not uncommon. And medical resources meet Feinberg's (and others') requirement in 
that they are "affective in character"; people desire and seek them and so they are 
generally looked upon with favor01". So there seems to be no reason to exclude medical 
resources as things that can be deserved based simply on the nature of medical 
resources. 
The pertinent questions, then, are questions about the desert bases. The desert 
bases are the justifications for desert and, as such, there are numerous views about what 
these bases can be. Like with desert in general, there are a few broad strokes of 
consensus on the desert bases. First, the basis for a person's deserving something must 
be something about that personclv. The allegedly deserving person cannot deserve 
something because of a quality of someone or something else; in a group math project, 
one teammate cannot deserve a good grade because of another teammate's hard work 
(though he may be entitled to it). Also, like things deserved, the desert basis must be 
something toward which we take appraisive attitudescv. The hardworking student may 
deserve the high grade because of her excellent work ethic, which is generally looked 
upon favorably, and the other student may deserve a low grade because of his 
inattentiveness and laziness, which are generally disfavored. Further, the quality of the 
deserving person must also be related somehow to the thing deserved. The hardworking 
student may deserve the high grade because of her strong math skills but she would not 
deserve a high grade on a math because of her lovely singing voice, which has nothing 
to do with math. A desert base must be an appraisable quality of the deserving person 
that is somehow relevant to the thing deserved. However, beyond this broad sketch, 
there is little agreement about what constitutes a desert basis. 
One larger view of desert bases, institutionalism, states that what a person 
deserves is entirely dependent on the goals of the institution in which the desert claims 
arise20. People thus deserve what they do because they forward the goals of the 
institutions that control the things deserved. For example, consider the Bowl 
Championship Series (BCS) in college football, which was instituted with the goal of 
determining the best team in college football. To this end, the BCS ranks teams and the 
two highest ranked teams play in a championship game. Since the goal of the BCS is to 
determine the champion, only the best team deserves to be the champion and only the 
20
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of the institution but this quickly collapses desert into entitlement. See Olsaretti, op cit, p. 9. 
two best teams deserve to be in the championship game. And, since the BCS ranking 
system does not necessarily pick the two unarguably best teams to play in the 
championship series, arguments that another team has been overlooked or underrated, 
or that the best team has simply suffered bad luck, make sense and go directly to the 
goal of the BCS. Thus, one can (and people often do) still make the intuitively 
plausible claim that some team other than the top two BCS-ranked teams deserves to 
play in the championship game. 
There are a few difficulties with institutional accounts generally. First, Sher 
points out that institutional accounts of desert severely limit the notion of desertcvl. 
Goal-based institutional desert by definition does not admit any desert claim that is not 
grounded in the goals of the institution. Returning to the BCS example, individual 
players and coaches cannot deserve anything in the BCS, only teams. And a team 
cannot deserve anything other than being in the championship game or being the 
champion. One cannot say that a particularly hard-working or sportsmanlike team 
deserves to win or that an arrogant, lazy player does not. An account of desert that does 
not allow for such desert claims limits the notion of desert to the point of being 
counterintuitive21. 
But this may not be the case. Desert claims often arise in large and complex 
institutions that may not have a clearly expressed goal or that may have multiple goals 
(which may or may not be clearly expressed themselves) that may conflict. But the 
goals of more complicated institutions such as "society" and "healthcare" are not so 
clear-cut and are undoubtedly multifaceted. Additionally, all of these institutions 
(including the BCS) are embedded within larger societal institutions and rarely arise as 
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isolated and independent entities. The hardworking team may not deserve to be the 
champion because it is not the best but maybe being hardworking promotes the goals of 
society or of college athletics generally and so the team deserves to win vis-a-vis 
society or college athletics. Given the interrelatedness of institutions and their goals, it 
seems that the notion of desert is not so circumscribed as it may initially seem to be. 
But this points to a new problem for an institutional account of desert. A 
proponent of this kind of desert theory would have to work out not only what the goals 
of society and healthcare are or should be but also how the goals of healthcare should or 
do fit in with the goals of society. This creates two serious problems. First is the 
problem of identifying the goals of the institutions. In identifying goals, one will have 
to strike a balance between identifying goals that are too broad and vague to offer any 
guidance and identifying goals that are too narrow to avoid inappropriate essentialism 
(even if multiple goals are identified). This is especially true of the larger, more 
complex institutions such as "society" and "healthcare". And, since most, if not all, of 
the smaller, more focused institutions are embedded somehow in the larger, more 
complicated institutions, the problem of identifying the goal(s) of the larger institution 
is pervasive. The second problem is determining how all these goals, once identified, 
relate to one another. This complicates matters immensely. What if goals conflict? 
Which goals would take precedence? The goals of the most proximate institution or the 
most overarching? What if the desert claim arises within overlapping institutions? 
Without such an analysis that answers these and other such questions, a person's desert 
claims could not be properly evaluated. 
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Of course, one possible response to this is to reject that all of the overarching 
institutions are irrelevant and only those which immediately give rise to the desert 
claims (that is, those that control the thing deserved) are relevant to desert claims. But 
there are two problems with this as well. First, Sher's initial criticism about 
counterintuitively circumscribing desert claims stands. Second, what reason is there to 
limit desert claims to the immediate institution given the fact that those institutions 
themselves arise within other institutions and so on? Taking this view (and biting the 
bullet with regard to Sher's criticism) simply ignores the fact of the interdependence 
and interrelatedness of institutions. To ignore this complexity and privilege the 
proximate institution without an argument as to why makes this a flawed approach. 
Once the interdependence and interrelatedness of institutions is acknowledged, it 
is not clear that there would be any serious differences in practice between institutional 
accounts of desert and pre-institutional accounts (which hold that desert is independent 
of institutions) regarding what counts as desert. There is one serious exception. On an 
institutional account of desert, considerations of desert cannot shape the institutions 
because those institutions determine desert. This is not a damning criticism, per se, 
since one holding such a view might see this as perfectly acceptable. Rawlscv", for 
example, who does have an institutional theory of desert, is clearly invested in the idea 
that there is no desert outside of institutions because if it is the case that there is desert 
that is not generated within an institution, then his two principles of justice as fairness 
are clearly not the whole story. However, this problem is not especially relevant to this 
project because, even if an institutional account of desert were operative, healthcare as 
an institution is embedded within larger institutions (such as "government" and 
"society") and so even justice in healthcare can be constrained by desert because of the 
desert claims in these larger institutions. Since I do not believe there would be a 
practical difference between institutional accounts (understood with institutional 
interdependence and interrelatedness) and pre-institutional accounts and because 
delving into all the theoretical analysis necessary for an institutional account would be 
beyond the scope of this project, I will make my arguments from a pre-institutional 
view. Parallel justifications can certainly be offered from an institutional view. 
A pre-institutional account of desert must find some other way to identify the 
morally appraisable quality of the deserving person and how that is properly related to 
the thing deserved. Given the complexity of desert claims, it is unlikely that any single 
principle will be able to ground all desert claims. Two of the more comprehensive and 
potentially helpful pre-institutional theories are those of Feinberg and Sher. Neither 
directly addresses desert of medical resources, though both have something to offer. 
Feinberg argues that there are different desert bases for different categories of "modes 
of treatment" (the things deserved). There is no single set of desert bases that can be 
applied to any mode of treatment because not all desert bases are relevant to all modes 
of treatment. Instead, he discusses five categories of modes of treatment (awards of 
prizes, assignments of grades, rewards and punishments, praise and blame and 
compensation, reparation and liabilityovm) and sets out appropriate desert bases for each 
mode of treatment. The appropriate bases for each treatment are appropriate for a 
variety of reasons and relevant to the desert bases in a variety of ways. In the case of 
prizes, desert is tied to the point of the competition for the prize, which is not unlike the 
institutional account above01". But in the case of compensation for injury, desert is tied 
to atonement and "functions not only to repair the damage but 'restore the moral 
equilibrium"'0". 
However, Feinberg's theory is not immediately helpful for the current project 
for two reasons. First, medical resources do not fit comfortably into any of Feinberg's 
categories since it cannot properly be understood as a prize, grade, reward, informal 
response or always (or even usually) as compensation. This is not a major issue, as 
Feinberg does not claim that his categories are complete and adding medical 
treatment/resources as a category would be more of a friendly amendment to than a 
criticism of Feinberg's approach. But the second problem is that, while he offers 
relevant desert bases for the various modes of treatment, he offers no explanation for 
exactly why it is that the particular desert bases are appropriate for those modes of 
treatment. For example, if an institutional approach is appropriate for determining the 
desert bases for competitive prizes, why is it not an appropriate basis for desert of praise 
or blame? Though his claims are intuitively plausible, the lack of a theoretical 
justification for his arguments makes it impossible to extrapolate his views into any 
other modes of treatment, such as medical resources. 
Sher takes a different tack and focuses on the desert bases themselves and 
discusses what about desert bases makes them justify a person's desert of a thing. 
Ideally, there would be a single elegant principle underlying all desert claims but, after 
unsuccessfully attempting to derive all cases of desert from the single principle of 
autonomous action, Sher concludes that different desert bases will have different values 
grounding them. This, he claims, makes sense; "because the notion of desert has 
probably evolved through a series of analogical expressions, there are unlikely to be any 
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strict necessary and sufficient conditions for its application"0"1. Thus, the value of 
acting autonomously will ground some desert claims while the fact of being wronged or 
made to suffer will ground others and so on. In many ways, this is an improvement 
over Feinberg's theory, since it provides theoretical justifications for why the particular 
desert bases ground desert claims and grounds the desert bases themselves in the values 
we find in various things such as a person's autonomous action or his or her effort. 
However, this theory is also not immediately helpful to the current project. 
Though it would seem easier to apply the justified desert bases to medical resources. 
But it is not that simple. Consider Sher's discussion of grounding desert in autonomous 
action. Since we value acting autonomously, then people deserve the reasonably 
predictable (good or bad) consequences of those autonomous actions. But even this 
must be circumscribed since this would generate many and outrageous desert claims. 
Sher notes at least four cases where one does not deserve the predictable consequences 
of one's free choices: when the consequences are "1) very easily acquired. 2) the 
disastrous results of merely careless acts. 3) the spoils of wrongful acts, [and] 4) the 
harmful effects of self-sacrificing acts"cx". This shows that the value of acting 
autonomously cannot simply justify a desert basis; the context of the situation is 
relevant as is a certain proportionality between the thing deserved and the desert basis. 
Thus, individual cases still have to be individually interrogated to determine if the value 
of the desert base applies in the particular situation. 
Unfortunately, then, there is no "plug and chug" theory of desert that would help 
here. In light of this, the approach I will take will be a kind of hybrid of Sher's and 
Feinberg's approaches. Like Feinberg, I will start with the thing deserved and discuss 
four possible broad categories of desert bases commonly asserted in the medical context 
that are qualities of the putatively deserving patient. In doing so, I will see if each 
desert base is appropriately connected to the thing deserved. However, unlike Feinberg 
but following Sher, I will interrogate these desert bases to determine what about them 
justifies the desert claim; that is, I will try to establish what morally appraisable value 
grounds the desert bases. The four potential desert bases are character, past 
contributions, responsibility for condition and compensation. Of course, all patients 
deserve some things, such as respect and care and there is a sense in which all deserve 
some medical resources—all simply in virtue of their humanity and suffering. The 
desert bases discussed below are those that would not generate claims true of all 
patients in the situation but that are above and beyond the general desert claims that 
could be made by all patients. 
2. What could justify a desert consideration? 
Character or Moral Virtue 
One prevalent claim is that someone deserves a treatment because he or she is a 
wonderful person. One's character, then, is asserted a basis for deserving treatment. 
People with good characters are deserving while people with bad characters are not 
deserving (or, more severely, are undeserving). And, at least at first glance, this seems 
like a plausible claim. One's character is the quintessential morally appraisable quality 
of a person. But the connection between having a good character and medical 
resources is somewhat shakier. It is difficult to go from good people deserving good 
things to a good person deserving that specific thing. It is clear that virtuous people do 
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deserve some things, such as praise and, possibly, good citizenship awards, but these 
things are related to virtuous characters (good citizens have virtuous characters, we 
praise people for things we value, such as good characters) in ways that medical 
resources are not. However, there is a connection between the virtuous character and 
medical treatment if the claim is that that people with good characters deserve those 
things that make it possible to have a good life, even if they do not necessarily deserve 
everything that would make that life good. Medical resources fall into this category 
since receiving treatment promotes good health. 
But there are some problems with this, even aside from the less than ironclad 
connection to the thing deserved. There is certainly a practical problem associated with 
this and that is the problem of judging a person's character. I am not asserting the 
relativist position that value is in the eye of the beholder, since there are certainly some 
virtues that valuable (honesty, fairness, kindness, etc.) and some qualities that are base 
(such as hatred, cruelty, dishonesty, etc.). There is little doubt that different people 
value different characters traits and some character traits can be valuable in some 
contexts and disvalued in others and even valued in some people and disvalued in 
others. But part of having a good character is being able to recognize what is 
appropriate and when, being appropriately kind, appropriately generous and so on. No, 
the problem is one of properly judging a patient's character. This is also not a question 
about how hospital personnel can accurately assess the character of, say, an unconscious 
patient or a patient they do not know well, though that is an interesting question. This is 
the broader question of how to identify those people of good character generally. No 
one is wholly good or wholly bad and almost everyone is a mix of saint and sinner. 
Despite this, we can all think of people we consider particularly good or particularly 
bad. But we judge this based upon people's actions. If one's character is simply the 
sum of his or her actions, then the desert basis is actually one of past contributions, be 
they good contributions or bad contributions. If we are simply judging the net worth of 
a patient's actions and calling that "character", then we can move on to a discussion of 
contributions. However, this is not what most people think of when they think of 
character. Instead, the issue is more of personality, of one's heart and soul. And how 
do we judge that? 
But these practical problems do not address the issue of whether possessing a 
good moral character is a basis for a claim of deserving medical resources. Sher argues 
that moral virtue can ground desert claims because the virtuous are worth more as 
persons than the non-virtuous or the vicious because the virtuous seek the right kind of 
value in the right kind of way and thus the objects of a virtuous person's endeavor have 
greater value. Thus, the success of their efforts and the satisfaction of their desires are 
simply worth more than that of an ordinary person0""1. Thus, virtuous people deserve 
the medical resources because the medical resources would promote the health of the 
virtuous person, which would satisfy their (more worthy) desires and allow them to 
continue seeking higher value in their lives. 
But one need not accept the perfectionist claim about the worth of virtuous 
people to accept that the virtuous do indeed deserve the medical resource that would 
promote their health and well-being. After all, there is a value in good things happening 
to good people and that value is in the sense that there is kind of order to the world in 
which working hard and being virtuous can result in a good life. There is a kind of 
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fittingness between being good and getting good in the same way that there is a kind of 
fittingness between being the fastest runner and winning the race. Circumstances may 
intervene (even good people get sick and many an excellent runner has tripped during a 
race) but the notion of desert is what captures that fittingness. And since health is a 
prerequisite for many of the goods in life, it makes sense that the virtuous person would 
deserve those things necessary for a good life. 
So if good people deserve the medical resource, do bad not deserve it, or deserve 
not to get it? There seems to be no reason to assume that if character counts for the 
good, it should not count for the bad. After all, the same arguments about worth or 
fittingness can be applied to vicious people as well as virtuous ones; it is, after all, 
equally fitting that a bad person gets what is coming to him or her. But, as I stated 
above, people deserve certain things, such as care and consideration, simply in virtue of 
their humanity and suffering. Because of this, bad people may not deserve to get a 
particular resource, but they do not deserve to not get the resource. 
Personal Responsibility 
The idea that a person's being responsible for his or her own condition (or for making it 
worse by not complying with doctors orders) makes it so that he or she deserves not to 
be given a resource over someone who is not responsible for his or her own condition. 
This would mean that people who attempt suicide, accidentally overdose on illegal 
drugs, go into diabetic comas for not following their diets and so on are undeserving of 
being given scarce resources. Like the character issue, there are certainly practical 
problems associated with this claim as well. Establishing a smoking gun causal link 
between a person's actions and his or her health is often difficult since connections 
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between the two are often statistically linked. And it is certainly an open question to 
what extent an addiction (such as smoking) or mental illness (such as depression) 
mitigates responsibility for one's actions. However, as above, these problems do not 
get at the heart of the matter, which is the question of whether or not personal 
responsibility for a condition can justify a claim of undesert. 
This potential desert basis also seems to fit the profile of an acceptable desert 
basis. A patient's own actions are certainly qualities of the (putatively undeserving) 
person that are morally appraisable. And, unlike the connection between character and 
medical resources, the connection between a patient's actions and medical resources is 
clear, since the intentional actions are what created the situation that made the patient 
seek the medical resources. The connection to the person is not simply that he or she 
has acted in some way to bring about the condition from which he or she suffers. If this 
were the case, then the undeserving would include those who lose control of cars and 
wreck them and those who eat things to which they are unknowingly allergic and have a 
reaction. The cases that are at issue are the ones where a person's intentional actions 
have resulted in a reasonably foreseeable consequence. If the actions were not 
intentional or if the consequence were unforeseeable, the person would not be morally 
responsible for his or her condition. 
The question then becomes how such a desert basis is grounded. Again, Sher 
offers a possible justification for this kind of desert basis. He argues that people 
deserve the expected consequences of their own free acts. The idea that the desert basis 
has to be something within one's own control is widespread, as even Rawls maintains 
that only things that are under a person's control can ground desert. But certainly, 
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people do not deserve all of the expected consequences of their acts; if this were the 
case then people would deserve innumerable benign things, such as for their tires to 
wear down when they drive their cars, as well as some fairly serious things normally not 
thought to be deserved, such as being mugged when walking down the dangerous street 
on which one lives. Sher argues that expected consequences are deserved when they 
inherit value from "an agent's genuine exercise of autonomy"cxlv. We value the 
expression of freedom in making autonomous choices and it is this that confers value on 
the person realizing the consequences of his or her own free choicecxv. The action that 
makes a person responsible for his or her condition and the value of his or her free 
choice of that action is the reason for deserving to not be treated. However, recall that 
Sher discusses exceptions to this general argument, since the context of the situation can 
alter one's desert claim. In discussing the exception for disproportionately bad 
consequences, he specifically states that, even for predictable consequences, "we would 
balk at the claim that.. .a heavy smoker deserves to get lung cancer" because it is 
"unduly harsh"CXVI. This makes sense for moments of stupidity but it seems difficult to 
argue that, if we really do value autonomous actions, a person who consistently abuses 
his or her body knowing what can result does not deserve the consequences of that 
action because it is so severe a consequence. It is also hard to characterize many of 
these actions, such as heavy smoking or attempting suicide, as a merely careless acts. 
Thus, it seems perfectly plausible that personal responsibility can be a basis for 
undesert. 
However, there is one complication. The foreseeable consequences of abusing 
one's body are the conditions that result. Not being treated is not the expected 
consequence of any of the actions that bring about a medical condition. The claim, 
then, has to be that the subject deserves the condition that he or she brought about and 
that deserving the condition makes the patient deserve not to be treated. To deserve the 
condition means that there is a certain propriety in that person having the condition but 
it is not clear that a patient should not be treated because of this. After all, there is a 
disconnect between deserving the foreseeable consequences of one's actions and not 
deserving treatment (which is not foreseeable). Couple this with the general desert of 
care and consideration because of patients' humanity and suffering leads to the 
conclusion that, like the person of bad character, the person who is responsible for his 
or her own condition may not deserve the treatment, but he or she does not deserve not 
to be treated. 
Past Contributions 
There are numerous contributions that a person might make that could potentially 
ground that person's desert of medical treatment. Generally, though, these 
contributions can be divided into two categories: contributions to society and in-kind 
contributions. Contributions to society include philanthropic projects, scientific 
advancements, community involvement and so on. In-kind contributions include (but 
are not limited to) things like blood (as in the donor case above), organs and donations 
of medical equipment and other monetary donations to health organizations. The 
intuition is that people who have given to society deserve to get something back in their 
time of need. These are different claims for an important reason. While both a person's 
past contributions to society and past in-kind contributions are morally appraisable 
qualities of that person, there is no clear connection between past contributions to 
society and the medical resources. Volunteering at the local food pantry or giving 
money to the Untied Way (or other charity) are certainly commendable activities, but 
these things have nothing to do with medical resources. Such actions may reflect upon 
a person's character, but if that is the claim then it is the person's character that will 
ground a desert claim, not the person's actions. 
Past in-kind contributions, on the other hand, are certainly connected because, 
by making the contribution, the subject has helped alleviate past scarcity of the same 
resource that is now putatively deserved by the subject. In the donor example above, 
the donor has contributed numerous units of blood to the general supply in the past and 
now he needs the same resource of which he has contributed so much of over the years. 
The question is what might ground this desert claim. An institutional argument would 
work well here, since by donating blood (or organs, or medical equipment, or money for 
more hospital beds) the person has clearly furthered the goals of healthcare (however 
they may be articulated) by making more medical resources available to others. Thus, 
by furthering the goals of healthcare, one then deserves what healthcare can distribute: 
medical resources. But one need not appeal to furthering the goals of an institution to 
justify the in-kind donor's desert of resources. Consider the blood donor. Certainly, if 
he is an autologous donor, who stores his own blood for a future surgery or other use, 
he deserves to get his blood back since it is his. But the donor in the example has given 
his blood to the general public for whoever can use it. Because he has given blood and 
helped to ensure blood would be there when people need it, he deserves that it will be 
there for him when he needs it. It is because of his helping others in similar medical 
situations that he deserves the blood. The situation with donations of money and 
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medical equipment is parallel, but the situation with some organs is a bit different since 
many organs are not donated until death. In such cases, willingness to participate in 
organ donation programs (by indicating donor status on a driver's license, for example) 
shows the commitment to helping alleviate scarcity of organs and to helping those in a 
desperate situation. 
Compensation 
The final potential desert base is compensation. Compensatory desert claims arise 
when the subject of the desert has been wronged by the person administering his or her 
medical care. This includes cases of medical malpractice and medical mistakes, such as 
when a nurse administers an incorrect medicine or when a surgeon leaves a sponge 
inside of a patient. The desert base is the fact of being wronged by the relevant people. 
Compensation does not ground desert claims in instances where on has simply incurred 
a harm (such as getting hit by a rogue meteor); it only grounds desert claims where one 
claims to deserve some recompense from the person or institution that has done him or 
her wrong. 
In cases of compensatory desert, it is the fact of having been medically wronged 
that is the morally appraisable quality of the person and it is because the person has 
been wronged by some medical error that he or she is in his or her present condition. 
Thus, the thing deserved serves to right the wrong done or at least improve the situation 
of the person who was wronged. Of course, in some cases, medical intervention will be 
unable to completely (or at all) right the wrong done to the patient. This is indeed 
something about the person but it is a different connection than the ones discussed 
above. The connection to the subject in all of the putative desert bases has been 
something that the subject is or has done and so has been something that is, at least 
partially, within the subject's control. But, though most desert bases will turn out to be 
something that is to some extent within the subject's control, it is not necessary that 
they be. Some of the more basic desert claims (especially those shared by all patients 
mentioned above) are based in the fact of humanity or the ability to suffer, neither of 
which is within a subject's control. 
What is it about the fact of being wronged that generates the claim of desert? 
Sher, again, argues that the value of diachronic fairness justifies the claim of deserved 
compensation for wrongs done. Diachronic fairness, "which demands the offsetting of 
earlier lapses from independent standards"cxy" relates to the value in treating people 
fairly and correcting mistakes when they are made. Negligence, carelessness and 
mistakes generally will happen, but these do represent a lapse from the quality standards 
of medicine and, as such, should be rectified. Certainly, a person will always deserve 
that wrongs against them be alleviated, but when the wrong has been done within the 
very institution that distributes the competed-for resources, the connection between the 
wrong and the thing deserved are particularly strong. Thus, because fairness demands 
that such a lapse be rectified, the patient deserves the resources necessary to do so. 
3. How does considering this limited form of desert fit in with other considerations? 
The above discussion yields the following desert considerations: virtuous people, 
people who have made in-kind donations and those who are wronged are all deserving 
of (at least some kinds) of medical resources. The question now is about the moral 
force of these desert claims. That is, does deserving a resource strengthen a patient's 
claim to that resource? 
Though it is clear that virtuous people deserve good things and the pre-requisites 
to those good things, I am not convinced that there is any obligation to see that they get 
them. Clearly, having desert as part of a claim does not ensure that the deserving 
person will get the resource because desert is not the only consideration. Others' 
situations may be more urgent or others may be able to benefit more. Of course, desert 
may still strengthen claims even if there is no particular person obliged to fulfill that 
desert claim. After all, desert simply means that there is a certain propriety to the 
person getting what he or she deserves. But given the already strained connection 
between the desert basis and the thing deserved as well as the practical difficulties that 
are warrant for serious concerns, I am convinced that a person's character should not 
factor into decisions about who gets the resource. 
The cases of compensation and in-kind donation are different. While the 
justifications for including desert because of in-kind donations as a consideration is not 
quite as strong as the reasons for including compensatory desert there are still solid 
reasons for including it. After all, those who have made in-kind donations have given 
of themselves (often literally) in to alleviate scarcity and to provide for others when 
they are in need. To not make similar resources available to the donor when and if he 
or she needs them would not only be ironic but it would also be a violation of that 
person's willingness to help make sure there is enough of what others need. Thus, 
desert because of in-kind donation should be considered when evaluating patients' 
claims. 
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In the case of compensation, there is an obligation to see that the person gets 
what he or she deserves since the value that undergirds compensatory desert is not fully 
realized until the wrong has been righted and the person given what he or she deserves. 
And, "since the standards that pertain to compensation forbid the infliction of certain 
sorts of harms, any deviations from them are best rectified by precisely the persons who 
inflicted the harm. Thus, it is also unsurprising that those persons bear the primary 
obligation to compensate"cxvl". In the medical context, it is not only the nurse who 
administers the wrong medication that bears the obligation, but since he or she acts as 
an agent of the hospital and since he or she is not able to offer twenty-four hour 
intensive care, the hospital and its staff also have the obligation to ensure that the desert 
subject gets what he or she deserves. Deserving a resource as a matter of compensation 
will strengthen the claim of a person deserving a resource. 
Consideration of desert from compensation and in-kind donations will not 
intrinsically clash with other considerations such as benefit, urgency and need. 
Certainly, a person who deserves a particular resource may be competing with those 
who more urgently need or would obtain a greater benefit from that same resource and 
there is potential for conflict there because of the importance of righting the wrong done 
to the deserving patient. 
Conservation of Resources 
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Those who use conspicuously large amounts of resources are often singled out as utility 
monsters- those who have consumed and consumed resources regardless of the situation 
of others. Because of this, there is the idea that requiring more of the resource lessens 
one's claim to the resource. Following Winslow, I will refer to the idea that requiring 
more of a resource lessens one's claim to that resource, as conservationcxlx. 
1. What does a conservation consideration encompass? 
In many cases where the supply of medical resources do not meet the demand, the 
resource in question cannot be effectively divided or shared amongst patients to ease the 
scarcity. In these cases, there is no way to "spread the wealth" since dividing the 
resource would make it completely ineffective at resolving the patient's problem. 
Dividing a transplantable kidney between two people would be pointless, since dividing 
the kidney in half renders the kidney useless since half a kidney does not help either 
person. However, other resources could be divided among several patients, such as 
blood for transfusions. In these latter cases, some people will require more of the 
resource and some will require less; if patients only require small amounts of a limited 
resource, then more patients overall can be helped. But in many situations, a handful of 
patients require significantly larger amounts of the resource such that their receiving the 
large amounts precludes the resource's availability to others. Consider the following 
scenario put forth by Philippa Foot: 
1) We are about to give a patient who needs it to save his life a massive dose of a certain drug in 
short supply. There arrive, however, five other patients each of whom could be saved by one-
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fifth of that dose. We say with regret that we cannot spare our whole supply of drug for a single 
patient... We feel bound to let one man die rather than many if that is our only choice™1. 
Although Foot introduces this scenario in an entirely different context, it is a paradigm 
case for considering conservation. 
2. Why consider conservation when determining claims? 
As Winslow points out, conservation is a strategy for maximizing the usefulness of the 
resourcecxxl. By giving the resource to the five people who require less of it than the 
one person who would require all of it, five lives are saved by the same amount of the 
resource that would otherwise have only saved one. And most would agree with Foot 
that it is simply common sense that, all else being equal, we should save the five lives 
instead of the one. Indeed, all would have to be vastly unequal for most to think it 
appropriate to save the one instead of the five. 
Taurek challenges this intuition.cxx" He argues that, though there may be other 
reasons for saving the five over the one or the one over the five, if all else truly is equal, 
then the numbers do not matter and the proper thing to do is to flip a coin to decide 
whether the one lives or the five live. Taurek's objection is two-fold: first, he objects to 
counting the aggregate loss of the five people because it objectifies the loss suffered by 
the individual. He states that "for each of the six persons it is no doubt a terrible thing 
to die.. .but should any one of these five lose his life, his loss is no greater to him 
because, as it happens, four others.. .lose their lives as well.. .Five individuals each 
losing his life does not add up to anyone's experiencing a loss five times greater than 
the loss suffered by any one of the five."CXX111 Second, because the profundity of the loss 
is equal, all six people should have an equal chance of receiving the drug and living. 
Thus, the roll of a six-sided die should decide the matter of who gets the drug22. 
But while it is true that, when all else is equal, each individual will suffer the 
same loss, it is difficult to understand how aggregating these losses somehow 
dehumanizes those who lose their lives. On the contrary, it is dehumanizing to 
understand human life from the purely self-centered point of view required of Taurek's 
position. By his account, what matters is only the loss to an individual person of that 
individual person's life. But others, including society generally, have an interest in 
those people's lives. Taurek does acknowledge the relationships between people and 
that others will experience loss when a person dies, but it is not the same as the loss 
experienced by the individual who dies. This point is well taken, but what is not so 
clear is why this latter form of loss is the only one that is morally relevant. Certainly, 
absent any special obligations or connections to the one individual, the loss of the five 
people is a greater aggregate loss, even if it is not a greater loss to the five individuals 
who have lost their lives. If all that matters is the perspective of those who actually lose 
their lives, then losing over 2300 people at Pearl Harbor on December 7,1941 cannot 
be counted a greater loss than the loss of one person in a car accident. From the 
perspective of those who died at Pearl Harbor and Darla Perez, it is the same amount of 
22
 Taurek actually says that it should be decided by the flip of a coin, but flipping a coin gives the one 
person a 50% chance and the other five together a 50% chance, which gives the one person a greater than 
equal chance of getting the drug compared to the other five. For each of the six to have an equal chance, 
they should each have a 1/6 chance, so I have changed it to the roll of a six-sided die. Of course, if the 
roll of the die comes up in favor of one of the five, then they will all get the drug and this may be what 
Taurek wants to equalize. Nothing in his argument really hinges on this, however- the point is that since 
the loss is equal, the chance to avoid it should be equal as well. 
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loss. But to claim that because it is the same from that one perspective makes it the 
same, full stop, is simply absurd . 
But Taurek is right to question what exactly is going on when the intuition of 
choosing the many over the few is qualified with a "ceteris paribus" and to seek 
justification for the intuition. Does the first person requiring more of the resource than 
the others really have anything to do with it? Consider the above scenario with a few 
modifications: 
2) We are about to give a patient who needs it to save his life lOmg—the entire supply—of a 
certain rare drug. There arrive, however, five other patients, who each need 7mg of the drug to 
survive. 
In this case, the lOmg of the drug will only save one patient no matter which patient is 
ultimately given the dose since giving any of the six patients the dose he or she requires 
will preclude all of the others from receiving the dose they require. Do we still feel 
bound to give the drug to someone who requires less of it? All else being equal, giving 
the drug to the person who needs more of it does not seem to be the miscarriage of 
justice it might be in the first situation; thus, conservation cannot simply be about using 
more of a resource. 
Winslow explains this by positing that the issue is not that one person requires 
more of the resource but that the person requires a disproportionate amount of the 
resource. It is thus disproportionality that is at the root of conservation. Winslow 
defines a disproportionate amount as an amount sufficiently large to save at least two 
other peoplecxxlv. Thus, in the first scenario, the amount is disproportionate because 
giving the drug to the person who requires the larger dose results in five people dying, 
23
 Others also object to Taurek's position and for a variety of reasons. For extended discussion, see 
Kamm F. Morality, mortality, volume 1: Death and who to save from it. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 1993: pp. 75-98. 
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while only one will die if the drug is given to the five people. In the second scenario, 
five people will die no matter who gets the drug and giving it to the person who requires 
the larger amount does not change this and, thus, is not disproportionate. 
But there are problems with understanding disproportionality this way. 
Consider a third scenario: 
3) We are about to give a patient in excruciating pain lOmg—the entire supply—of a certain 
pain drug that is in short supply. The lOmg of the drug will not entirely relieve his pain and he 
will still be in moderate, but tolerable, discomfort. There arrive, however, five other patients, 
each in moderate discomfort and each needs 2mg of the drug for pain relief. 
Understanding in disproportionality this way reduces a conservation consideration to a 
simple count of how many people benefit and this certainly is not right. If the point is 
to maximize the usefulness of a resource, simply counting the number of people who 
get some benefit from it will not necessarily maximize the usefulness of a resource. 
Giving one person even a disproportionate (on Winslow's definition) amount of the 
resource can realize a greater usefulness than simply distributing it over a greater 
number of people, as the third scenario shows is possible. But a more complex 
calculation of usefulness to maximize will inevitably include other considerations such 
as benefit, need, etc. in order to assess the usefulness of the resource in a given 
distribution, which could lead to double-counting or over-emphasizing these 
considerations. And while conservation is one strategy to maximize usefulness, 
usefulness maximization is not the same thing as conservation, which is giving priority 
to those who need less of a resource. 
Additionally, in the third scenario, the man in excruciating pain could quite 
reasonably argue that giving him the entire supply would not be disproportionate- it 
would be entirely proportional to his pain. And it is not clear how Winslow would 
respond to this. He could revise his definition of disproportional to mean that an 
amount is disproportional if giving someone that amount leads to a non-maximized 
distribution. With this move, disproportionality is no longer doing the theoretical work 
and is replaced with utility maximization. This is not necessarily a bad thing, as it is 
gets straight to the point of why even consider conservation in the first place-for utility 
maximization. But, again, utility maximization is not the same thing as conservation 
and the idea of conservation is dropped in favor of utility maximization. 
However, as is alluded to above, there are problems with adding utility 
maximization as a consideration. Aside from the narrow issue of double-counting some 
considerations, determining a utility maximization and what all goes into that is an issue 
that is at least as complex and context-dependent as determining what a person is due. 
Since utility maximization (efficiency) at least partially justifies some of the 
considerations, including benefit and others that would have to play into utility 
maximization, a vicious circle can develop. Fortunately, this problem can be avoided 
entirely because there is another way to account for the strong intuitions for each 
scenario. Rather than think about these scenarios in terms of quantity of the resource, 
disproportionality, or utility maximization, a better idea is to think about it in terms of 
competing claims. 
In what has been discussed thus far, the cases considered have all been cases where 
only one person can have the resource; there may be two, three or more people 
competing for the resource, but in each case only one person could actually have the 
resource, so the strength of each person's claim is only compared to the individual 
claims of the others. But when the resource is divisible and more than one person can 
use the resource, each person's claim is compared to the combined claims of the group 
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of people who have claims as if they were a single claim. In the cases where everyone 
lays claim to the same amount of the resource, one person's getting the resource does 
prevent the others from getting it, but only one of the others would have gotten it. 
However, when one person's getting the resource prevents others from getting it, all (or 
several) of whom would have gotten it, then those claims are combined. 
In Scenario 1, the first patient is in competition with five others and has to compete 
with the combined claims of five other people because if the first person gets the drug, 
then five people who would have gotten it otherwise will not get it. Assuming that each 
of the six claimants has the same claim, then the claims of the five people combined are 
five times the claim of the first person. Thus, because the combined claims are stronger 
than the one person's individual claim, the five should get the drug. In Scenario 2, only 
one of the people will get the drug so each individual claim is compared with the 
individual claims of the others. Since only one person will get the drug no matter who 
that one person is, then only the individual claims are considered and the person with 
the strongest claim should get the drug. In Scenario 3, there is not currently enough 
information to determine who's claim is the strongest, but it is at least possible that a 
person in excruciating pain has a stronger claim to the pain drug than the other five 
people in moderate pain combined. Understanding the problem as one of competing 
claims provides a framework for evaluating such situations. 
3. How does this fit with the larger framework? 
The upshot of all of this is that requiring a large amount of a resource does not in and of 
itself weaken a person's claim to that resource and thus should not be considered. 
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However, because all competing claims are considered, it will likely often work out that 
the sheer number of competing claims will offset even a strong claim but this is not 
because requiring more of the resource weakens the claim but because the cumulative 
effect of the several claims against the one. 
Past Resource Use 
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Another potential consideration that evokes the utility monster is past resource use. The 
concern with past resource use is the idea that "everyone should get their firsts before 
anyone gets seconds". Just like all of the members of a kindergarten class should get a 
first cupcake before any of them get a second, the thought is that everyone who needs a 
kidney, for example, should get one before anyone gets a second one. With kidneys, of 
course, the stakes are much higher and there is also a bit of the idea that the person who 
has already gotten a kidney has already had his or her chance. What is actually behind 
this intuition must be sorted out. 
1. What is the concern with past resource use? 
This issue arises most frequently in the discussions of repeat transplants in patients for 
whom a first transplant failed and who need a second transplant. However, this is not 
the only time the issue arises. It is also appears as concern about giving even more 
resources to those who have already used a large amount of resources over the course of 
their lifetimes. In this case, there may be one particular resource at issue, such as giving 
a blood transfusion to someone who has already gone through copious amounts of 
blood products. Or the concern may be about resource use generally, such as expending 
resources on someone who has a long history of various medical problems and 
associated resource use. 
The main concern with past resource use is that giving more medical resources 
to one person over the course of his or her lifetime at the expense of others' lives or 
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health would result in a distribution that fails to treat people as equals. Again, the issue 
is not simply that the person has gotten "more" of a resource; the amount of a resource 
(or of resources generally) that a person uses has to be such that others are deprived of 
the resources. The idea is that it is unfair for one person to get "seconds" before others 
have had their "firsts".24 Consider the following scenario: 
Three patients who require a kidney transplant are all a match to the same kidney. One patient, 
Alex, receives the kidney but, unfortunately, the transplant fails and Alex requires another 
kidney transplant. A new kidney is identified that is a match to Alex, but this time there is a 
second patient, Billy. 
If all of the players in this scenario were contemporaries and the question was whether 
or not to give Alex two kidneys while three others receive none then it would be a 
matter of determining the strength of the patients' claims. But how does one, over time, 
account for claims that were overridden in the past? In much of the literature, the 
question that this scenario generates is "is it fair?" and the answer depends solely on 
how one unpacks the "fairness". 
2. Why consider past resource use ? 
In many cases, particularly in news stories, "fairness" is not unpacked any more 
than by using examples such as "pieces of the pie" or the "firsts" and "seconds" 
language used above. Ubel, et al. offer a brief discussion of the fairness question and 
use just such language: "A more commonsense view of justice dictates that we all 
deserve an equal slice of the healthcare pie. That is, all else equal, we should not be 
giving out scarce pieces of pie to those who have already had some, while others await 
their first piece"cxxv. They maintain that this is the case whether the issue is 
24
 An argument similar to this is sometimes used to try to justify an age criterion but this argument is not 
addressed in that section because an age criterion would not necessarily help equalize resource use 
between people's lifetimes. 
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retransplantation or simply having used large amounts of resources in the past for 
various health problems or where the patient has gone through a large amount of a 
specific resource, such as blood product. Ubel, et al. answer this question in the context 
of retransplantation and conclude that it is inappropriate to deny Alex a second graft 
because of fairness concerns because doing so focuses the issue of fairness far too 
narrowly on a single organ and does not account for larger distribution patterns. The 
sum total of health care resources distributed to individual patients should be examined, 
not simply a single organ (or two)cxxvl. But this response sidesteps the issue entirely. In 
the outset, Ubel, et al. frame the question as "all else equal"cxxvn but then answer it with 
the assumption that all else is not equal; access and use of healthcare over the lifetimes 
of the patients are assumed to be unequal. They never answer the original question: all 
else being equal, does Alex's previous transplant matter? Further, they claim that 
looking solely at one specific organ is too narrow and does not account for health care 
resource distribution more broadly but do not say whether or not accounting for a 
broader distribution would matter. If one person has had greater access to or usage of 
resources, would this matter? They seem to imply that it would, but they do not provide 
an argument either way. 
Veatch also frames the question of the fairness of retransplant in terms of the 
"pieces of pie" analogy but he offers an answer to the question. Veatch argues that it is 
easy to say that no one should get a second piece of pie until everyone has had one 
because no one needs pie. A kidney is a different matter entirely.cxxvl" We are 
interested in treating equals equally and Alex and Billy are equal with relation to their 
need for the kidney. Assuming then, as Veatch does, that '"fair shares' are proportional 
to need"cxxix, giving Alex the second kidney would be giving her a fair share. This 
diffuses the question because if the second graft is a fair share for the Alex, then the 
question of whether or not it is fair to give a patient a second (or third) transplant, or 
additional blood products during a shortage, is answered "yes". The problem with this 
answer, while somewhat intuitive and satisfying, is that it does not explain why need 
and urgency are the only arbiters of fairness. One arguing the other side of the issue 
need only come back with "but past resource use is also an important element of 
fairness" and Veatch's argument would not be able to address this objection because he 
does not explain why fair shares are proportional to need (and urgency) . 
One important point about past resource use echoes the arguments in 
conservation and the resulting procedural point about competing claims. Veatch argues 
that this is not a reason to deny Alex the second kidney because each kidney can only 
ever help one patient, regardless of who that patient iscxxx. And that is true but it is also 
only part of the story in most cases. Understanding this argument this way presupposes 
that past resource use will be ignored. If resource use through time is considered, then 
Alex's previous kidney transplant matters because if the current kidney is given to Alex, 
then two kidneys will have gone to help one person. One kidney may only be able to 
help one person, but sometimes people require more than one kidney. If Alex gets the 
kidney instead of Billy, then only one person is helped instead of two and the finite 
number of organs are distributed to fewer people. This is also true of other resources, 
such as blood products or ICU beds; if people are able to use large amounts of these 
resources, fewer people will have access to them. It is this latter concern that, I suspect, 
Kilner, in a similar move, also appeals to need (and urgency) to explain why past resource use should 
not weaken a patient's claim to a resource. His argument also suffers from the same problem. 
drives much of the concern over "slices" of the health care "pie". If people have open 
access to an infinite number of slices of pie, no one will care who has had firsts, 
seconds or even thirds. It is when having seconds makes it so others cannot have firsts 
that the problem arises. 
And it is this same sentiment that drives the intuition in the conservation case, 
that, all else being equal, it is better for one to die than for five to die. And the part 
about "all else being equal" is what those who claim that treating people with equal 
(and equally urgent) needs as equals requires ignoring past resource use miss. If all else 
truly is equal, then the need, urgency, potential benefit and all of the other 
considerations that take rights and such into account are equal in the case. The only 
thing that is not equal is past resource use and when the only difference is a difference 
that presents the choice of saving more or saving fewer, the choice has to be saving 
more. 
3. How does past resource use fit in with other considerations? 
Past resource use then does weaken a patient's claim to a resource. How much the 
claim is weakened is extremely context dependent and depends on the nature of the 
resource in question, the number of people concerned, the actual amount of the 
resource(s) consumed to date, the real scarcity of the resource and so on. But even 
without knowing the specific circumstances, it is clear that past resource use will likely 
conflict most with considerations such as benefit or need since past resource use is a 
restriction that weakens the claims of those who may be in need or who might greatly 
benefit from a resource. 
Queuing 
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Queuing is frequently invoked and intuitively compelling, since we have all learned 
since childhood to take turns, wait your turn and do not cut in line. However, despite 
the frequent appeals to queuing, rarely are any of them justified beyond an unexplained 
reference to their being required by equity or justice. Further, few if any of these 
justifications deal with the problem of there not being equal access to the healthcare line 
at all. The relevant questions are, then, why is this set of concepts so strongly linked to 
equality and justice and also whether their reflection of equity holds true in the medical 
setting. 
1. What does the queuing consideration encompass? 
This, at least, is fairly straightforward. Queuing refers to a family of concepts that are 
all intrinsically linked to each other including waiting time and first come, first served 
(FCFS). The idea in all of these is that the person who has gotten there first and has 
thus been waiting longer should have a greater claim to the resource. It is important to 
note that even though queuing is generally thought of as a procedural consideration (and 
would thus not fit into this discussion of substantive considerations), it has substantive 
elements as well. It is these substantive elements that will be the focus of the discussion 
here. 
2. What is the moral justification for FCFS generally? 
Writers in fields as disparate as operations research, psychology, philosophy and 
queuing theory all cite some version of FCFS as the just procedure for handling queues 
We learn from a young age that it is not acceptable to cut in line or jump the queue 
altogether and we feel that we have been wronged if someone does jump the queue 
ahead of us. This is because the idea of first come, first served is rooted in 
egalitarianism; it is "in harmony with the basic principle of human equality"CXXX1. 
Larson, for example, discusses queue theory with reference to social justice, "as 
measured by adherence to (or violation of) first in, first out"cxxx" and further states that 
"queuing theorists and social scientists have long believed that first come, first served 
(FCFS) is the socially just queue discipline"cxxxl". Unfortunately, he does not explain 
why it is so considered and he is not alone. Very little explanation or justification is 
ever offered for why FCFS, and consequently waiting time (since the person who had 
gotten there first is the person who has been waiting the longest), seems to be such an 
important feature of justice. 
Winslowcxxxlv, who offers a more extensive discussion of the issue than most 
others, discusses several possibilities for justifying FCFS. One of those possibilities is 
also the most popular justification among those who discuss the issue at all; most seem 
to agree that the importance of FCFS is grounded in equality, i.e., that FCFS is the 
proper way of treating equals equally. FCFS is widely held to embody fairness and 
equality. Unfortunately, the most widely cited justification of FCFS is also the least 
explained. The quote at the beginning of this section from Larson is essentially all that 
he says by way of justification. And Brady, in his study of people waiting (sometimes 
more than a week) in line to purchase tickets to Star Wars: The Phantom Menace, 
simply states, "Presumably, people sense a kind of fairness about queues"cxxxv. And a 
host of people (including some cited by Winslow) simply write elaborate examples of 
people forming lines in situations where line jumping would be somewhat frowned 
upon by most and go little farther. The fairness of FCFS and its promotion of equality 
are, apparently, meant to be self-evident from these examples. And they are 
compelling. In situations where all other things are equal, we really do think that 
people who jump lines should be punished (sometimes severely). But why this is still 
needs to be teased out. 
One idea that is frequently mentioned in conjunction with FCFS and equality is 
that, with FCFS, people's wait times will be equal, so no one will have to wait any 
longer than anyone else. But this can only be true in highly idealized lines. Consider, 
for example, a line at the bank with only one teller window open. In order for everyone 
to wait the same period of time, every person's interaction with the teller must be the 
same length and one person must join the line just as the person at the front of the line 
leaves it. And there is no way for the wait to be the same for everyone during initial 
line formation. Thus, FCFS does not do anything to equalize wait times. At most, it 
limits the length of time the longest waiting person must wait compared to a system 
where people may jump the line. Or, more precisely, it ensures that no person will wait 
longer than a person who arrives later. But more likely it does not even do this since in 
the healthcare world the access to the line is radically unequal. And the problem again 
is what the significance is of arriving first. After all, if wait times are unequal, why 
should someone who arrives first be accorded the shortest wait? 
Another, more promising, possibility that Winslow mentions is that the relevant 
form of equality in FCFS is equality of opportunity. All people, Childress maintains, 
are equal in their humanity- that is, everyone is equal with respect to personal 
dignityCXXXVI. And this is not a new sentiment. In everyday life, people are generally 
considered equals although rarely are any two people truly equal with regard to 
intelligence, talents, education, wealth, etc. The idea is that, qua human beings, people 
are equal with respect to their individual human dignity- that they are fundamentally 
equal. Thus, Childress argues, "The individual's personal and transcendent 
dignity.. .can be protected and witnessed to by a recognition of his equal right to be 
saved. Such a right is best preserved by procedures which establish equality of 
opportunity"CXXXV11. The procedures that best serve this purpose are those that rely on 
randomness or chance. When flipping a coin, both heads and tails have an equal 
opportunity to come up and when drawing lots, each person has an equal opportunity of 
drawing the desired lot. Childress explains that FCFS is a form of "natural 
chance"cxxxvm that does promote equality of opportunity over time. Although it is not 
random, a person's place is line is determined by chance; that person could have joined 
the line at some other time when the line was longer or shorter. Taking people in the 
order in which they joined the line then preserves the equal opportunity all have to 
receive treatment. 
On Childress's account, simply being at the head of the line is not what is 
morally significant. Instead, what is morally significant is that, by utilizing FCFS, 
people have an equal opportunity to obtain whatever it is that they are waiting in line for 
and the principle of treating equals equally is maintained. And Childress's explanation 
maps onto general intuitions about equality, fairness and waiting in line. Reactions to 
line jumping tend to be of the "what do you think makes you so much better that you 
don't have to wait like the rest of us" variety. The thinking is that by jumping the line, 
the line jumper asserts that he or she is somehow "better" than the others in line, or that 
he or she is "too good" to wait in line. The issue is not so much that this person goes 
before other people; it is that by going before the other people, the line jumper shortens 
his or her wait at the expense of others. He or she makes the other people in line wait 
longer and spend more of their time waiting than they otherwise would have. And 
because we take all people to be fundamentally equal in personal dignity and humanity, 
usurping FCFS essentially treats equals unequally, violating the basic principle of ethics 
to treat equals equally. 
But how does such an application map onto healthcare? Though FCFS is 
intuitively compelling, its application in the healthcare setting is problematic for a 
number of reasons. Practically, the idea that line formation comes about through 
natural chance is a suspect one. If everyone had equal access to healthcare, the idea 
would not be so problematic but, in reality, people do not have equal access to 
healthcare. As a population, people who live in rural areas, the poor and uninsured and 
certain ethnic populations often do not have the same access to care that insured white 
(sub)urbanites do. The Institute on Medicine's Committee on the Consequences of 
Uninsurance (IOMCCU) reports that those without insurance (who are 
disproportionately poor and from racial or ethnic minority populations0"50"") "generally 
have reduced access to care"; they "are less likely to have any physician visit within a 
year, have fewer visits annually, and are less likely to have a regular source of care"cxl. 
The barriers to access do not end once an uninsured person has seen a physician, 
however. IOMCCU further reports that the uninsured are also less likely to receive 
treatments deemed necessary by their physicians or to receive routine care for chronic 
conditions0"'1. These barriers to access are associated with worse health outcomes 
overall0"1". With such substantial barriers to joining the line, one's position in line can 
hardly be considered a case of natural chance among equals. 
One approach with the potential to avoid this problem is to take Fried's position 
that being at the head of the line for a physician's services creates a doctor-patient 
relationship between the physician and the person at the head of the line (presumably 
because the person at the head of the line has a face-to-face encounter with the doctor 
before any of the other people in the line)oxl1". Once there is a physician-patient 
relationship with this first patient, the physician would be guilty of abandoning the first-
in-line patient were he or she to treat someone father down the line or put the farther-
down patient's interests ahead of the first-in-line patient. But why this is the case is not 
entirely clear; broadly, this does not explain why there is moral significance to being at 
the head of the line. If people farther back in line have seen the physician on previous 
visits, then there is a pre-existing physician-patient relationship with them- shouldn't 
then they be seen first? And if everyone in the line has a relationship with the 
physician, why should FCFS hold? 
And even if no one in the line has a pre-exiting relationship with the physician, 
the core problem still exists. The problem is that concern over the physician-patient 
relationship does not justify FCFS; it can only justify treating people with whom the 
physician has a relationship over those with whom he or she does not. Why, for 
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example, does the person at the head of the line have an expectation of a relationship 
when that people farther back do not? Only if we presume FCFS does the person at the 
front of the line see the physician first (and thus establish a physician-patient 
relationship prior to the others) but the presumption of FCFS does not justify its use. 
The physician does not have to approach the front of the line. If the physician 
approaches the line and pulls out someone from the middle to treat, then that person has 
a physician-patient relationship with the physician, not the person who is in front of the 
line. By the reasoning of Fried's argument, at the point that the physician approaches 
the line, the physician's obligation to any one person in the line is equal to his or her 
obligation to any other person in the line. But once a patient has been identified, from 
whichever section of the line the patient is pulled, that patient has the physician-patient 
relationship and thus takes priority. Nothing in Fried's argument justifies FCFS. 
Additionally, FCFS is remarkably inefficient since more people are likely to 
suffer harm or die while waiting in line. This is not the case in lines for movie tickets or 
bank tellers. If emergency rooms were to adopt strict FCFS as a triage measure, a 
person having a heart attack could die in the waiting room while the doctors and nurses 
set broken fingers, see people suffering from colds and suture cuts. In discussing 
casualty treatment on American Civil War battlefields, Winslow quotes Walt 
Whitman's description: "The men, whatever their condition, lie there and patiently wait 
till their turn comes to be taken up"cxllv. Certainly, even with the dubious value of 
medical treatment at the time, men died waiting for care while those who could have 
waited received care. And the physician has a professional obligation to act as a 
fiduciary of his or her patients and consider their best interests primarily. To let people 
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die in line who could be saved while others who could wait are taken care of is certainly 
not in the best interests of most patients. 
Of course, inefficiency in itself is not a sufficient reason to reject a 
consideration, for as Veatch points out, distributive justice must balance efficiency with 
human rights and equality. A frequently proffered partial solution to the problem of 
inefficiency that is operative if not explicit in most FCFS accounts is to limit who can 
join the line in some way, such as to those who can benefit from the resource or to those 
who will die without it instead of allowing just anyone to join. ChildressQxlv clearly has 
something like this in mind because the examples of FCFS he uses are examples where 
the line has already been limited to those who need the treatment in question. But once 
a person's condition becomes morally relevant to line-joining or line formation, it is no 
longer wholly about fundamental human equality. It is about equality among those of a 
certain condition26 or treatment as equals. And in order for that to obtain, much more 
than FCFS must be considered. 
But these problematic attempts to solve the problems associated with FCFS 
point to a more fundamental problem with Childress's account specifically and the 
exclusive use of FCFS generally. If the line is limited to only those who would benefit, 
the Civil War problem still exists; certainly many of the wounded soldiers who could 
have waited to see the surgeon presumably benefit from seeing the surgeon. Those 
lines would not have changed much. The fundamental equality is preserved but it costs 
numerous lives and, in this sense, undermines its own justification. Since people die or 
suffer harm while waiting for others who could wait are treated, equal respect for the 
This is also the case to a certain extent when the line is limited to those who can benefit from the 
resource in question. 
lives of those involved is denied. If people really are fundamentally equal then there 
should be equal respect for the value of their lives. Having people wait in line 
regardless of their situation and, in short, treating them equally, fails to give equal 
respect to the lives of those in the line. 
And this is the central problem with Childress's account: he chooses as his 
"relevant equality" the fundamental equality of all human beings regardless of their 
situation. In doing so, he essentially advocates equal treatment instead of treatment as 
equals. Childress clearly does not support giving everyone the same treatment, 
regardless of condition. But if everyone is equal in everything that is considered 
relevant (i.e., their personal dignity and fundamental human equality), then there is no 
reason to treat anyone differently from anyone else. And this is what Childress points 
to as a virtue of his account and why he advocates natural chance. But acknowledging 
differences in condition and situation is what allows us to treat people as equals instead 
of simply giving them equal treatment. By having them wait in line as if their 
conditions were the same for the sake of fundamental equality does fail to treat people 
as equals in important ways, especially when the very lives of some people are at stake. 
Using FCFS, it is possible, indeed probable, that people with more urgent conditions 
who could be saved are allowed to die in line while those who might have waited 
receive treatment. By failing to acknowledge their differences of condition, the 
individuals in line are not accorded an equal opportunity to receive treatment or to be 
saved. 
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But acknowledging a person's situation does not eliminate concern for the 
fundamental equality of people27. Instead, it becomes one consideration among others 
because personal dignity is apart of each person's (human) condition. But because it is 
equal (by definition) in each person, it can neither directly strengthen nor weaken a 
person's claim to a resource relative to another person's claim and so the operative 
considerations must be those that differentiate one person's condition and situation from 
another's. However, there will be many times when people's claims to a particular 
resource are similarly strong. In this case, FCFS is often justified as a kind of 
tiebreaker. Veatch advocates using FCFS (as determined by wait time) only as a 
tiebreaker among those with similar claims to a resourcecxlvi. 
However, using FCFS only as a tiebreaker minimizes the importance of the 
concern for basic human equality; even if such a concern does not directly affect a 
claim, it can indirectly affect a person's claim in terms of wait time. In the case of 
organ donation, patients with certain blood types or from certain racial or ethnic groups 
are less likely to receive organs due to the shortage of matching donor organs. Patients 
in these groups usually face longer wait times than patients from other blood groups and 
backgrounds. And, some patients may simply have a longer wait because a match for 
them simply does not come up. Because we are concerned to treat these people as 
equals and with respect to their personal dignity as humans, the fact of their having 
longer wait times does strengthen their claim to the resource. This is because the 
concern for the equality of personal dignity is tied to a concern for equality of 
opportunity. Clearly, those with longer wait times face diminished opportunity to 
27
 Supporters of a lottery system also point to the fundamental equality of people as the justification for 
using a pure lottery system to distribute goods. The difficulties with lottery systems and the comparison 
of a lottery system to the claims system I propose are discussed in the last chapter. 
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receive the resource. Considering wait time in determining the strength of claims to 
some degree offsets the inequality of opportunity afforded those with longer wait times. 
3. How will wait time as a consideration work with the other considerations? 
Although some writers advocate using wait time only as a tiebreaker, it can strengthen 
the claim to the extent that the claim of a person with a long wait time may override the 
otherwise stronger claim of a person who has not waited as long. How much wait time 
strengthens a person's claim to a resource will depend on the length of time spent 
waiting and also on the magnitude of the disparity between the claims in question 
(before wait time is factored in). When a person has spent much longer waiting and the 
magnitude of the disparity in claims is small, wait time can offset the disparity in 
claims. However, the greater the magnitude of the disparity to be overcome and the less 
the difference in wait time, the smaller the impact of wait time. Wait time is dependent 
in this way on the other considerations because, as was discussed above, giving too 
much weight to it causes us to treat people equally, instead of as equals. 
Since wait time is a consideration based in concern for equality (like concern for 
dependents), it will likely conflict with efficiency-based considerations, such as benefit 
and urgency, though the conflict is not inevitable. In many cases, a patient will have 
deteriorated as he or she waits for treatment and because of the deterioration the 
situation will be more urgent. 
"Squatter's Rights" 
Though this consideration does involve a possible right, it is included as part of the 
claims section because it is not a clear cut and legally defined right as are those 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
In making distribution decisions, the prevailing mental image is that of an 
unused resource and a group of claimants with competing claims. The person who then 
has the greatest claim to the resource avails him or herself of the waiting resource. 
Once the resource is "claimed" it is no longer available. This is certainly accurate when 
the resource in question is something like a drug dose that is not reusable. But many 
medical resources are reusable. Is this picture accurate, or should it be, with regard to 
reusable resources? The picture assumes that the person who is initially given access to 
the resource should have ongoing access to the resource that is not consistently 
reevaluated. The question is whether the picture is an accurate one. 
1. What is a squatter's right to a resource? 
Though the idea of squatter's rights in healthcare seems fairly straightforward, there are 
a few conceptual issues that must be addressed. First, who counts as a squatter and 
what counts as "squatting" must be clarified. The legal understanding of a squatter as 
someone who is using another's property without permission does not accurately map 
onto what actually happens in health care institutions but, for the sake of simplicity, I 
will use the term anyway and I discuss the issues regarding property issues below. 
Here, the term "squatter" refers to the person who has initially been given access to a 
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resource and for whom continued use of that resource is medically indicated. In most 
cases, the squatter is the person who is "using" a resource, such as the person occupying 
an ICU bed or the person receiving dialysis. The complication comes in determining 
what "to use" or "a use" means. There are some clear examples of a resource being 
used: the person lying in the ICU bed is using that bed, a patient plugged into a dialysis 
machine is using that machine and a patient with an LVAD is using that LVAD. 
However, this picture of healthcare delivery is far too simple. People in ICU beds go 
for tests, sit in chairs beside the bed and use potty chairs; they are not always in the bed. 
Does each time the patient returns to bed count as a new use? Or is the patient always 
using the bed, even when he or she is not in it? Or does each new day count as a new 
use, whether or not the patient has at any point left the bed? 
What counts as a use will almost always depend on the resource itself. What 
counts as using or a use of a bed might be different than what counts as using or a use of 
hemodialysis treatment. In what follows, I will consider a "use" of a resource to cover 
the entire time period that the resource is unavailable according to standard practice. 
There are times when a resource might be physically available to be used by another 
person but, according to standard practice the resource would not be seen as available. 
Consider the ICU bed. Once a patient is assigned a bed, the bed is generally considered 
unavailable to others until the patient has been transferred or discharged. Thus, it is not 
a new "use" every time a patient returns to bed or starts a new hospital day. 
Admittedly, this sounds question-begging because determining that a resource is 
"unavailable" assumes that a squatter has rights. However, by saying that a resource is 
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unavailable, I simply mean that the resource would not normally be assigned to anyone 
else if there is no shortage of resources to contend with. 
To better illustrate this, consider hemodialysis (HD). HD is what people 
generally think of when they think of "dialysis". It is a procedure in which a patient is 
hooked up to a machine that filters the patient's blood. It is usually administered 
several times a week for several hours at a time. A patient receiving HD uses the 
machine during his or her treatments but in between treatments the machine is available 
for others to use. Thus, even though an HD patient may be engaged in a treatment 
regimen, he or she is not always using the machine. Each individual treatment is 
considered a new use of a resource. This is a bit different from how most people think 
about HD treatment. Ceasing HD treatments is usually referred to as a withdrawing of 
dialysis, not a withholding; calling it a "withdrawal" instead of a "withholding" makes 
it sound like the patient is using the machine and it is being taken away, not that the 
patient is between treatments and not using the machine. However, even if a patient is 
not actively using the HD machine, the withdrawal terminology can still make sense if 
what is meant is that the patient is stopping the treatment regimen. The treatment plan 
or order for HD is withdrawn, but the individual treatments are withheld28. Given this 
understanding, an HD patient is not a squatter on the HD machine except when he or 
she is actually receiving treatment. 
By this account, squatters' rights can only apply to "withdrawings" and not 
"withholdings". With this understanding in mind, I now turn to the arguments for and 
against considering squatters' rights in resource allocation decisions. 
28
 Unless, of course, the patient is in the middle of a treatment when it is stopped; then it is rightly called a 
"withdrawing". 
176 
2. Whatwould justify squatters'rights to a resource? 
There are a number of arguments both for and against considering squatters' rights, 
some of which are tied up in much larger issues. The most notable of these is the 
concern that withdrawing treatment for any reason is impermissible because it would be 
killing the patient. Of course, this is an extreme position as most accept that treatment 
might be withdrawn if doing so accords with the patient's wishes but there are many 
groups that hold the more moderate and defensible position that withdrawing indicated 
treatment against a patient's wishes is impermissible. This argument frequently appears 
in debates about withholding or withdrawing medically inappropriate (so-called 
"futile") treatments and, as vehement as some are against the withdrawal of a medically 
inappropriate treatment against a patient or surrogate's wishes, the intuitions are even 
stronger against withdrawing treatment from someone who can clearly benefit from the 
treatment. The reason is, quite simply, that withdrawing indicated treatments against a 
patient's wishes for any reason is willfully harming, or even killing, the patient and to 
do so is morally unacceptable. 
This raises the issue of the possible moral valencing of doing and allowing. 
Suppose, for example, that Albert is using a hospital's only ECMO machine (extra-
corporeal mechanical oxygenation, akin to a heart-lung machine) and removing him 
from the machine will certainly kill him. Betty then arrives by ambulance and she has 
an (otherwise) greater claim to the ECMO machine than Albert. On this argument, the 
machine cannot be withdrawn from Albert for Betty's sake because to withdraw the 
machine kills Albert while Betty simply dies for lack of resources. Killing Albert is 
morally impermissible and so there is nothing we can do for Betty . There is a large 
literature surrounding this issue and I do not think it would be productive to turn this 
into a protracted discussion of the issues raised by that literature. Suffice it to say here 
that my take on this is that there are numerous cases in which it is morally wrong to 
cause something to happen but not to allow it to happen but there are also cases where it 
would be equally morally unacceptable to cause something to happen as to allow it to 
happen, cases where it would be morally acceptable to both cause and allow something 
to happen and maybe even cases where it would be morally acceptable to cause 
something to happen but not to allow it to happen. The moral acceptability of an action 
or non-action rests not with whether it can be classified as a "doing" or an "allowing" 
but on the context of the situation. The argument should be not about the fact of 
withdrawing or withholding the resource but instead should be about the rightness or 
wrongness of withdrawing the treatment from this specific patient or withholding it 
from that specific patient. It is not clear is why it is always (or even generally) morally 
worse to harm the patient by withdrawing the treatment in order to give it to another 
patient with a stronger claim than it is to allow the patient with the stronger claim to be 
harmed by withholding the treatment in favor of a patient with a lesser claim who 
happens to be using the resource currently. 
Other arguments in favor of squatter's rights fare little better. One such 
argument is similar to the one put forth by Charles Fried when he argues in favor of 
"first come, first served" but would apply here as well since, presumably, the patient 
291 realize that there are numerous ways that the actions and inactions involved in the Albert and Betty 
case can be conceptualized and only on some of these will what I have written be the case. On other 
understandings, this might not be a case of killing versus letting die or of doing versus allowing. 
However, I have conceptualized the (in)actions in this way to illustrate the issue that arises- that of killing 
versus letting die, doing versus allowing- and not to argue that this is the correct conceptualization. 
who is using the resource did indeed come first. This does not mean that queuing or 
"first come, first served" are an argument in favor of squatters' rights, though they 
might be easily conflated, but instead that an argument that purports to support the one 
might also support the other. The idea is that the squatter has an ongoing relationship 
with the physician caring for him or her. Once in this relationship, the physician has an 
obligation to act as a fiduciary of the patient and act in the patient's best interests. 
Withdrawing a beneficial treatment from a patient would not be in the patient's best 
interests and would therefore be a breach of the fiduciary duty. To do so then is not 
only in violation of a physician's obligations to his or her patient, but they have 
detrimental effects on that specific patient's trust in his or her physician and patients' 
trust in the medical profession generally. 
There are two serious flaws in this argument. The first is inherent in Freid's 
argument that the obligations of the physician-patient relationship support allowing the 
squatter to continue using the resource. It is certainly not the case that the squatter 
always has a relationship with a physician and the second person does not. 
Realistically, since the second person is seeking an ICU bed, he or she has probably 
already been evaluated by a physician who has determined that ICU care is indicated. 
And what if the physician for the squatter changes? Physicians do go on vacation or 
sign off of cases and often the new physician has not ever seen the patient before. 
These complications are not meant to show that the squatter is not in a physician-patient 
relationship or that the squatter's physician does not have a fiduciary duty to the 
squatter. The complications show that it is likely that the second patient likely does 
have a physician, with whom he does have a relationship and who has a fiduciary 
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obligation to him as well. Also, physician-patient relationships and interactions in the 
hospital are much more complicated than the model Freid assumes. 
Even accepting that simplistic model of the physician-patient relationship in 
hospital settings does not yield any support of considering squatters' rights. Rather, 
Freid has offered a defense of why the patient who is already using the resource should 
be allowed to continue to do so without reference to squatters' rights. The argument 
uses reasons of professionalism and consequences for trust to support squatters' rights, 
but these reasons have nothing to do with the patient being a squatter. The physician's 
obligation to his or her patient and the personal and public trust in the medical 
profession are principles in their own right that have little to do with being a squatter. A 
more direct argument from fiduciary duty and the consequence of losing trust is much 
less problematic than having to justify squatters' rights along the way. 
Of course, there is another way of understanding the relationship issue that 
would support squatters' rights and that is to posit an implicit promise to the patient that 
once treatment is begun, it will be seen through to the end. Many patients and their 
families certainly think this but patients and families have many beliefs about what they 
think they are entitled to, including the right to demand treatments of various sorts, but 
this is not the case. The question is not whether or not patients and families think there 
is such a promise but whether there is such a promise. Freid tried to ground the promise 
in the physician-patient relationship but is there a broader promise, between the medical 
institution and the patient or some other such relationship? The problem with assuming 
such a promise is showing that it is there. Yes, hospitals and individual physicians 
work to save everyone but, generally, they all recognize the necessity of triage and the 
realization that not everyone will be able to be treated as much as they might require 
because of limitations in the amount of a resource. Even the Texas legislature 
recognizes this in the Texas Advance Directives Act, which states that the act "may not 
be construed to require the provision of life-sustaining treatment that cannot be 
provided to a patient without denying the same treatment to another patient"C5dy". This 
explicitly denies any such promise and recognizes the difficult decisions that must 
sometimes be made. The argument 
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that very few of the rights that Bjorkman and Hansson list would be rights that a patient 
has to a medical resource that he or she is simply using. However, while this theory of 
property rights interestingly informs their discussion of ownership in biological 
specimens, it would be at best circular and at worst question begging in the current 
discussion because the present question is whether or not any form of property right will 
grant a patient the right to continued use of the medical resource at issue. The "bundle 
of rights" idea assumes that we know what rights a person has to an object and then 
determines the property relation from there. 
More helpfully, Locke famously argues a natural rights theory of property that 
starts from the idea that resources are owned by all in the community. A resource 
becomes the exclusive property of one member of that community when that member 
mixes his or her labors with the resource, thus adding value to it; by cultivating a piece 
of land or sculpting some mud into a piece of art. The owner has invested work and 
added value to the resource and so becomes his or her exclusive property because of 
this investmentcxhx. There are numerous challenges to this theory but the more relevant 
challenges are those that arise when this theory is applied to the problem at hand. 
Certainly, when a patient uses a medical resource such as a dialysis machine, the patient 
certainly in some way mixes with the machine; after all, it processes his or her blood. 
However, there are two problems with using Locke's theory to justify a patient's right 
to continue using a dialysis. First, it is not obvious that simply using something means 
that the patient has mixed his or her labors with the thing. It is especially difficult to 
make the case that use equals labor mixing in the case of say, an ICU bed that a patient 
simply lays on. Further, even if use did equate to labor mixing, using a medical 
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resource does not generally add value to that resource. So use of a medical resource 
would not be the kind of investment and improvement in a thing that Locke seems to 
have in mind. 
This bears some closer scrutiny, however, given the connection between 
Locke's theory of property rights and legal rulings on land squatting, or adverse 
possession. This usually applies to land or real estate; if a squatter uses land owned by 
another person as if the squatter were the owner without the owner's permission, then 
after some amount of time, the squatter acquires rightful ownership of the land. The 
squatter cannot simply occupy the land or walk on it; the squatter must actually improve 
the land somehow by, at the very least, mowing or clearing the land. Now, the patient-
squatter would clearly not have a claim to actual title of the medical resource. As was 
pointed out before, the patient-squatter has not actually improved anything. But a more 
interesting issue is the point about the owner's permission. Those squatters on 
healthcare resources are doing so with the (sometimes reluctant) permission of the 
healthcare institution. The better analogy than that of patient-as-squatter would be more 
along the lines of a renter, but there is difficulty with this as well. Renters have rights in 
virtue of a variety of laws governing the renter-landlord relationship but more 
immediately in virtue of the contract they enter into. Though there are laws governing 
the relationship between the patient and the healthcare distributor, there is no contract 
analogous to that signed by the renter that clearly defines the scope of treatment. 
Indeed, the inpatient does not rent the ICU bed or the dialysis equipment from the 
hospital in the same way that a tenant rents a living from a landlord. The patient does 
pay for the use of the resource, but the use is at the discretion of the physicians in 
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charge of the resource. Given these problems, squatters' rights to medical resources 
cannot be justified by appeal to property rights. 
There is one objection to considering squatters' rights that should be mentioned: 
the idea of "taking turns". The idea here is similar to the signs hanging in the cardio 
rooms of most gyms that limit people's time on the equipment to 20 or 30 minutes when 
others are waiting. The idea is that those who are already on the equipment working out 
should not monopolize the machines and should take turns. Similarly, a patient who is 
using an ICU bed when someone else comes in who requires the bed should yield to the 
new patient because the squatter has already had a turn with the bed. This argument 
also appeals to a strong intuition: the idea of taking turns that has been ingrained in us 
all since we were small children. This should not be confused with a concern for past 
resource use, which is a concern about amounts of resources consumed by an individual 
that is discussed in a separate section. Instead, it is a concern about everyone having the 
opportunity to use a resource. 
However, the cardio room analogy is not perfect and may mask an important 
objection to this argument: the squatters' turn might not be up. In order to make an 
argument about taking turns, what counts as a "turn" has to be defined. In baseball, a 
turn is defined by strikes, outs and innings. In the cardio room, a turn is defined by the 
number of minutes on the equipment that has been determined by the management. 
How is a turn decided in medical resource allocation? And is a turn the same for 
everyone using a particular resource? Further, just because a person is using a resource, 
it does not mean that he or she has had a turn; the squatter might be in the middle of his 
or her turn, like the person who has only been on the treadmill for 5 minutes. The 
concern about people having the opportunity to use a resource is a valid one, but access 
is not the only concern, especially since access does not really matter if the patient 
cannot benefit because his or her access is rescinded before the benefit can accrue. 
3. What it means to not consider squatters' rights. 
The strongest objection to considering squatters' rights is that there is no good 
justification in support of them, other than intuitions that may have more to do with 
"first come, first served" or beliefs in entitlements that do not exist. Of course, if 
hospitals and physicians removed people from treatments every time someone else 
came along, then it is likely that very little of the benefit would accrue to everyone since 
no patient would be able to finish his or her treatment. Of course, this has little to do 
with squatters' rights and more to do with benefit and efficiency. And it is by no 
means certain that resources would be used inefficiently, squatters' rights or no. After 
all, if the people who are already receiving treatment have a greater claim all things 
considered, then they will certainly continue to receive treatment. Those who do not 
have sufficiently strong claims will receive alternate treatment, just as if they arrived at 
the same time as the patients who have recently arrived. 
Thus, the picture described at the beginning of this section is an inaccurate one. 
When using a reusable resource, a patient's claim to that resource should be reevaluated 
as circumstances change and evaluated against newly arriving claims if there is not 
enough of the resource to go around. 
Immigration Status 
The basic idea is that priority (at the very least) should be given to American citizens 
(or at least those who are in the country legally) when considering who should be given 
a medical resource in America. This consideration is almost always used as a reason 
against providing medical resources to illegal immigrants and it is sometimes difficult 
to separate the issues of distributive justice from the tempest of rhetoric and spleen that 
is the immigration debate. But, while some reasons for considering immigration status 
can certainly be written off as irrationally xenophobic, there are some rational 
arguments that might justify some form of this consideration. 
1. What would an immigration status consideration entail? 
As potential considerations go, defining one's immigration status is fairly 
straightforward. And it is fairly easy to determine who counts as an American citizen. 
However, the nation is not so easily divided into citizens and non-citizens given the 
spectrum of residency situations. The extremes are certainly citizens on one end and 
undocumented immigrants on the other but between these two situations there are 
permanent residents, asylees, people with a rainbow of visas and so on. Certainly most 
of the vitriol about non-citizens and health care is directed at undocumented immigrants 
but there is also some concern about, for example, medical tourism and its associated 
resource use. Without understanding why it is that American citizens should be given 
priority, however, drawing lines between any of these groups would be arbitrary. 
Whether or not immigration status affects the claims of which groups directly depends 
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upon the justification provided for prioritizing some groups over others. Different 
justifications will encompass different immigration statuses. Thus, the issue of which 
groups receive priority under this consideration will have to be put off until a 
justification is found that would ground this consideration. 
2. Why accept an immigration status consideration? 
Probably the most prevalent argument in support of an immigration status consideration 
is also a red herring. And that is that the issue is about money and, specifically, money 
spent on undocumented immigrants. In discussions of health care for undocumented 
immigrants, there is a ubiquitous portrait of the destitute undocumented immigrant who 
works odd jobs, does not pay taxes and has had some medical misfortune befall him and 
now requires extensive costly medical intervention. Or, the undocumented immigrant is 
a poverty-stricken woman (who also does not pay taxes) having a child who will be a 
U.S. citizen, thus anchoring the family in America. In both of these portraits, the 
undocumented immigrants have contributed little if anything to the community in which 
they live and are using costly medical resources. The argument that accompanies this 
portrait is that undocumented immigrants cost taxpayers (who are presumably American 
citizens) billions of dollars per year in medical care alone. With some hospitals barely 
staying open because of the strain of uncompensated care, excluding treatment from 
those whose mere presence in the country is a violation of U.S. law seems to be a good 
resource management plan. Under this justification, having undocumented immigrant 
status would weaken one's claim to medical resources while those who are in the 
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country legally are accorded the same status as citizens vis-a-vis the strength of their 
claims to a resource. 
But there are several problems with this argument, including problems with both 
the explicit and the implicit assumptions that undergird the argument. For starters, 
although solid numbers are hard to pin down because of the nature of the study 
population, estimates of the percentage of illegal immigrants who file some form of 
income tax (including payroll taxes) are between 50-55%, with some estimates as high 
as 75%cl. Additionally, even those who do not file income tax pay sales taxes on all of 
the goods they buy and also pay property taxes through the rent that they pay to 
landlords01'. Further, several recent studies challenge the picture of rampant health 
resource overuse by illegal immigrants. These studies show that undocumented Latinos 
(who make up roughly 80% of the undocumented population in the United States) have 
a lower rate of use of health services than documented and citizen Latinos01" and there is 
also some evidence to suggest that undocumented immigrants spend less on health care 
than native citizens0'"1. And even in places like California, which has the highest 
undocumented immigrant population in the United States and spends an estimated $9-
$10 billion on uncompensated care for illegal immigrants, a Congressional Budget 
Office Report states that the amount of money spent is not a large portion of the state 
health care budget, nor is it disproportional to the size of the immigrant population in 
the state. The large amount of money California spends on uncompensated care for 
illegal immigrants constitutes less than 10% of the state's health care budget, which is 
proportional with the estimates that roughly 8% of California's population is 
undocumentedcllv. 
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Of course, even if it is proportional, $9-$ 10 billion from one state is still an 
enormous sum of money. And even using generous estimates, the Congressional 
Budget Office Report concludes that the government (mostly on the state and local 
levels) does not take in enough in taxes and other contributions to the economy to offset 
what they spend on health care and other services, such as law enforcement and 
education, for illegal immigrantsclv. So even if the portrayal of the undocumented 
immigrant is unjustly harsh, the fact remains that someone has to pay for services for 
the illegal immigrants who do not pay for themselves. But if the issue is that 
undocumented immigrants are simply not paying for themselves, then the question is 
one of ability to pay, not immigration status. Presumably, then, if the undocumented 
immigrants paid for the medical services and there was no uncompensated care 
attributable to them, this would be a non-issue. And, as was also the case with using 
age as a shorthand for potential benefit, using immigration status as a shorthand for 
ability to pay is unjustified targeting of a particular population. After all, there are 
plenty of American citizens who also receive uncompensated care and many surely are 
a greater burden on the health care system, pay fewer taxes and contribute less 
economically to the community than some illegal immigrants. It is true that the average 
illegal immigrant family is poorer than the average native-born family or legal 
immigrant family and less likely to be insuredclvi but there are individuals that buck that 
trend. It simply does not make sense to say that a certain group will be excluded simply 
because many people in that group are unable to pay; no one asserts that people who 
live in a particularly poor ZIP code should be denied care because many of the people in 
that ZIP code are unable to pay for treatments and thus contribute to the shortages. 
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But this does not have to be understood as an ability to pay issue. Even with 
resources that are not (directly) paid for, such as organs or blood products, there are 
arguments in favor of prioritizing citizens over non-citizens. The argument that 
grounds such reasoning is the most popular argument for prioritizing citizens after 
ability to pay arguments: community membership. And though the argument from 
community membership is often a reflection of zealous nationalism or xenophobia, the 
most prominent discussion around community membership in the literature on organ 
transplantation is that the relevant community membership is that of the "giving 
community". The argument is "that since foreigners are not members of the community 
which gives organs, it would be unfair to allow them to receive organs"clv". This can be 
extended beyond the organ donation debate to encompass a health care giving 
community, in which undocumented immigrants are "free riders" on American health 
resources. However, in neither the organ debate nor in the broader health care debate 
does this argument hold up. Davis and Goldberg, et al. challenge this argument both on 
the grounds that American citizens comprise the relevant community and also that 
foreign nationals are not members of a "giving" community. First, Goldberg, et al. 
challenge the idea that foreign nationals are not members of the giving community by 
pointing out that American citizens receive 96.2% of the organs but only donate 94.8%. 
Clearly, Americans do donate the vast majority of organs transplanted in the United 
States but they do not donate all of themclvm. Others are apparently giving to the giving 
community. 
Davis points out that defining the giving community as American citizens is 
untenable since not all Americans are willing or able to donate organs and, among 
Americans there are some families and religious groups that are opposed to donation 
(even if they are not opposed to receiving a transplant)01'". Goldberg, et al. point out 
that this disparity applies to certain racial groups as wellclx. Because some Jewish and 
Muslim sects and blacks donate in proportionately small numbers, should these groups 
be excluded from the giving community? The question becomes why include all and 
only American citizens (and legal residents) in the giving community when there are so 
many groups within America that will not or do not give? The other part of this 
argument is that there may be those who are willing to donate in other countries but do 
not have the chance. Clearly then, willingness and ability to donate, to give, does not 
put a person in the giving community and, by defining the giving community as 
American citizens and legal residents only, a giving community is not decided by who 
actually gives or is willing or able to give. And this is why the idea that equating 
American citizens and legal residents falls apart. 
However, the concern about community membership can be understood a 
different way which is often crudely expressed as "taking care of our own first". The 
argument is this: governments and government entities are primarily institutions of the 
people, by the people and for the people. Because of this, government and government 
entities have a special obligation to their own citizens to consider their interests over 
and above the interests of people from other countries. Curbing the use of health care 
resources by non-citizens protects the interests of American citizens by making sure that 
as many medical resources are available to citizens as possible. If there were a surplus 
of medical resources for American citizens, then providing compensated care for 
undocumented immigrants with that surplus would be acceptable since no American 
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would be deprived of the resource by giving it to a non-citizen. But America does not 
have a surplus and since hospital budgets are strained and many Americans go without 
basic health care, then what medical resources the U.S. does have should go to 
American citizens. Reducing uncompensated care for non-citizens makes funds 
available to pay for care for indigent citizens. Or, even if more money is not spent on 
care for poor Americans, then hospitals will receive some relief and those that may have 
closed otherwise will be able to stay open, thus providing access to care generally. 
Resources that would have gone to non-citizens are available for American citizens. In 
short, because not everyone can receive indicated health care, what resources are 
available should be given to citizens because of the special obligations of a government 
to its own people. 
But what exactly this special obligation entails is fairly confusing. The 
governments themselves offer little theoretical help and do not even present a cohesive 
position. All hospitals that receive federal funds are required by the Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) to evaluate everyone who comes 
to the emergency room and treat those with emergent conditions (including active labor) 
regardless of immigration status. But then, in an attempt to discourage illegal 
immigration, the federal legislature passed the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), which broadly denies public 
benefits (including Medicaid) to nearly all undocumented immigrants. This 
dramatically curtails federal spending on undocumented immigrants but PRWORA also 
includes language that allows individual states to pass laws that provide public benefits 
for undocumented immigrants, thus shifting the financial burden to the state and local 
level and, increasingly, to the hospitals themselves . In Texas, for example, after then-
Attorney General of Texas John Cornyn issued a non-binding opinion that PRWORA 
"prohibits [public hospital districts] from providing free or discounted non-emergency 
health care to undocumented aliens, even if they reside within the district's 
boundaries"clxi, the Texas legislature passed a law permitting, but not requiring013"1, 
public hospitals to provide non-emergency care to undocumented immigrants. 
Essentially, despite some federal programs , the decision about whether to provide 
non-emergency health care to undocumented immigrants, and the burden for doing so, 
has been passed from the federal government to the states and, at least in Texas, from 
the state to local government. 
But inconsistency in legislative acts is hardly an objection to the theoretical 
point that governments have special obligations to their citizens with regard to health 
care. More to the theoretical point, the special obligation can only extend to government 
entities and programs. The special obligations due citizens over non-citizens can (at 
least partially) justify federal legislation like PRWORA and other programs that limit 
what the government will reimburse for non-citizen medical resource use and also 
UNOS's restrictions on transplanting organs into foreign nationals and non-resident 
aliens32. What the special obligations argument cannot justify is making sure all entities 
in the health care system follow the same priorities regarding immigration status 
because the special obligation to prioritize citizens and their interests is a government 
30
 Jones, et al. note that at Harris County (Texas) Hospital District's Ben Taub Hospital, only about 25% 
of the $128 million spent on undocumented immigrants was reimbursed by state or federal funds. See 
Jones J, McCullough L, and Richman B. My brother's keeper: Uncompensated care for illegal 
immigrants. Journal of Vascular Surgery. 2006: 44(3); 679-682. 
31
 Such as Medicare's Disproportionate Share (DiSH) Payments and the $250 million allotted by the 
Medicare Modernization Act (2003) to compensate hospitals for care to illegal immigrants. These 
payments nowhere near offset the expenses incurred by hospitals. 
32
 UNOS was chosen as the OPTN required by the National Organ Transplant Act (1984). 
obligation, not an individual obligation. At most, a government's special obligations 
can extend to government facilities (such as public hospitals, who might then have 
policies that bind their employees and those who practice there) but not into the greater 
medical community. This is the most that an argument from the special obligations of a 
government to its citizens can do. 
3. What is the effect of not directly considering immigration status? 
Since all that can be justified in immigration status is for governments to consider their 
own citizens first, bedside patient selection decisions should not directly consider 
immigration status. All that can be considered is the impact of those government 
priorities on other considerations and on the possibilities open to the patient given these 
restrictions, should they choose to restrict programs and reimbursement to citizens and 
legal residents. I strongly suspect that the thrust of most concerns about foreign 
nationals using American health resources is a concern about paying for those 
resources. It is an interesting side note that there are very few complaints about legal 
immigrants receiving care or about illegal immigrants receiving care that they pay for, 
the debate over organs notwithstanding. This concern is addressed by considering a 
person's ability to pay, though it may play a greater role since a greater number of 
people will have claims and may not be able to pay if governments and government 
programs will not reimburse hospitals for no-pay undocumented immigrants. Also, 
program restrictions will impact the potential benefits available to non-citizens. 
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Chapter 4: A Theory of Distributive Justice 
The set of considerations that I have accepted as affecting a patient's claim to a resource 
are: need, potential benefit, urgency, past resource use, queuing, a very limited form of 
desert, responsibility for dependents and a narrow form of ability to pay. But simply 
identifying these elements, combined with rights from Chapter 2, does not really 
generate any action-guidance on the issue. Thus, the work of this chapter is to explain 
how these considerations fit together as a patient's claim and how claims fit with rights 
to provide guidance to those trying to determine the just course of action. After 
working through those issues, I will I apply the resulting theory to two prismatic cases 
to demonstrate how this understanding of justice plays out and how it fits in with a 
larger pluralistic theory for making medical decisions. 
Structure 
The sections on each of the accepted considerations in the previous chapter contain a 
brief discussion about whether the consideration would strengthen or weaken a patient's 
claim to a resource. A bit needs to be said, however, about how this is, i.e., about the 
nature of the considerations. The considerations are facts about a person's condition or 
situation within a certain context that ceteris paribus generate some kind of duty that 
they be given (or denied, depending on the consideration) the resource. There are two 
important elements to this that need to be teased out: the ceteris paribus clause and 
context-dependence. First, the ceteris paribus clause does not mean that all 
considerations have equal weight in all cases; it merely indicates whether the 
consideration is a reason the person should get the resource (or a reason the person 
should not get the resource) in this context. To say that a person who needs a resource 
should, ceteris paribus, get that resource simply means that a person's needing a 
resource is always a reason in favor of giving that resource to the person in the 
appropriate context. Second, the considerations accepted from the previous chapter are 
context dependent, which means that in a certain context (medical scarcity) each 
consideration is a reason that a person should be given a resource, ceteris paribus. As 
such, they are not meant to be the sole arbiters of people's claims to a resource in every 
distributive situation. The role of the BCS for example, is to distribute the NCAA 
college football championship each year. It would be difficult to argue that a school's 
or team's potential to benefit from being a champion should matter or that the fact that a 
team has been a champion in the past should count against its being a champion this 
year. 
In Dancy's terms, this makes the considerations "contributory principles"33clxi" 
to which he objects. A person who accepts contributory principles is a generalist (one 
who believes that "the rationality of moral thought and judgement depends on a suitable 
provision of moral principles"clxiv and generalists who accept contributory principles 
suppose, "qua generalist, that a feature that makes a difference in one case will make 
the same sort of difference in every case, and that there will be a contributory principle 
specifying its regular contribution"clxv. The "regular contribution" is simply the idea 
that the fact that a patient, for example, needs a resource will always count in favor of 
his or her getting the resource. As a particularist (one who believes that there are no 
33
 Dancy's seminal work on the topic is his 2001 book but the Stanford Encyclopedia entry is a more recent 
and clear statement of his objection to contributory principles and so much of what follows will be taken 
from that account. I will pull examples and clarification from the earlier work, where appropriate, however. 
principles but instead morally relevant reasons can count either for or against a course 
of action in different circumstances), Dancy agrees that there are many relevant facts 
about the situation that, taken together, determine what the right (or just) thing to do is. 
However, he objects that particularists "merely want to say that the matter is not regular 
in the way that [generalists] suppose"01™. On this account, the fact that a patient needs 
a resource might count in favor of a patient getting a resource or count against a patient 
getting a resource, depending on the circumstances. 
Dancy offers three arguments against contributory principles. First, he suggests 
possible counterexamples to individual contributory principles, such as fidelity. On the 
generalist account, that one has promised to do T is always a reason in favor of Ting 
but Dancy imagines a situation in which promising to T is a reason against Ting, such 
as if one has promised not to keep his or her next three promises01™1. Since in that case, 
promising to T is a reason against Ting, promising to T is not always a reason to T 
and the generalist position does not hold. But this should be thought through more 
carefully. On Dancy's account, the earlier promise not to keep the next three promises 
makes the subsequent three promisings reasons to not keep the promise. But this does 
not in any way demonstrate that there is no longer any reason at all in favor of keeping 
the subsequent three promises. That one has promised in all four promisings might still 
be a reason in favor of keeping those promises (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1 
Promise not to 
keep next three „ ., • _j 
• 1st promise 2nd promise 3 rd promise 
V V V V 
Initial promise makes Initial promise makes Initial promise makes 
"that you promised" "that you promised" "that you promised" 
reason against reason against reason against 
keeping this promise keeping this promise keeping this promise 
in order to satisfy the in order to satisfy the in order to satisfy the 
first promise. But, first promise. But, first promise. But, 
"that you promised" "that you promised" "that you promised" 
is still reason in favor is still reason in favor is still reason in favor 
of keeping the of keeping the of keeping the 
promise. promise. promise. 
The point about a promise being a contributory principle is that it makes "that you 
promised" always ceteris paribus a reason to do whatever it is that you promised. That 
"that you promised" might also be a reason against is entirely beside the point. 
Of course, the particularist might reply that that is beside the point; the point is 
that the first promise to not keep the next three promises makes the three subsequent 
promises reasons against keeping the promise and so "that one promised" can be a 
reason both for and against Ting- it is not regular in the way the generalist says. But if 
this is the case, then in each of the three subsequent promisings, promising is both a 
reason for Ting and a reason against Ting. That a reason can be in the same instance a 
reason for and a reason against Ting is, to say the least, quite awkward. It is much 
simpler to take the path open to the generalist and claim that, in each promising, that 
one has promised to T is a reason in favor of Ting but that circumstances are such that 
the importance of the first promise outweighs the importance of keeping the three 
subsequent promises (or, conversely, the importance of one or more of the three 
subsequent promises outweighs the importance of keeping the first promise). 
Dancy's second objection is "to ask why we should suppose that a feature that 
counts in favour in one case must count the same way wherever it appears"01™" (italics 
mine) and, as a second question, how can we 
t e Ucixix ? T h e s t a n d a r d 
answer from 
generalists is that it is a standard method in analytic philosophy and is often applied not 
only to moral reasons but also to reasons in general, explanations and so on. This 
follows the scientific method in which theories are developed via generalization of 
principles015™. In this case, the answer to Dancy's first objection above shows the 
resilience to counterexamples. Without assuming a world completely different from the 
one we actually inhabit, I cannot think of a situation in which, for example, "that a 
person has a right to T" is not a reason in favor of allowing the person to VF. Now, that 
might be outweighed, and the overall correct action might be to not-1?, but being 
outweighed does not mean that it is a reason against. Incidentally, the answer that 
Dancy thinks is appropriate but not open to the generalist is that different cases will 
have different features and in some cases the features will indicate that the reason in 
question should favor the action while in other cases be against it because of different 
features of the caseolxxl. I think that Dancy's thought that this answer is not available to 
the generalist rests on a misunderstanding of contributory principles (or, at least, rests 
on an understanding of contributory principles that is different from this project). As is 
discussed above, contributory principles include the ceteris paribus clause; all other 
things being equal, the contributory principles counts in favor of (or against, depending 
on the principle) giving the resource to this person. In the cases where the situation is 
radically different, all other things are not equal. Recall from above that the BCS will 
have a different set of contributory principles than medical distributions because it is a 
completely different distributive situation. What the generalist says is, ceteris paribus 
(i.e., in similar distribution situations) this contributory principle will count in favor of 
this distribution. If the distribution situation is different, all other things are not equal. 
In this way, the answer Dancy gives is open to the generalist. 
Dancy's final objection (related to the second objection) is broadly that the 
generalist account of relevance (that is part of the epistemology of contributory 
principles) assumes that all contributory principles are stand-alone entities and, as such, 
cannot make sense of interactions between different reasons. On Dancy's view, the 
generalist account of relevance "understands a feature as relevant here if and only if, in 
any case where it is the only relevant feature it would decide the issue""1**11 (italics his) 
and he concedes that "if this account of particular relevance were defensible, we would 
indeed have some reason to suppose that what is relevant here would be relevant in 
every other situation"clxxi". Dancy attributes this account to Rossclxxiv but it is not clear 
why he interprets Ross as saying that relevance is determined by what would be the 
case if it was the only relevant feature. If, as above, Ross is understood as saying that a 
feature is relevant if, ceteris paribus, it decides the issue, then relevance is preserved as 
is a connection between individual principles because "all other things being equal" 
recognizes the presence of other things. For example, Dancy points out that "the 
definition is trying to characterize something that a feature can do in concert with others 
by appeal to something that can only be done in concert with others... [this is] no better 
than trying to characterize the contribution made by a football player to his side's 
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victory by talking only about how things would have been had he been the only player 
on the field"olxxv. But by reading the relevance account as all other things being equal, it 
is more like characterizing the contribution made by a single player when the other 
twenty-one players are equally matched and that one player makes all the difference. If 
he is a superstar, the team wins; if he is no better than the towel boy, the team loses. 
And, if the other players are not equally matched, this one player's contribution still 
matters though he may be outplayed. 
In none of Dancy's objections do I see sufficient reason to understand the 
considerations as anything other than contributory principles that, ceteris paribus, 
provide reasons that regularly strengthen (or weaken, depending on the consideration) a 
patient's claim to the resource in question. Therefore, the next step in determining 
which patient has the strongest claim to a resource is to determine which patients have a 
claim to the resource in the first place. Broome argues that because things are being 
distributed to qualified candidates, the distribution amongst the candidates should be a 
just one. And this is quite helpful in explaining this particular theory because it 
explains how patients have claims to the medical resources without having claims to all 
and anything that would make them better; that is, the claim can only be made on things 
that are being distributed such that they should be distributed justly. For example, 
suppose that Fred suffers from kidney failure and is a candidate for transplant. Because 
UNOS and transplant centers are in the business of distributing cadaveric organs, Fred 
has a claim on those organs. He does not, however, have a claim on his coworker 
Beth's kidney no matter how perfectly it may match. This is because Beth's kidney is 
not being distributed. 
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However, applying the idea of claims in this particular theory requires a bit more 
explanation. Consider Broome's original example: "It seems implausible that anyone 
has a right to a research grant from, say, the Ford Foundation. But if the Ford 
Foundation decides to distribute research grants, it should surely deal fairly with the 
applicants"olxxvi. In this case, it is only grant applicants who can have claims on the 
Ford Foundation but who are the equivalent of the applicants for medical care? Surely, 
not every person has a claim (however small) to cadaveric kidneys, so how is the field 
narrowed? In the case of kidney transplantation, it is fairly easy to answer that the 
people on the transplant list are the ones with claims, but this misses the point. The 
problem is to explain why certain people have claims, not necessarily to identify those 
who do. In the case of the Ford Foundation, the applicants have a claim because they 
have applied; the group is thus self-selecting. But medical resource distribution is not 
as clean as this as the relationship between distributing institutions and recipient groups 
is much more complex. 
Even though the kidney transplant list example generally misses the point, 
pushing it one step farther is instructive. The question becomes not who has a claim to 
the cadaveric kidneys but how a patient gets on the transplant list. Those who are on 
the transplant list are, putting it quite simply, those who would benefit from a kidney 
transplant. They have a condition where their kidneys do not work properly and a 
kidney transplant would (presumably) solve that problem. This explanation holds when 
extended to other medical situations as well. If a patient has a virus, he or she does not 
have a claim to antibiotics, since they will surely not help. Thus, what makes a patient 
part of the group that has a claim on a particular resource is that the patient has the 
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potential to benefit from the resource. The reason that medical resources are distributed 
at all is for the sake of benefitting people and so it makes sense that the people who 
have the potential to benefit from those distributed resources constitute the group of 
people who have a claim. Potential benefit, in this tier, is all or nothing since if a 
patient can benefit at all, then he or she has a claim. The amount of the potential benefit 
only plays into the second tier where the strength of these claims is determined34. 
Potential benefit, then, is unique among the other considerations for the double 
role it plays. First, it is the criterion for entry into the group of people who have a claim 
to a medical resource and, second, it is a consideration that affects the strength of that 
claim. This creates a two-tier system where the first tier is entry into the distribution 
group (the group of people who will be considered to receive the resource) and the 
second tier is where the relative strength of patient's claims is determined. There are 
two important points that should be made about this first tier before turning to the 
mechanics of the second tier. First, it should be noted that entry into the first tier is not 
solely determined by whether or not a person has a claim to the medical resource. 
Again, recall from Chapter 2 that rights and claims are separate aspects of a person's 
entitlement. A person may have a right to a medical resource because he or she own the 
resource, has entered into a contract for that resource or has some other legal right to the 
resource. Since rights are not absolute, a person's having a right to the resource does 
not automatically preclude the resource from being available to others but having the 
right certainly gives a patient an entry into the distribution group. 
34
 Note that this statement about claim creation only applies to the type of general medical distribution I 
have been discussing. If, for example, a hospital can only afford to perform three charity care bone 
marrow transplants per month and establishes a committee to determine which of the candidates should 
receive the charity care transplants, then a patient's ability to pay will also be a claim-creating 
consideration because only those patients who cannot pay would be eligible for charity care. 
Second, some might argue that some other consideration should be in the first 
tier, most notably need. However, this is unnecessarily narrow for two reasons. First, 
recall that the understanding of need I adopt is a strict understanding: a person needs X 
in order to *¥ if and only if there are no other alternatives to X that would allow the 
person to *¥ and he or she cannot *F without X. Given this, no one would have any 
claim to any resource that he or she does not strictly need. Most medical resources are 
distributed to people who do not strictly need them. In many cases, even patients in 
kidney failure do not strictly need a kidney transplant because of the availability of 
dialysis. Usually when someone argues for distribution based on need, they construe 
need much more broadly. Secondly, as a practical point in this particular context, it is 
unlikely that there is anyone who will need a medical resource who will not benefit 
from it. While it is theoretically possible that someone can need X for the sake of some 
*F that is not in any way beneficial, it is hard to see this happening in the medical 
context. 
In the second tier, the strength of the entitlements of those in the distribution 
group is determined. However, there is no magic wand to wave to automatically sort 
the competitors for the resource and determine the strongest entitlement and so a there 
must be some mechanism for doing so. One possible strategy is to take QALYs as a 
model and develop a mathematical calculation that takes into account all of the 
considerations to determine a patient's claim as well as any rights a patient may have to 
determine which patient has the strongest overall entitlement. There are some 
advantages to this approach, not least of all the ease of use of such a model; it offers an 
opportunity for plug-and-chug ethics. Additionally, the more automated a system is, the 
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less likely it is to be sabotaged by human error (except of course, for any human error in 
developing the model). Despite these attractions, this is not the best approach. First, it 
would be extremely difficult to create a mathematical model that would be sensitive to 
particular contexts and situations in which the weights of the various considerations and 
rights differ from other contexts. Additionally, and more problematically, any equation 
created would require input from a human operator and any output will only be as good 
as the input that comes from a human operator. Thus, any equation or calculation will 
likely not be particularly context sensitive and will also be only an added layer of 
complication on top of a decision maker's reasoned judgment. 
Instead, I will rely on reasoned (and clinical) judgment to assess the entitlements 
of the members of the distribution group. There are some points to bear in mind, 
however, while assessing people's claims. First, a methodological point about 
competing claims is introduced in the section on conservation. If a resource is divisible 
such that different people can use greater or smaller amounts of it, then several weaker 
claims (or entitlements) combined can override a stronger claim (or entitlement) if all of 
those with weaker claims could use the resource if the person with the stronger claim 
does not get it. Thus, claims (or entitlements) are not always considered singly but can 
be considered as groups if the entire group could use the resource. 
Second, although this is certainly controversial, there is no a priori hierarchy 
among the considerations or among claims and rights. One might argue for a simple 
priority in the sense that rights always trump claims and, within claims, need always 
trumps past resource use, which always trumps ability to pay and so on. Another, more 
appealing, hierarchy option is to make subsets of considerations always trump other 
subsets. Indeed, there are some who emphasize medical criteria in medical decision 
making, including those who think that "medical criteria" such as need, benefit and 
urgency should be the only criteria for decision makingc,xxv". Such a hierarchy might 
have rights as the primary subset, medical considerations (need, potential benefit and 
urgency) as the second tier and all the other considerations as the third tier. However, 
that would render the entitlement determination completely unresponsive to situational 
context. There are certainly cases where the fact that one patient cannot pay for a 
resource will be a more important feature of a case than the patient's need for the 
resource. Also, the whole reason that one patient's right to a resource does not make 
that resource completely unavailable to others (who do not have such rights) is that 
rights are not absolute and can be overridden by claims. 
This does not mean that all rights and considerations are given completely equal 
status. Certainly, a claim would have to be especially strong to overcome another 
person's right to a resource since the nature of a right versus the nature of a claim 
makes the right a relatively strong reason to give the resource to the person with the 
right to it. This is especially true considering many people who have rights to resources 
will also have a claim to the resource in virtue of being able to benefit from it. 
Additionally, the scope of this project is limited to medical contexts and so because the 
medical facts of the situation are central to the context of the situation, they are 
especially important in determining the strength of a patient's claim. However, this has 
more to do with the fact that the context of the situation will always be medical than 
with anything inherent in those particular considerations. Having more a priori 
importance does not equate to an a priori hierarchy. 
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A third issue is the problem of accounting for future claims. In many cases, the 
resource in question will be sufficient to satisfy all current claims to the resource but it 
can be anticipated that others will have claims in the future and that the supply of the 
resource is not sufficient to satisfy those claims as well. Consider the following 
example: 
General Hospital (GH) is a large public urban hospital in a very cold region. It stocks a supply 
of a special drug that reverses the effects of frostbite. Currently, the city that GH is in is 
suffering a severe cold snap and it is anticipated to last for another five or six days. Each day, 
several people are brought in with frostbite ranging from minor to severe enough to require 
amputation without the frostbite drug. GH has enough to cover everyone who has already 
presented with frostbite but if it treats all cases of frostbite with the drug, it will run out before 
the cold snap is over. 
If all of the cold snap's frostbite victims presented at the same time, a straightforward 
determination of their entitlements would settle the issue of who receives the drug. But 
because the patients present over time, some who would have had much stronger claims 
to the frostbite drug might go without while those who would have had much weaker 
claims are treated with the drug. The question is whether and how these potential future 
claims should be weighed. 
One option is to argue that future claims should be given the same weight as 
current claims; after all the suffering of people tomorrow is just as serious as the 
suffering of people today. But this is problematic because it is not certain that there will 
be people with stronger entitlements to the frostbite drug later in the week. The cold 
snap might end, or maybe the most severe cases will have already presented. This 
uncertainty should certainly be accounted for. Another option is to completely 
disregard future claims, since they are not actual, but potential, claims to the resource. 
It is interesting to note that this move to disregard the potential in favor of the actual is 
most often made in the literature on the morality of abortionclxxvm. And this makes 
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some sense, since the suffering of a patient here and now is much more compelling than 
the possible suffering of possible future patients whose claim to the resource is 
uncertain. However, this approach is needlessly strong, especially since there will be 
varying degrees of certainty in different cases and "uncertain" does not mean "will not 
occur". 
A better solution to the problem of future claims is a middle ground that is 
context dependent. The future potential claims of people should be discounted 
according to the likelihood of there being future patients, how many future patients 
there might be, whether the dose the actual patient requires would be sufficient to 
relieve their suffering, how many of them would be helped by the drug, the likelihood 
of the drug supply being replenished and other contextual factors. In the frostbite case, 
GH might choose to only use the frostbite drug on patients who have strong claims 
anyway, such as cases that would cause facial disfigurement or require amputation, 
since it can be fairly certain to see more severe cases over the next several days. Thus, 
like most of the literature supports, the potential future claims should be discounted, but 
not entirely disregarded. 
Finally, during the discussion of queuing, the issue of tiebreakers is mentioned. 
What happens when, after due contemplation, the entitlements are equal among all 
competitors for the resource? In the queuing section, the idea of wait time as a 
tiebreaker was entertained and rejected but there are other possible procedural 
tiebreakers, the most discussed of which to hold a lottery. Now, there are many 
problems with this approach as a stand-alone arbiter of just distribution in and of itself, 
especially in the healthcare setting, and these will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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However, many of these problems for lottery systems as a just distribution system do 
not really hold for lottery systems as a tiebreaker; as such, if the entitlements of 
competitors are roughly equal, it seems to make sense that a lottery system could be 
implemented as a procedural element to break these ties and determine the just 
distribution of a resource. However, this would be a mistake. The reason is that justice 
is but one appeal used to determine the correct course of action and not all appeals have 
to "side" with a particular course of action. That justice is equivocal as to which course 
of action to take, even if the question is primarily one of distribution of a resource, is 
not problematic. It simply means that other appeals that are not equivocal on the issue 
will determine the correct course of action. Now, once all appeals are considered and if 
all of the appeals are, on balance, equivocal, a tiebreaker might be appropriate at that 
level. But a tiebreaker would only be appropriate in a scheme for distributive justice if 
distributive justice were the only thing determining the best course of action. 
The central element in all of this, and the primary justification for leaving the ultimate 
determination of a person's entitlement to a decision maker's reasoned judgment is that 
the facts of the particular situation are crucial in determining the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of patient's claims. Decision makers should first determine who is in the 
distribution group by assessing who has rights to the resource in question or who could 
benefit from it. Then, he or she should evaluate each competitor's entitlement by 
weighing the considerations given the facts of the case to determine the person's claim 
relative to other competitors and also determining each competitor's rights. This, 
combined with the procedural points about competing claims and dealing with future 
claims, should guide decision makers in determining which patient(s) should receive the 
resource. 
Illustrative Cases 
Finally, I will discuss two cases in order to demonstrate how this theory operates and 
also fits with a larger pluralist theory of decision making. In reviewing the cases, I will 
first determine what a just distribution would be and then discuss how the appeal to 
justice would fit in with the other appeals to determine the best course of action. 
Case 1: Mr. O is a 66 year old black male who arrives in the emergency room with 
myocardial infarction. The emergency room physician thinks that if he can keep the 
oxygen flowing to Mr. O's brain during the immediate crisis, he could survive with 
minimal neurological damage and so he hooks Mr. O to the hospital's only heart lung 
machine. Unfortunately, over the next several days, it becomes apparent that the 
damage is worse than initially thought and that Mr. O will not regain consciousness. 
The physicians meet with Mr. O 's family who understand the situation and say that Mr. 
O would not want to be kept alive and they agree that there should be no escalation in 
treatment and that Mr. O should not be resuscitated if he should go into cardiac or 
respiratory arrest. They further agree that the best thing to do is to withdraw the heart-
lung machine allow Mr. O to die. 
However, the family has consulted a shaman, who has determined that the 
optimal time for Mr. O 's spirit to leave his body and enter the spirit plane would be 
eight days hence. They will not agree to withdraw the treatment before then, though 
they have no objection to the DNR order. In the meantime, Mr. O is monopolizing the 
heart lung machine. Several surgeries have already been postponed and, if Mr. O 
remains on the heart-lung machine, five more cardiac bypass surgeries will have to be 
postponed. Also, Mr. O is going through copious amounts of blood products, which are 
always in short supply. The question is whether the heart-lung machine should be 
withdrawn from Mr. O before the eight days are up. 
The first step in evaluating justice is determining whether or not Mr. O is a member of 
the distribution group. Mr. O does not have any apparent rights to the heart-lung 
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machine or to the blood products since he does not own the heart-lung machine or the 
blood products, nor does he have any contractual rights. Regarding claims, the question 
is whether or not Mr. O has the potential to benefit from the heart-lung machine and 
blood products. It seems clear that he does; even if continued biological life is not a 
benefit for Mr. O, surviving until the optimal time for his spirit to enter the spirit plane 
certainly would be. Thus, Mr. O is a member of the distribution group. The question 
then becomes who else is a member of the distribution group. The clear candidates are 
the five surgical patients whose surgeries have to be postponed and anyone whose claim 
for blood products will not be satisfied because of the large amount of blood that Mr. O 
is using. Regarding the blood products, Mr. O will not completely deplete the supply. 
Some patients may get O- blood instead of their exact type if they are the same type as 
Mr. O. Also, physicians will likely hold off on giving blood products to patients who 
are borderline in whether or not they would benefit from them. Thus, it is not clear that 
there is any patients who have a claim to the blood products whose claim will not be 
satisfied. The surgical candidates are another matter. They may not have a right to 
their surgeries, but they certainly have a claim. After all, they would not have 
scheduled surgeries if the surgeries do not have the potential to benefit them. Thus, the 
distribution group includes Mr. O and the five surgical patients and each of them have 
claims but not rights to the heart-lung machine. 
In evaluating the six patients' claims, each patient's need, potential benefit, 
urgency, responsibility for dependents, past resource use, queuing, desert and ability to 
pay. Suppose that all of the patients either have insurance or Medicare and so can pay 
for their treatments and that all have average medical histories and so past resource use 
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roughly evens out for them all. One of the surgical patients has a son in his sophomore 
year of college that he supports financially but there are no other responsibilities for 
dependents. None of the surgical patients have been waiting an especially long time for 
the surgery but all of their surgeries were scheduled before Mr. O was admitted to the 
hospital. There are no issues of compensatory desert (since none of the patients is 
having surgery to correct a prior error), though Mr. O and two of the surgical patients 
have been regular blood donors. 
Mr. O clearly needs the heart-lung machine in order to preserve his life. The 
need for the surgical patients is less clear. Some of their conditions might be managed 
by medical means and diet and exercise, though this probably is not true for all of them. 
Suppose that two of them actually need the surgery and for the other three, other 
surgical techniques that do not require the heart lung machine or medical management 
would suffice. But what do the surgical patients need the surgery for? Certainly 
prevention of heart attacks, which can be life-saving but possibly might also be an issue 
for quality of life and morbidity, since some people who survive heart attacks have 
significantly reduced quality of life, especially if there is some anoxic brain injury or 
some other such complication. 
This is what the surgery is needed for, but it also gets into the idea of what the 
potential for benefit is. The surgical patients then, anticipate significant benefit from 
the surgeries. Of course, there are also risks; there can be unexpected complications in 
surgery or after, or the surgery simply may not work. However, cardiac bypass surgery 
is fairly commonplace and the benefits are well-documented. In Mr. O's case, one 
potential benefit is that he will live for another eight days. This benefit is fairly likely to 
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accrue but the quantity of the benefit is questionable since Mr. O will not regain 
consciousness and his family maintains that he would not want to be kept alive this 
way. The more important benefit for Mr. O is that living the extra eight days allows his 
spirit to enter the spirit plane at the most opportune time. This is a significant benefit 
but it clearly is not imperative, since Mr. O's family does not insist that everything (or, 
indeed, anything additional) should be done to keep him alive until this time. 
Regarding urgency, Mr. O's case is more urgent than any of the surgical patients 
since his need is immediate; he will die without the machine. The surgical patients will 
still accrue the benefits of the surgery if their surgeries take place several days later than 
planned. However, it is the case that patients who need bypass surgeries are in some 
ways a ticking bomb. Of course, if their physicians believed them to be in imminent 
danger, the patients would be in for emergency surgery, not for planned surgery. Thus, 
postponing the surgeries for a week or ten days carries some small but real risk that the 
benefit of the surgery will not accrue. 
Past resource use, desert and ability to pay are all pretty even and so do not 
support a particular course of action. Since one of the surgical patients has a son who is 
financially dependent on him, responsibility for dependents favors withdrawing 
treatment from Mr. O in favor of the surgical patients but the dependence is not severe 
and there is only one dependent in question so this consideration will not be especially 
important. Queuing would weakly favor the surgical patients but since no one has been 
waiting very long and will not have to wait appreciably longer either way, queuing is 
not a particularly important consideration here. Need likewise supports the surgical 
patients since two surgical patients need the resource, but urgency strongly favors 
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keeping Mr. O on the heart-lung machine because he will die immediately without it 
while the surgical patients can wait. Benefit would also strongly favor the surgical 
patients, because the benefit they have the potential to accrue is much greater than the 
benefit Mr. O has the potential to accrue. And, bearing in mind that the combined 
claims of the surgical patients weigh against Mr. O's claim, it seems that the just course 
of action is to withdraw the treatment from Mr. O so that the heart-lung machine will be 
available for the other five surgeries. But though the surgical patients' claim is stronger 
than Mr. O's it is not a great deal stronger given the strength of the urgency 
consideration and the immediacy of the benefit he accrues. 
But just because withdrawing treatment from Mr. O is the just course of action 
does not mean that it is the best course of action, all things considered. There are 
appeals other than justice that may have more importance. For example, the 
consequences of withdrawing treatment from Mr. O could be serious. In Texas, there is 
a process set out in the Texas Advance Directives Act that physicians must go through 
to withdraw treatment from the patient against the wishes of the patient or the patient's 
legal surrogate in order to be protected from liability for the patient's death. 
Withdrawing treatment against a patient or surrogate's wishes without going through 
the process is not illegal; however, physicians who do so are not protected from 
liability. The process takes, at a minimum, 12 days. So physicians (or a hospital's risk 
managers) may be reluctant to withdraw treatment from Mr. O because of a concern 
about litigation, even if the actual risk of this happening is small. Also, the 
consequences of withdrawing treatment from Mr. O are much more severe (he loses his 
life, such as it is, and his spirit does not enter the spirit plane at an optimal time, which 
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causes his family much grief) than the consequences of a couple of days of surgery for 
the other patients. More importantly, compassion for the family's and Mr. O's situation 
would support following the family's wishes and waiting the eight days. Because of 
these appeals, one could argue that even if the just course of action is to withdraw 
treatment from Mr. O immediately, the overall best course of action is to wait the eight 
days before doing so. 
Of course, this is a judgment call about which reasonable people can (and did) 
disagree. It is also the case that if any of the surgical patients had needed surgery 
emergently (and could not have been transferred to another hospital for treatment) or 
were more immediately facing dire clinical outcomes without the surgery, then the 
surgical patients' claim would be much stronger relative to Mr. O's and the appeal to 
justice would be much more compelling in the overall picture. Additionally, had Mr. O 
or any of the surgical patients had a right to the heart-lung machine, through ownership 
or through some sort of contract, then it would require a very strong claim to overcome 
this right. Thus, even small differences in the facts of the case can dramatically change 
the final judgment about the best course of action. 
Case 2: In 1962, the arteriovenous shunt, which allowed kidney dialysis to be a chronic 
treatment for kidney failure, had only recently been developed and there was only one 
outpatient clinic in the country. The Seattle Artificial Kidney Center did not have 
enough treatment slots available for everyone, or even most of the people, who needed 
this life-saving treatment. To decide who would receive the treatment, the Center 
formed the Admissions and Policy Committee that was comprised of community 
members (including a minister, lawyer, businessman, homemaker and a labor leader) 
and two physicianscba'x. Those that the committee chose to receive the dialysis would 
likely live while those that were not chosen would die, likely within a couple of weeks. 
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Suppose that it is 1962 and there is only one treatment slot currently available. The 
members of the committee have to decide between the following two people35: 
Mrs. A: Mrs. A is 32 year old widow with two young school age children. She works as 
a secretary to support her family and her sister watches the children while she is at 
work Her family lives in the area but her parents are frail and her sister has to care 
for her ailing in-laws. She does not have health insurance and cannot pay for her 
treatment, should she receive it. She had been reasonably healthy until she caught a 
severe case of the flu that caused severe dehydration and, ultimately, kidney failure. 
Mr. B: Mr. B is a 40 year old married man with three teenaged children and a large 
extended family that is very close. His wife stays home with the children and he 
assembles widgets at a factory. He has health insurance through his job that would pay 
for the treatment. He has also been reasonably healthy until he suffered from acute 
appendicitis that required an appendectomy. The surgeon botched the procedure, 
which, among other complications, led to sepsis and, ultimately, kidney failure. 
Neither Mrs. A nor Mr. B has any rights to the dialysis treatments. Both need the 
dialysis, without which they will die and in both cases, the need is equally urgent. 
Regarding the potential for benefit, they are both likely to live the same amount of time 
with the dialysis and neither has any comorbid conditions that would make them less 
likely to benefit from the dialysis. However, Mr. B has a large support network to help 
him get to treatments and to allow him to rest after the treatments. Mrs. A has no such 
support network. As such, Mr. B is slightly more likely to benefit from the treatment 
since he will be able to better focus on his own health. Additionally, they have both 
been waiting about the same amount of time. Mr. B's claim, however, is significantly 
strengthened by the compensatory desert consideration. Mr. B would not need dialysis 
had his appendectomy not been botched in the first place. 
Both Mrs. A and Mr. B have financial responsibility for their children. Mr. B 
has more children than Mrs. A, but his children are older and more able to fend for 
themselves. In addition, Mr. B's large and close family would certainly step in and care 
35
 The information about the Admissions and Policy Committee is factual. The patient profiles are entirely 
fictional. 
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for his children, just as they will for him. And, while no one can replace a lost parent, 
Mr. B's family can fill some of the emotional needs of his children after his death while 
Mrs. A's children are emotionally dependent on her. Her family, while they would 
certainly do what they could for the children, does not have the financial or emotional 
resources to provide for them adequately. And so even though Mr. B has more children 
and he is the breadwinner for his family, he has family who will step in and take care of 
his children both financially and emotionally. Mrs. A has a greater responsibility for 
her dependents since their financial and emotional well-being rests almost exclusively 
with her. 
However, Mr. B can pay for his treatment, while Mrs. A cannot. Mrs. A's 
inability to pay for the treatment does not directly cause dialysis to be unavailable to 
anyone else, but providing dialysis free of charge does have an impact on the Center's 
coffers and the Center needs money to be able to increase the number of treatment slots 
available. So, while there is not a one-to-one correlation between Mrs. A's free 
treatment and some other patient not receiving treatment, her not paying does contribute 
to others not receiving treatment. Her not paying does not prevent forever an additional 
treatment slot being opened, however, at most it delays it a bit. Therefore, her inability 
to pay will only weaken her claim proportionally with the delay in opening an 
additional slot that her inability to pay contributes to. Thus, though this weakens her 
claim, it is not weakened much. 
This is a difficult judgment to make since the claims are quite even and no rights 
are involved. Mr. B's claim is strengthened somewhat by his ability to pay for the 
dialysis and his marginally better potential for benefit. However, it is especially 
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strengthened by considering compensatory desert. Mrs. A's claim is slightly weakened 
by her inability to pay but she has a significant responsibility for her dependent 
children. In this case, I would argue that Mr. B should receive the dialysis since the 
compensatory desert consideration is something that is owed directly to the patient as a 
result of the initial botched surgery and the primary relationship in medicine is with the 
patient. Additionally, Mrs. A's children will be cared for even though they will indeed 
suffer a significant setback in their interests with the death of their mother; the children 
are not being condemned to death by the death of their mother. And, in this case, this is 
important because the other appeals all tend to be a wash and not strongly support one 
competitor over another. The consequences on both sides are serious and irreversible, 
the virtues all apply equally to both patients, and so on. In this case, justice is the 
deciding appeal. 
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